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ABSTRACT 
A Framework Relating Producibility Problems to the use of 
Manufacturing Information in Design 
by Michael John Gregory 
This thesis presents the development of a framework for relating the reasons for 
problems of producibility that occur in manufacturing to the sources of information 
available to designers. Advice and guidance on Design for Manufacture was obtained 
from textbooks, journal articles and conference papers that sought to improve the 
process or report on design-related difficulties in manufacturing. Industrial experience 
was gained from a two-year project in defence aerospace, researching concurrent 
engineering in the extended enterprise. Examples of good practice across a range of 
industries were gained from interviews with practitioners, with advice both from 
customers engaged in design and from manufacturing suppliers. Further industrial 
experience was provided by two studies of civil aerospace, covering in-house and 
outsourced manufacture. Potential problems were classified and then related to the 
sources of knowledge available to prevent these problems reaching the shop floor. 
The detailed analysis of findings is presented and provides a structured approach that 
could assist in planning concurrent engineering processes, especially communications 
and teamworking. This would enable potential producibility problems to be addressed 
in a comprehensive manner so as to minimise the costs, effort and delay associated with 
them. It would also encourage opportunities for improvement to be promoted at the 
earliest stage in product development, where they are the most effective. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
video n: eliora proboque, deteriora sequor. 
"The better course I see and do approve, the worse I follow. " (Ovid c. 20 BC) 
1.1 Overview 
A wide range of design models and methods, training courses, standards, procedures, 
specifications, reports, textbooks, computer-aided design (CAD) systems, design for 
manufacture (DFM) databases and tools is available to designers, and concurrent 
engineering (CE) practices have been widely publicised and adopted by industry, with 
emphasis on teamworking and collaboration. Many improvements have been made 
compared with the earlier practices, whereby each party in the chain worked 
sequentially and in isolation, throwing the drawings `over the wall' from Design to 
Procurement to Production Planning to Manufacture to Inspection to Assembly. It is 
now widely accepted that Design should encourage the early involvement of other 
disciplines so that changes can be made to avoid later difficulties and also enable 
positive suggestions to be embodied before the design is complete and changes become 
costly or impracticable. However, empirical evidence suggests that manufacturing 
`problems' still exist. 
This thesis describes the research undertaken to find out why problems should occur in 
the manufacture of individual piece parts for the aerospace industry. The aerospace 
industry has an annual turnover of £18 billion, 151,000 employees, and a positive 
contribution to the UK's trade balance of £3.8 billion (Society of British Aerospace 
Companies' year 2000 data). Problems may either follow from the design not being best 
matched to the processes and materials used, or because the manufacturing instructions 
do not adequately convey the design to those on the shopfloor responsible for 
interpreting them and making the parts. The results of this research are presented in the 
form of a framework that identifies the types of reasons for such problems, the sources 
of information and influence available to designers to prevent them, and the factors that 
contribute to the reasons and relate them to the sources. 
. 
Development of the PhD research question began with the author's involvement as a 
researcher on the AEROEXTN project. This was a two-year longitudinal study of CE 
across the supply chain in the aerospace defence industry. The project involved setting 
up and running the SESAME live pilot project for the design and manufacture of 
missile parts. The AEROEXTN project began with a study of 12 prime-supplier pairs 
across a range of industries. This study was undertaken using on-site interviews to learn 
about current best practice in CE. At the same time an initial study was made of the 
relevant published literature. Workshop sessions with the industrial collaborators were 
held to distil practical issues from these studies, and the subject of producibility (or 
manufacturability, involving matching product to process) was accorded the highest 
priority. An integrated project team comprising the customer, manufacturing supplier 
and university researchers was formed to identify and resolve issues of producibility 
during the SESAME pilot. The author was responsible for developing a Producibility 
Interaction model that was used as the basis for structuring the team discussions. This 
CE dialogue involved 13 DFM issues and analysing their characteristics. 
On completion of the AEROEXTN project, so as to obtain a broader base of case study 
material for the PhD research, the author used the PI model as a tool to investigate 
problems in the manufacture of other parts in the civil aerospace industry. The author 
conducted on-site studies with two major UK aerospace companies to cover both 
internally sourced aluminium parts and outsourced titanium and composite parts. He 
interviewed separately representatives of Design, Manufacturing, Quality and 
Purchasing to compile reports that were then reviewed collectively. A total of 25 further 
DFM issues were documented and analysed. 
The AEROEXTN and the civil aerospace studies led the author to appreciate what was 
involved in setting up and running a CE project, including the priorities, tasks, issues 
and enablers, barriers, and benefits. While managers understood the principles and 
benefits of CE, the implementation issues seemed not to be readily apparent to them. 
Hence a whole range of producibility problems could arise, despite the availability of 
CE and DFM techniques that should ensure designers have access to information to 
prevent them. The focus of the PhD research was then directed towards examining why 
such information was not used to greater effect. 
The author believes that the prime responsibility for producibility lies with design. Lack 
of optimisation may result in a design that is difficult or impossible to make with the 
specified process, or a part that could have been made better (e. g. more easily, quickly, 
with less scrap/rework, with cheaper tooling). Where problems occur because the design 
was not optimised for manufacture, it would be important to trace the sources of 
information available to influence the producibility of the design, and the designer's use 
of them. Whereas the number of potential producibility problems may be infinite, they 
may be classified as occurring for a finite number of types of reasons. Particular 
manufacturing problems from the industrial studies were used as units of analysis to 
explore the reasons, and were combined with a continuing research of literature to 
formulate a list of 35 types of reasons for such problems. These reasons were then 
grouped into five categories, based on subjects that could be recognised as representing 
the range of possible causes. 
Similarly, while a vast quantity of information exists in the world, the number of 
sources available to influence the design of parts (including their producibility) is finite. 
Such sources were identified and formulated into five categories. Although these 
particular categories were not the only possible ones, they were selected with the 
intention of helping both the author and the user of the research to focus on both 
obvious and more obscure matters that were relevant. A two-dimensional matrix was 
constructed to show how the types of reasons could be related to these sources. This 
framework was populated with extensive citations from the literature to illustrate the 
factors that defined these relationships, and further examples were added from the 
industrial case studies. 
`Communication and teamworking' was, at 47%, the category of sources of information 
for preventing producibility problems reaching the shopfloor that related to the greatest 
number of factors. However, any of the 91 factors in the framework, alone or in 
combination, could provide the key to avoiding particular problems. No attempt has 
been made in this research to prioritise the factors. 
Recognition of these factors is an important step towards avoiding the problems, but no 
benefit will follow from falling into the trap Ovid reported (quoted under the chapter 
title above). It is important that all those involved in the design to manufacture chain 
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should not only see the better course of action and approve of it, but that they should 
follow it. The factors identified in the framework suggest that soft issues such as 
leadership and motivation are just as necessary as the hard technical issues in achieving 
this. 
1.2 Industrial Input to the Research 
The AEROEXTN project was a 2-year contract funded jointly by industry and the UK 
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, under their Innovative 
Manufacturing Initiative. The consortium partners had initiated the thinking that led to 
the project proposal to extend the benefits of concurrent engineering beyond their 
internal processes. They wished to embrace the expertise of the suppliers on whom they 
were increasingly relying for the production of parts. The objective was to develop 
processes by which competence in Concurrent Engineering could be applied to the 
Extended Enterprise with advantage to quality, time and competitiveness. 
The AEROEXTN consortium consisted of: two major UK defence companies, MATRA 
BAe Dynamics and British Aerospace (BAe) Military Aircraft and Aerostructures; one 
small/medium enterprise (SME) aerospace supplier, Bellhouse Hartwell Ltd, 
Westhoughton; and two academic bodies, Cranfield University and the University of 
Luton. 
BAe Chadderton and MATRA BAe Dynamics (Stevenage and Lostock) were the 
AEROEXTN industrial collaborators to pilot CE practices in a project called 
`SESAME'. BAe Chadderton acted as an independent supplier of machined parts for 
guided missiles to MATRA BAe Dynamics, the prime contractor and customer. The 
prime contractor undertook design and systems integration at Stevenage, with assembly 
and test at Lostock. The supplier manufactured specific complex machined parts to the 
detailed CAD design of the prime. Bellhouse Hartwell were involved in discussions on 
the application of CE to SMEs, but took no direct part in the design or manufacture of 
SESAME parts. 
SESAME demonstrated that it was possible to involve the supplier in the CE loop (SIL- 
CE) and benefit both customer and supplier - the `win-win' solution. However, this 
needed the correct investment, planning and management to be successful. 
The AEROEXTN project recognised the importance of producibility to the industrial 
collaborators. The 13 issues raised during the SESAME pilot showed that even an 
experienced senior designer could improve the producibility of his design when 
prompted by the supplier's producibility engineers. However, the spirit of mutual co- 
operation that had been carefully set up to foster teamworking and encourage the 
discussion of possible changes during this pilot project meant that most of the `sot' 
issues that literature suggested might be barriers to limit producibility interaction were 
pre-empted. The result was to focus largely on `hard' technical matters. 
Further industrial case studies in a different environment might be expected to show a 
higher proportion of the soft issues. This was found to be so when, after completion of 
AEROEXTN, the author conducted two one-week on-site investigations at two major 
UK aerospace companies to examine producibility-related manufacturing problems in 
the civil aerospace sector. The first study showed that producibility problems had not 
disappeared when batches of a previously outsourced part, supposedly mature, were 
brought back to be manufactured in-house. Despite discussions with Design during the 
planning of manufacturing transfer, a number of problems were discovered on the 
shopfloor. The second study covered outsourced parts and the producibility problems 
that had been addressed between customer and supplier. A further 25 producibility 
issues were captured during these civil aerospace studies, bringing the total to 38. 
The civil aerospace studies showed that similar problems had arisen in the areas covered 
by the SESAME pilot. However, a number of issues were related to human error and 
culture/social reasons that had been `managed out' by the structured approach in 
SESAME. Particularly noticeable was the reluctance of designers to initiate changes 
that could compromise performance (e. g. departing from their ideal shape, or adding 
weight) where the production engineers had to argue the case for a compromise to ease 
manufacture. This often meant that such changes were not considered until detail design 
was complete, and only compelling cases could be accepted. 
A comparison between in-house manufacture and outsourced supply showed that there 
was no clear-cut net advantage in producibility from having parts made in the 
company's own workshops. Although there were no contractual or intellectual property 
rights barriers to internal communication, and there was full compatibility of data 
transfer, there was still the problem of Manufacturing being a different department from 
Design. In some respects, the in-house function had less dialogue because they did not 
negotiate manufacturing contracts in the same way as an outside supplier. Conversely, 
the outside supplier would be given an incentive to share in the saving of costs from any 
changes they suggested to ease manufacture, and they may well be able to draw on their 
wider experience from supplying similar parts to other customers. 
The success of CE in improving producibility appeared to depend on the way the 
processes were led and managed rather than whether or not they involved the Extended 
Enterprise of an outsourced design to manufacture chain. What was significant was 
whether designers used the sources of information on producibility that were available, 
and what reasons might prevent them from receiving or using such information 
effectively. 
1.3 State of the Art 
The literature was examined to supplement the interviews conducted with practitioners 
to determine the current state of the art of concurrent engineering principles, and DFM 
in particular. Examples were sought of: 
" Successful applications; 
" Tools to assist DFM; 
"' How designers obtained their knowledge of manufacturing; 
" How production and manufacturing engineers communicated with designers; 
" Problems occurring in manufacturing. 
It was apparent that many tools existed to assist the CE process, but they were not 
always applied. There was no indication in the literature that information on 
producibility was in any way lacking, apart from concern that industry practice 
concentrated on filing reports of successful projects without recording failures. In some 
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instances designers may need to request tests or trials to prove a particular process and 
material combination. However, it should normally be possible to initiate this at an early 
stage so that the results are available by the time they are needed to complete the design. 
Published studies suggested that designers made only limited use of the sources of 
information available, often relying on their own experience and limiting consultation 
with others to their immediate colleagues. Management methods were available to 
promote the best practice in CE, e. g. to provide appropriate incentives for 
communication and teamworking. However, reports of dramatic improvements 
following their application suggested that the implementation of such methods is not 
currently widespread in industry. Managers might be motivated to act if they could fully 
appreciate the reasons why the available sources of information on producibility are not 
always used to prevent manufacturing problems reaching the shopfloor. 
These considerations led to the formulation of the research question: 
"Why do manufacturing problems reach the shopfloor when sources of 
information are available to prevent them? " 
1.4 Research Objectives 
The research objectives are to: 
" determine producibility issues; 
" identify sources of information and influence; 
" devise a framework for application to practical engineering environments; 
" partially validate this framework, according to recommended case study 
research methodology. 
The domain for this research is the design for manufacture of individual mechanical 
piece parts for the aerospace industry. This industry was chosen because of its 
importance to the national economy, the close ties it has with Cranfield University, and 
the author's previous involvement with this environment. Mechanical parts were 
chosen to avoid security problems - particularly in Defence applications - that could 
limit access to information or prevent its open publication. Piece parts, rather than 
assemblies, were selected to help focus the work on a field that was not too broad for 
the effort available. 
1.5 Research Methodology 
Various accepted qualitative methods were considered for this research. There is a vast 
amount of data in industry and in the published literature covering this broad area of 
concern. A `Grounded Theory' approach was therefore adopted as the most appropriate 
method of developing a model to present and analyse the data that would best answer 
the research questions. 
In qualitative research, the rigour and validity of the research is established in the design 
and execution of the research. The industrial validation demonstrates the relevance of 
the research results to practical applications. Because the research effort was directed at 
building the framework and validating it according to the methods used and the case 
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studies, further work to apply the final framework to industry was left to future 
research. For this reason, the completed validation is described as `partial'. 
The grounded theory method was applied in the form of 14 action steps that: collected 
and discussed preliminary data; formulated the research question; developed concept 
categories for collecting further data; formed a framework for analysis; collected further 
data; analysed and presented the results. 
1.6 Contribution to Knowledge 
The particular achievements are: 
" Identification of a comprehensive list of producibility problems in the research 
domain; 
" Identification of the types of reasons for problems or missed opportunities in 
Design for Manufacture that may allow manufacturing problems to reach the 
shop floor; 
" Identification of the sources of information or influence that could enable 
designers to prevent them; 
" The development of a framework for application to practical engineering 
environments that shows the factors that relate the reasons for producibility 
problems to the sources of information that could have prevented them. 
This approach is different from the published literature on Design for Manufacture and 
concurrent engineering. Published literature gives both general and specific guidance in 
a prescriptive manner. The literature includes examples of poor design for 
manufacturing and warnings of the obstacles to the implementation of concurrent 
engineering. There is no easy way to use the information to diagnose producibility 
problems in industry. 
The framework assimilates a comprehensive range of principles, guidelines and case 
studies from literature, together with industrial producibility case examples into a 
practical tool that managers can use to specify particular actions to address their specific 
set of producibility problems. 
1.7 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is organised as follows: 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
1.2 Industrial Input to the Research 
1.3 State of the Art 
1.4 Research Objectives 
1.5 
, 
Contribution to Knowledge 
1.6 Research Methodology 
1.7 Thesis Structure 
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Chapter 2 Research Methodology 
The chapter describes the design of the research process and the reasons for the 
selection of the `grounded theory' approach and associated methodology. The structure 
of the research is set out as 14 action steps. The implementation of each of the 14 steps 
is summarised. 
Chapter 3 Industrial Rationale for the Research 
This chapter describes how the producibility problem has evolved, through the work of 
the AEROEXTN project team on developing a template for CE in the extended 
enterprise and the author's subsequent studies of producibility interactions in civil 
aerospace. 
The `best practice' study undertaken at the start of the AEROEXTN project is reported, 
covering interviews with pairs of customers and manufacturing suppliers in a number of 
industries in addition to aerospace. The issues and enablers that resulted from 
workshops with the industrial collaborators were used to develop a template for the 
application of concurrent engineering in the extended enterprise. Live case studies were 
conducted for the AEROEXTN project and the civil aerospace studies, to gather data on 
concurrent engineering and design for manufacture. A list of practical producibility 
problems is presented. 
Reflection on the shortcomings of the application of concurrent engineering and DFM 
principles led to the refinement of the research question. 
Chapter 4 Literature Review 
This chapter defines `Producibility' and provides an overview of published literature on 
design, design models and methods, design for manufacture and concurrent engineering. 
Designers' requirements for different levels of manufacturing information at various 
stages of the design process are set out. Sources of information that may provide or 
influence manufacturing information are outlined. These cover: training and experience; 
standards, reports, procedures and textbooks; CAD Systems, DFM tools and software; 
communications and teamworking. 
Current approaches to Concurrent Engineering (CE) are addressed, and shortcomings of 
current methods are outlined. Material on human, social, communication and 
management subjects is included to provide guidance when considering the types of 
reasons for problems occurring in manufacturing. 
The research gap addressed by this thesis is identified. 
Chapter 5 Framework development 
This chapter describes how producibility cases captured during the industrial research 
were combined with the literature study. The framework was developed to model the 
relationships between the reasons for manufacturing problems and the sources of 
information and influence. 
Data from the early literature study and the case study research was used to help 
formulate concept categories and ideas for the types of reasons for problems in 
manufacturing and for the sources of producibility information. These categories were 
used to sensitise the author for the collection of further material from the literature, by 
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showing the relevance of data from published case studies. A two-dimensional matrix 
was used to test relationships between the categories, using examples of producibility 
problems as factors. Several iterations were undertaken before the final framework 
format was frozen. 
Examples are given of how the framework was populated to show the relationships. 
Chapter 6 The Relationship Framework 
This chapter presents the principal results of this research in the form of the final 
framework, consisting of a set of tables accompanied by notes, examples and 
references. These form an analysis of the relationship between the types of reasons for 
problems that occur in manufacturing and the sources of information and influence on 
design that may prevent them or help to optimise the process. 
Chapter 7 Validation Illustrations 
This chapter shows how the issues from the industrial case studies could be mapped to 
the relationship tables, and presents the industrial validity of the relationship 
framework. 
Chapter 8 Discussion 
This chapter discusses the significance of the work in the light of the state-of-the-art 
published material and industrial practice, and explains how the framework could be 
applied in an industrial situation to improve the design for manufacture process. 
Chapter 9 Conclusion 
This chapter describes the extent to which the Research Objectives have been met, sets 
out the justification for claiming an additional contribution to knowledge, and suggests 
ideas for future research. 
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Chapter 2 Methodology 
This chapter describes how the methodology for this PhD research was derived and 
planned. Possible models of the research process are presented. The reasons for the 
selection of the grounded theory strategy and associated methodology are given. 
The planned 14 action steps are presented, together with a detailed account of how each 
step was realised. 
A clear distinction is drawn between the contribution made by the author towards the 
AEROEXTN project and the work done by him as an individual for this PhD research. 
2.1 Models of the research process 
Robson describes alternative models of the research process as follows: 
" Positivistic, also known as natural-science based, hypothetico-deductive, 
quantitative or even simply `scientific'. This calls for all data to be collected 
before starting to analyse it. 
" Interpretive, also known as ethnographic or qualitative - among other labels. 
This has data collection and analysis intertwined. 
The positivistic model involves five sequential stages: 
1. Deducing a hypothesis from theory. 
2. Expressing the hypothesis in operational terms that propose a relationship 
between two specific variables. 
3. Testing the operational hypothesis by experiment or some other form of 
empirical inquiry. 
4. Examining the outcome (to confirm or indicate the need for modifying the 
theory). 
5. If necessary, modifying the theory in the light of the findings and repeating the 
cycle so as to verify the revised theory. 
The interpretive model develops theories and concepts as the result of inquiry. They 
come after data collection rather than before it, hence this approach may be referred to 
as `hypothesis generating' (rather than the `hypothesis testing' of positivism). In the 
interpretive approach, data collection and analysis are not rigidly separated, but theories 
are formulated early and elaborated and checked as the process continues (Robson 
1993) pp 18-19. 
Glaser and Strauss describe `Grounded Theory', a form of interpretive research 
commonly used within case studies. Theory is developed from the initial data gathered, 
and is then used to guide further data sampling (Glaser and Strauss 1967) p2 onwards. 
Easterby-Smith et al view positivists as seeing the world as external with properties that 
should be measured objectively, independent of the observer's value and perception, 
while the interpretivists believe that reality is socially constructed and observation can 
never be free of the observer's values and experience. Table 2.1 summarises the key 
differences between the approaches (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe et al. 1991) p 27. 
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Table 2.1 Differences between positivistic and interpretive research methodologies 
Positivistic Interpretive 
Basic World is external and objective The world is socially constructed and 
beliefs Observer is independent subjective 
Science is value-free 
Observer is part of what is observed 
Science is driven by human interests 
Research Focus on facts Focus on meanings 
should: Look for causality and Try to understand what is happening 
fundamental laws Look at the totality of each situation 
Reduce phenomena to simplest Develop ideas through induction 
elements from data 
Formulate hypotheses, then 
test them 
Preferred Operationalising concepts so Using multiple methods to establish 
methods that they can be measured different views of phenomena 
include: Taking large samples Small samples investigated in-depth 
or over time 
2.2 Methodology selection 
The author was seeking a method to identify problems in manufacturing, and a means of 
relating them to the sources of information and influence that may prevent them 
reaching the shopfloor. It appeared that such problems and sources were not merely 
technical, but depended on human factors that were likely to be qualitative rather than 
quantitative. Because no established theories were evident, this research would need to 
build rather than test theory, for which purpose Gill and Johnson regard the interpretive 
route as being appropriate (Gill and Johnson 1991). It would be necessary to develop a 
framework and construct relationships, for which Adler regards the optimal research 
strategy as being inductive and qualitative rather than deductive and formal (Adler 
1989) p 93. 
One form of interpretive approach is the case study, which Robson describes as "a 
strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular 
contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of 
evidence" (Robson 1993) p 5. Robert Yin regards a `case' or `site' as something to be 
studied in its own right, not as a sample from a population (Yin. 1989). Denzin suggests 
that multiple and different sources (e. g. informants), methods, investigators or theories 
could be used to achieve `triangulation' - as in surveying, where it is a means of finding 
out where something is by getting a`fix' on it from two or more places (Denzin 1988). 
The use of such multiple methods has the important benefit of reducing inappropriate 
certainty, where a single line of investigation produces a clear-cut result that may lead 
investigators to believe they have found the `right' or complete answer (Robson 1993) p 
290. 
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The initial study of the literature had shown that a wide range of issues would be 
involved, and that many of these would be likely to have more than one possible cause 
or explanation. In order to identify these, a degree of probing was likely to be required 
to elicit details - especially where practitioners may be embarrassed that they had failed 
to anticipate problems. Considerable clarification may be needed where the different 
parties involved (e. g. Design and Manufacturing) do not agree as to exactly what 
happened or why. In such a situation, Daft and Lengel regard a rich communication 
channel such as the face-to-face interview as the appropriate mechanism to be effective 
(Daft and Lengel 1986). 
In the absence of a theoretical framework for the analysis of the qualitative data 
gathered, Robson suggests an intermediate stage to assist in identifying themes that can 
form the basis for a workable descriptive framework (Robson 1993) p 378. In the real 
world of a complex case study, Yin recommends postulating simple patterns, such that a 
match is more likely to be seen at a gross level by `eyeballing' the data. Iterative pattern 
matching can then be used to build up an explanation of the phenomena gathered (Yin 
1989) pp 114-115. 
The above considerations led to the selection of an interpretive approach for this 
research. 
2.3 Grounded Theory 
Glaser-and Strauss describe `Grounded Theory' as a strategy for qualitative research 
whereby the theory is derived from data and then illustrated by characteristic examples 
of data. The theory is therefore `grounded' in the data, in contrast with logico-deductive 
theory. They warn that the logico-deductive notion of independence too often ends up 
being taken as a licence to generate theory from any source: happenstance, fantasy, and 
dream life, commonsense or conjecture, and then dress it up as a piece of logical 
deduction. They suggest that grounded theory is likely to be a better theory to the 
degree to which it has been inductively developed from social research. This does not 
prevent certain ideas, or even `models' coming from sources other than the data e. g. 
flashes of insight, but the generating of theory from such insights must then be brought 
into relation to the data - or theory and the empirical world would mismatch (Glaser 
and Strauss 1967) pp 5-6. 
Whereas verifying is the researcher's principal and vital task for existing theories, the 
main goal in developing new theories is their purposeful systematic generation from the 
data - verifying as much as possible is requisite while one discovers and generates the 
theory, but not to the point where verification becomes so paramount as to curb 
generation. Thus, generation of theory from comparative analysis both subsumes and 
assumes verification and accurate descriptions but only to the extent that the latter are in 
the service of generation. Otherwise they are sure to stifle it. The job is to develop a 
theory that accounts for much of the relevant behaviour, not to provide a perfect 
description of the area. The kind of evidence, as well as the number of cases, is not so 
crucial -a single case can indicate a general conceptual category or property (Glaser 
and Strauss 1967) pp 28-30. 
An effective strategy recommended by Glaser and Strauss is, at first, to ignore the 
literature of theory and fact on the area under study, in order to ensure that the 
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emergence of categories will not be contaminated by concepts more suited to different 
areas. Similarities and convergences with the literature can be established after the 
analytic core of categories has emerged. The type of concept that should be generated 
has two joint, essential, features. First, the concepts should be analytic and sufficiently 
generalised to designate characteristics of concrete entity, not the entities themselves. 
They should also be sensitizing - yield a `meaningful' picture, abetted by apt 
illustrations that enable one to grasp the reference in terms of one's own experience 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967) pp 37-39. 
2.4 Slices of data 
Different kinds of data offer the analyst different views or vantage points from which to 
understand a category and to develop its properties: Glaser and Strauss called these 
`slices of data'. While there are no limits to the techniques of data collection, the way 
they are used, or the types of data required, the practical constraint on the collection 
techniques that can best obtain the desired information is structural - e. g. who is 
available to be observed, talked with, interviewed, and at what times. The best data to 
obtain may include the trivial and anecdotal - only they must be theoretically relevant. 
Anecdotal comparison, through the researchers' own experiences, general knowledge or 
reading, and the stories of others, can offer useful comparisons especially when starting 
research in developing core categories. Researchers can then think where else they 
learned about the category and can make quick comparisons to start to develop it and 
sensitize themseves to its relevancies (Glaser and Strauss 1967) pp 65-66. 
Stacey et al argue that narrative knowledge can be particularly valuable when 
researching very complex human dynamics. Narrative knowledge is embedded in 
anecdotes and stories, as well as the evaluation of those stories. The point is not whether 
they can be empirically validated or not, but whether they resonate with the experience 
of others and help them make sense of that experience (Stacey, Griffin et al. 2000) p 
203. 
The criterion for judging when to stop sampling the different groups relevant to a 
category is the category's `theoretical saturation' - this means that no additional data 
are being found whereby the properties of the category can be developed further (Glaser 
and Strauss 1967) p 61. Miles and Huberman referred to saturation as occurring when 
there are "no significantly new explanations for this data". They point out that, if an 
analyst has collected his own data, then from time to time he will remember other 
incidents that he heard but did not record. If the unrecorded incident applies to an 
established category, either it can be ignored because the category is saturated, or (if it 
indicates a new property of the category) it can be added to this and then integrated into 
the theory. If the unrecorded incident generates a new category, both incident and 
category can be added toward their place in the theory - this may be enough if the 
matter is minor, but if it becomes central to the theory there is reason to return to the 
field or the library to collect more data (Miles and Huberman 1984) p 71. 
2.5 Unit of analysis 
The core subject around which the research is focused sets the boundary for data 
collection, and is determined by the research question. Yin differentiates between two 
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versions of the single case study on the basis of the level of the unit of analysis. A study 
where the concern remains at a single, a global level is referred to as `holistic'. This 
would apply to the study of an institution as a whole, the different functioning of 
separate sub-units within the institution (Yin 1989) p 17. 
A holistic approach was appropriate to ensure that the research would include all 
aspects of the chain from design to manufacture. This meant that industrial collaborators 
would be asked for access to representatives of all appropriate functions, both internal 
and (where manufacturing was outsourced) external. The unit of analysis adopted was 
the `producibility issue'. Each of these identified a DFM problem or query 
2.6 Analytical framework 
Some form of analytic framework was needed to relate the qualitative data collected to 
the concepts in the categories generated in accordance with the grounded theory 
outlined in Section 2.3 above. Miles and Huberman suggested how matrix displays may 
be used for such a purpose (Miles and Huberman 1984) pp 211-214. This approach was 
supported by Robson (Robson 1993) pp 390-393. A set of two-dimensional matrices 
was adopted as a framework for analysis. This allowed initial relationships between 
concepts to be displayed, and also sensitized the author to explore the possibility of 
additional relationships when gathering further data. 
An electronic database was found to be extremely helpful as a method of storing notes 
on references and other material in a way that could be searched for keywords. Notes 
from many references, especially textbooks, covered a variety of relevant subjects that 
could be picked out in this way to support discussion in the appropriate area. 
2.7 Validation 
Table 2.2 Research validities and ways to achieve them 
RECOMMENDED TESTS RESEARCH STRATEGY 
Criterion Interpretivist viewpoint Case study tactic 
Phase of 
research 
Construct Has the researcher gained Triangulation by data source and by Data 
validity full access to the method to establish chain of evidence. collection 
knowledge and meanings Live case studies reviewed at on-site 
of informants? meetings with all functions 
represented, to achieve consensus or 
identify conflicting views. 
Variety of literature. 
Internal Will different researchers Explanation building, but categories Data 
validity/ make similar and relationships involved a degree of analysis 
Reliability observations on different subjective interpretation. 
occasions? Illustrations of applications. 
External How likely is it that ideas Case study companies chosen from Research 
validity/ and theories generated in two different industry sectors. `Best design 
Generalis- one setting will also practice' broader. 
ability apply in other settings? Much literature was general. 
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Easterby-Smith et al recommend three tests for case study research to ensure reliability 
and validity. These tests and the methods used in this research to achieve them are set 
out in Table 2.2 (after (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe et al. 1991) p 41, and (Yin 1989) p 41). 
Table 2.3 Practical relevance of this research 
Criterion Question addressed Demonstrated by this research: 
Descriptive Does the research Discussions with practitioners in industry and 
relevance capture a `real' feedback at seminars and conferences. 
problem for the 
`practitioner'? 
Goal Is the output of the Much literature is devoted to the development 
relevance research related to the of management techniques such as concurrent 
objective/function of engineering that improves efficiency, reduces 
organisations? time to market and cost, encourages innovation 
and inspires participants. 
Timeliness Do the phenomena Despite rapid changes in technology, most of 
change faster than the problems are related to the human, cultural 
science can come to and organisational aspects that require good 
grips with the leadership and management to prevent them. 
problem? 
Operational Can the results of the The whole thrust of this research has been to 
validity research be present the results so as to draw attention to the 
implemented by causal variables, with the intention that this 
manipulating causal should help practitioners and researchers to 
variables? address them. 
Non- Does the research While many of the issues appear obvious to 
obviousness simply reinvent the those practitioners involved, and much is drawn 
wheel? _ 
from published literature, they are put together 
and presented in such a manner as to provide a 
new insight into the relationships between the 
types of problem and the influences on them. 
Thomas and Tymon suggest that to ensure the practical relevance of management 
research it should meet five other criteria: descriptive relevance; goal relevance; 
timeliness; operational validity and non-obviousness (Thomas and Tymon 1982). 
Table 2.3 summarises how this research demonstrates that these criteria for practical 
relevance were met. 
Multiple and different sources were used to achieve `triangulation', as discussed in 
Section 2.2 above, to avoid the results being too heavily dependent on a single industrial 
project or the views of particular individuals. Data were always sought from 
practitioners from design and manufacturing, as well as other functions involved in the 
design-to-manufacture chain, 'in order to obtain a balanced perspective. While the 
detailed live case studies were in the aerospace industry, the best practice interviews and 
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literature covered a broader range of industries. Whenever a site visit was made, the 
author arranged for a tour of the shopfloor to observe processes at first hand, and where 
appropriate to talk to operators and supervisors as well as managers and executives. 
2.8 Research steps 
In the process of exploring the important issues in applying DFM in industry, the 
research started with a quest to develop methods to achieve CE across the supply chain. 
As this work progressed, it was realised that the fundamental understanding to relate 
manufacturing problems to design decisions was not in place, and problems could occur 
despite the adoption of CE. The research was then re-focused to develop a framework to 
relate possible reasons for manufacturing problems with sources of information and 
influence that could have prevented the problems, to show why they were not used. 
Applying the grounded theory strategy of Glaser and Strauss outlined earlier, the 
following 14 action steps were adopted for this research: 
Initial slice of data - gathered to support the initial research direction to plan for CE in 
the Extended Enterprise: 
(1) `Best Practice' studies; 
(2) Literature review; 
(3) CE implementation review; 
Second slice of data - obtained from planningCE and analysing case studies: 
(4) `TO-BE' Task list; 
: (5) CE Template plus Initial Producibility Interaction model; 
(6) SESAME pilot project: Monitor interactions and refine PI model; 
(7) Analyse Producibility Interactions; 
(8) Civil Aerospace studies; 
Research refocused to look at why problems in manufacturing still exist, even with CE: 
(9) Initial types of reasons for manufacturing problems; 
(10) Concept categories for reasons; 
(11) Concept categories for sources of information and influence; 
(12) Framework to relate reasons to sources; 
(13) Populate framework with factors and review; 
(14) Validate framework through illustrations. 
These steps are shown diagrammatically in Figure 2.1, and are explained in Section 2.9. 
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2.9 Research realisation 
Figure 2.1 shows the relationship between research milestones and the 14 steps in the 
methodology, and distinguishes between the PhD work by the author as an individual 
and the work contributed as a member of the AEROEXTN project team. The diagram 
also indicates the Thesis chapters describing the work. 
Details of the AEROEXTN project nature, structure and management are set out in 
Appendix B. Section B. I defines the `Supplier in the loop CE' (SIL-CE) approach for 
the project. Figure B. 2 is a project flow chart showing where the work relates to the 
action steps of the PhD methodology. 
The following sections describe the work done to complete each of the 14 steps. 
2.9.1 Best practice study 
In order to learn about current `Best Practice' on SIL-CE in a range of industries that 
manufacture CAD-intensive custom parts, the author and the other full-time research 
assistant on the team looked at examples of how prime contractors worked with their 
suppliers. This was done at the start of the AEROEXTN Project, by conducting on-site 
semi-structured interviews of prime-supplier pairs. Prime-supplier pairs were selected to 
enable the extended enterprise to be viewed from both aspects, not just that of the 
prime. 
The selection of companies for study drew upon the extensive range of contacts 
previously established by Research Managers and other members of the Department. 
Study cases covered a total of 12 prime-supplier pairs in the following industries: 
9 Military & civil Aerospace; 
" Military & civil Telecommunications; 
" Automotive and Retail electronics. 
Although initiated with the principal purpose of looking at outsourced manufacturing, it 
was recognised that many of the considerations applied equally to the in-house 
manufacture and supply of parts. Appendix A provides a summary that compares the 
findings from different industries. Points from the study are covered in Chapter 3, 
Section 3.2.3. 
During the best practice study, the researchers also made visits to the industrial 
collaborators sites so that they understood the current way of working (the `AS-IS' 
scenario). 
2.9.2 Literature review 
Concurrently with the best practice study, published literature was studied to determine 
the state-of-the-art information up on how CE could be achieved across the supply 
chain. Subjects included Design, CE, DFM, outsourcing, communications and project 
management. Coverage consisted primarily of textbooks, journal articles, conference 
papers and trade magazines, with electronic databases used to search for relevant 
material using appropriate keywords. The author's role in the AEROEXTN research 
team included a principal responsibility for the subject of Producibility. 
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The focus of the research later changed to examining why problems in manufacturing 
still existed, even with CE. The author then made further extensive studies of the 
literature, and broadened the search to include subjects such as human error, culture and 
organisational matters. The literature review was mainly written after the data analysis 
has been completed, as recommended by Silverman, so that it could include critical 
comment and show how the work for this thesis fitted in with what had gone before 
(Silverman 2000) p 231. 
2.9.3 CE implementation review 
The first of two one-day workshops was held four months into the AEROEXTN project 
and the second four weeks later. The purpose of these workshops was to determine what 
actions were needed to set up SIL-CE between the principal industrial collaborators and 
ensure that their requirements and expectations were met. Experienced industrial 
managers attended, to represent both the customer and the supplier. Each workshop was 
structured as a whole-day session for the members of the academic team to present the 
results of the best practice and literature studies, and then to discuss the issues and 
enablers. 
The output of these workshops was a prioritised list of issues and enablers to be used as 
an input to the `TO-BE' task list. `Producibility' was identified as the highest priority. 
2.9.4 `TO-BE' task list 
The next step was to determine what tasks would have to be completed in order to 
achieve the desired outcome. This was done by first comparing the issues and enablers 
that would represent the ideal `TO-BE' scenario with the `AS-IS' current processes, so 
as to identify the gap between them. The AEROEXTN team then addressed the 
potential weaknesses and problem areas so revealed, in order to compile a list of 'TO- 
BE' tasks that would be needed to prevent them. 
2.9.5 CE template & initial PI model 
The team developed the list of TO-BE tasks into an `ideal' model of the SIL-CE process 
for the pilot project. This process was set out as a prescriptive CE template (Appendix 
B, Figure B. 3), with producibility activities at the heart of it. The concept was to create 
the conditions for the design intent and the manufacturing implications to be thoroughly 
understood by all involved, encouraging a free exchange of views. This was so that 
potential problems and opportunities for improvement could be raised early enough for 
solutions to be developed at minimum cost. 
The author became responsible for developing a `Producibility Interaction' (PI) model 
in order to promote timely discussion during the pilot, and to ensure that no aspect of 
producibility was missed out. An initial list of subjects relevant to Producibility was 
compiled from the issues identified at the initial AEROEXTN workshops. This was then 
presented to a working group from the AEROEXTN team, including the appropriate 
customer and supplier function of specialists, especially Design and Manufacturing. The 
PI working group then ratified and expanded the subjects, and agreed on how they 
might best be addressed. 
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2.9.6 SESAME pilot project 
The CE template was used to plan and manage SESAME. This was the code name for 
the live project to pilot the CE process for the design and manufacture of a small batch 
of missile parts. An integrated development team (IDT) was formed to progress the 
project, monitor the producibility interactions, and refine the PI model. The IDT held 
six meetings at monthly intervals over the period of the pilot. 
2.9.7 Analyse producibility interactions 
The detailed Case Study presented by SESAME enable the AEROEXTN team to 
capture the DFM changes made and the reasons for them. The effects were measured in 
terms of direct savings in set-up and machining man-hours, and the reduction in queries 
and late design changes. The results were evaluated against the cost of SIL-CE 
participation, and showed good cost benefits. 
2.9.8 Civil aerospace studies 
The success of the PI model in the AEROEXTN context of a small pilot project in 
defence aerospace led to the question of whether'it would be relevant to a different 
sector of industry. Contacts in civil aerospace were approached to enable the author to 
undertake two further case studies, to use the PI model as a tool to review the 
Producibility of parts currently being manufactured. To broaden the field of application, 
diversity was sought in two ways: in-house and outsourced manufacture, and parts made 
from different materials. Both conditions were achieved, because the first Case Study 
involved a light alloy part machined in-house, while the second covered two sets of 
outsourced parts, one machined from titanium forgings and the other moulded from 
composites. 
The author collected the data by interviewing separately representatives of the functions 
responsible for the design-to-manufacture chain for each of the parts, analysing the 
Producibility Interactions in a manner similar to SESAME, and reviewing the results 
against the PI model at on-site meetings with the representatives for each case. 
With minor changes to the wording to reflect the broader range of production processes, 
the subjects in the PI model were found to cover the civil aerospace cases. However, 
problems in manufacturing still existed, even with the application of CE. The author 
therefore refocused the research question to ask why this should be so. 
2.9.9 Initial list of types of reasons 
The author reflected on the experiences of AEROEXTN and the civil aerospace studies, 
and considered that prescriptive use of the PI model depended for its success on the 
effectiveness with which the subjects were discussed and driven to a satisfactory 
resolution. This appeared to be more a matter of whether management encouraged and 
pursued the issues and enablers in the CE template so as to get the right people to 
discuss and act on Producibility at the right time, rather than whether people knew the 
PI subjects. 
Acting on these considerations, the author drew ideas from the experience of the case 
studies and the continuing literature review to formulate a list of 35 types of reasons for 
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problems that were likely answers to the following two questions on the Producibility 
process: 
" What can go wrong? 
9 What opportunities could be missed? 
2.9.10 Concept categories for reasons 
To explore the problem space further, the 35 types of reasons were grouped into four 
categories. As suggested by Glaser and Strauss (see Section 2.4), this enabled the author 
to think where else he learned about each category so as to develop it and sensitize 
himself to its relevancies. Further refinement added a fifth category. 
2.9.11 Concept categories for sources 
Again reflecting upon the research experience, the author considered the ways in which 
designers may obtain producibility information or be influenced in their formulation of 
the manufacturing instructions. Ideas for sources were generated and grouped into five 
sensitizing categories to answer the question: 
" What sources influenced design? 
2.9.12 Framework structure 
In order to relate the categories of reasons to the categories of sources, a two- 
dimensional matrix as suggested by Miles and Huberman (see Section 2.6) was adopted, 
with the types of reasons forming the rows and the source concept categories forming 
the columns. Each cell could then be used to relate a type of reason to a source by 
entering one or more factors in answer to the question: 
9 Why can things go wrong? 
As well as issues that might cause difficulties in manufacturing, these factors included 
the potential causes of missed opportunities for improvement. 
2.9.13 Populate framework 
Once the outline framework had been set up, brief notes were entered in cells to show 
the sort of factor that might indicate a relationship, with footnotes added for 
explanation, examples and references from the literature, the AEROEXTN pilot project, 
the civil aerospace studies and the best practice study. Within each category of types of 
reasons, further rows and a fifth category were added to develop the framework, as one 
idea led to another. Several iterations were made, as suggested by Robson's `playing 
with the data' to help identify themes (Robson 1993) p 378, before settling on a final 
arrangement. 
The factors entered were checked for duplication and saturation, with the research notes 
being reviewed for additional examples and references to broaden the relationships. The 
framework was considered complete when no additional cells were filled, and further 
material served only to duplicate or reinforce the factors already entered without 
providing fresh insight into the nature of a relationship. 
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2.9.14 Validate framework 
To check for framework completeness in respect of the SESAME and civil aerospace 
case studies, all 38 issues that had been raised during the studies were mapped on to the 
framework to verify that there was at least one factor in the framework to which each 
issue could be related. 
The framework was reviewed to demonstrate that the validation criteria for practical 
relevance set out in Section 2.7 Table 2.3 were met. 
2.10 Output of the research 
The Relationship Framework represents the output of this research as a final set of 
tables relating the types of factors to the sources of information and influence. This is 
illustrated by examples and references to the literature and to industrial experience, to 
explain why manufacturing problems reach the shopfloor when sources of information 
are available to prevent them. 
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Chapter 3 Industrial Rationale for Research 
This chapter explains how the research problem evolved during the investigation of the 
industrial problem, covering steps 1 to 8 of the methodology set out in Chapter 2. 
Details of the literature studied are covered separately in Chapter 4. 
The initial research question "How can CE be achieved across the supply chain? " posed 
for the AEROEXTN Project described in Section 1.2 led to the recognition of 
Producibility as the priority subject, the development and application of a Producibility 
Interaction model, and the realisation that problems in manufacturing will still exist 
even with CE. 
The initial slice of data (obtained from methodology steps 1 to 3) was the raw material 
gathered to find out what issues and enablers needed to be addressed in the live pilot 
project. Three elements contributed to this: a `best practice' study over a range of 
industries; an initial review of the relevant literature; and a CE implementation review 
involving workshop discussions with the industrial collaborators to capture their 
concerns and priorities so as to arrive at a task list. 
The second slice of data (obtained from methodology steps 4 to 8) was needed to find 
out the producibility issues that were raised in practice in the design-to-manufacture 
chain. This involved further workshops to arrive at a TO-BE task list and to formulate a 
Producibility Interaction (PI) model. This was the principal element of the CE template 
developed for the `SESAME' live pilot phase of AEROEXTN. Thirteen producibility 
issues were raised and discussed during SESAME, and the PI model was refined. To 
determine whether the PI model could be applied outside the military aerospace context 
of AEROEXTN, the author carried out further case studies in civil aerospace, yielding a 
further 25 issues. 
Although all the 38 issues raised were primarily technical in nature, it became clear that 
`soft' influences permitted manufacturing problems to exist despite the application of 
CE. The final research question was then framed to focus on why this should be so. 
3.1 The industrial context 
The AEROEXTN project had been set up to develop concurrent engineering practices in 
the extended enterprise in the aerospace industry. Public funding had been made 
available to support this initiative because, although the aerospace sector had already 
achieved a degree of maturity in CE for the internal development of products, there was 
limited involvement of suppliers in CE. The increasing use of outsourcing for the 
manufacture of parts meant that the benefits of CE would be lost without the inclusion 
of suppliers. New drives for efficiency provided opportunities for restructuring of the 
supply chain. 
This scenario provided a good opportunity to develop general DFM theory and, 
combined with Cranfield University's good contacts and close association with the 
aerospace industry, led to the choice of aerospace as the industrial context for this 
research. 
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3.2 The Best Practice Study 
3.2.1 Scope 
A `Best Practice' study was conducted at the start of the AEROEXTN Project in order 
to investigate current CE practices in the extended enterprise. The term `Best Practice' 
might more properly be called `Good Practice', since there could have been better 
practices that the team did not find. However, the phrase was in vogue at the time and 
has been retained in this thesis. 
The research team looked at examples of how prime contractors worked with their 
suppliers in a range of industries manufacturing CAD-intensive custom parts. Twelve 
prime-supplier pairs were selected to enable the extended enterprise to be viewed from 
both aspects, not just that of the prime. Study cases covered: 
" Military & civil Aerospace; 
" Military & civil Telecommunications; 
" Automotive; 
" Retail electronics. 
3.2.2 Method 
The study used on-site semi-structured interviews of industrial practitioners to cover the 
following topics: Product requirements; Engineering capability and skills; Design 
processes; IT Enablers: design/supplier interface; Supplier relationships; Intellectual 
Property Rights and Metrics. 
3.2.3 Observations 
A table summarising the results of the Best Practice study, as presented by the 
researchers to the first AEROEXTN one-day workshop, is at Appendix A. Each subject 
is represented in a table by a number of rows, one for each topic. The industrial firms 
visited were grouped as indicated in the column headings. One particular aircraft 
manufacturer and their suppliers had a particular way of working recorded under the 
heading `Aircraft (1)', while observations from other aircraft manufacturers and their 
suppliers are shown under `Aircraft (2)'. Although the study had looked at outsourced 
manufacturing, it was recognised that many of the considerations applied equally to the 
in-house manufacture and supply of parts. 
Observations from the study were provided in this manner to stimulate discussion in the 
workshop sessions, and were very helpful in providing a basis for understanding the 
application of CE to a variety of industrial contexts. As a state-of-the-art assessment this 
formed a valuable anchor in reality. This acted as a counterpoint to the initial literature 
review, which tended to portray an optimistic view of what was possible with current 
technology rather than what was actually being achieved. For example, suppliers with a 
comprehensive 3D CAD capability were still required by some major customers to 
work with 2D paper drawings as the master contractual documents, although they 
exchanged data models electronically. In one case, the culture of the overseas customers 
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had not yet allowed them to migrate to a fully electronic system, despite the existence 
for some years of the technical capability. 
The best practice study made a significant contribution to the evolving research problem 
by demonstrating that awareness of CE practices and the availability of technology did 
not guarantee that industry would adopt or use them, and that lack of funding for 
investment was not necessarily the problem. It was also noted that the CE process 
needed to be tailored to the context in which the design-to-manufacture chain was 
operating. 
3.2.4 CE implementation review workshops 
The AEROEXTN workshops served two purposes. First, they acted as a means of 
capturing the in-depth industrial experience of the industrial collaborators, providing 
multiple disciplines and viewpoints, and ensured that the interpretation of the best 
practice study and the literature could be related to the real-world requirements of the 
target industry. Second, they helped to engender a common sense of purpose, 
commitment, and understanding of the contributions necessary to achieve success. 
In order to obtain a balanced contribution from the industrial collaborators, with an 
appropriate level of expertise, the customer and the supplier were each represented by 
two mid-level managers. The sessions were co-chaired by the two academic Principal 
Investigators, supported by the two full-time researchers, including the author. The 
workshops were held in a room with projection facilities, flip charts and a large wall for 
hanging posters. 
The academic team presented the results of the best practice study on a display of 
posters that showed the contents of Appendix A. This stimulated the discussion of the 
many examples of issues, enablers and metrics shown, and provided points that were 
added to the discussion column (incorporated in Appendix A as the final column in each 
table). 
The industrial collaborators provided inputs on the current customer-supplier way of 
working (the `AS-IS' process model), together with their priorities for the issues to be 
addressed and the metrics and enablers to be adopted to achieve SIL-CE. Producibility 
was identified as the highest priority subject, and it was recognised that the interactions 
between Design, Manufacturing and others involved in the design-to-manufacture chain 
would be at the heart of the CE process to be developed for the project. 
3.2.5 Conclusions from first slice of data 
The material gathered and discussed at the workshops contributed many ideas that were 
later included in various forms in the framework that represents the output of this PhD. 
There was a noticeable contrast between the ideal design-to-manufacture processes put 
forward in the literature, which tended to be based on developing original designs, and 
the real-world practices and limitations found in the best practice study, where most 
design work was incremental rather than original. 
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3.3 `TO-BE' task list 
Further workshops were held to address the requirements for implementing CE and 
planning the pilot project. These resulted in a TO BE task list and the recognition of the 
timeline for each task. Tasks were grouped according to whether they had a long lead 
time, needed to be completed before the pilot project, would be carried out during the 
pilot, or were to be completed after the pilot. The output of these considerations formed 
the basis of the CE template that was subsequently constructed. 
3.4 Producibility Interaction (PI) model 
One output of the AEROEXTN project was to bring together the appropriate specialists 
in the design-to-manufacture chain at the appropriate time to address producibility 
matters for a live pilot project, named `SESAME'. Details of AEROEXTN and the CE 
template that was applied to SESAME are set out in Appendix B. 
To get the most from the producibility dialogue, it was important that the participants 
were prompted to raise all relevant subjects in a manner likely to promote the timely 
recognition of problems and opportunities. The PI model was developed as a tool to 
optimise the effectiveness of the PI discussions by providing a structure for this 
dialogue. Based on the issues and enablers raised during the earlier workshops, the 
author compiled an initial list of 24 subjects for consideration by a PI working group 
with the industrial collaborators. 
The initial list of subjects relevant to Producibility was entered into a table with a row 
for each subject and columns headed to help structure the discussion. This initial model 
was presented to the PI working group, and refined at successive workshops as the 
project progressed. Each subject was addressed in turn, to assess who should raise it, its 
likely format, how it should be communicated, and remarks were added where 
necessary to focus on likely problems. The subjects that could be related to an initial 
CAD model of the part to be manufactured were indicated and grouped together. During 
the preparation for SESAME the subjects were developed from the initial 24 into a total 
of 29. These provided a comprehensive list of the topics that should be addressed to 
ensure a common understanding of design intent and production constraints, in the form 
shown in outline in Table 3.1. The PI table was subsequently used as a tool during the 
civil aerospace studies described in Section 3.7. A fuller version with remarks is set out 
in Appendix C. 
Table 3.1 Producibility Interaction Table - Outline 
Generated by Method 
'6 Subject Format of Remarks 
Cl' Des Mfg Other Comm'n 
1 Concept/problem at hand V V 
2 Change since last review 
Project 
3 Programme plan: cost/timescale/no Planners 
req'd/milestones through 
Procurement 
14 Risk Assessment- Design 
26 
5 Risk Assessment- Production V 
6 Status & date 
Inputs from 
7 Physical Interface Definition stress, 
aerodynamics 
8 Material properties V 
Input from 
9 r.. Tolerances- 
key V Assembler 
-cý needed 
10 
o E Tolerances- manufacturing 
11 
A 
Datum/clamping V 
12 
. 
NC programming ease 
13 Manufacturing 
limits: Capability 
ºý (processes) 
14 Manufacturing limits: Capacity V (size) 
15 Manufacturing 
limits: Capacity V 
(throughput) 
16 Special processes V 
17 Standards acceptability V 
18 
Key Features-Design 
2-D drawings-req't for format & views 
19 Key Features-Production V 
20 Model req'ts-Designer 
21 Test piece req't 
22 Process Plan 
23 Jigs & fixtures V 
No. of separate set-ups and 
24 manufacturing activities, manufacturing WO 
time and specialist cutting tools 
25 Integrated Development Team V 
26 Inspection Requirements Quality 
27 
Quality: Requirements for Manuf to Supplier QA Release 
28 
Quality: Requirements for Assembly to Prime QA/ 
Accept Procurement 
29 Non-conforming parts QA 
This PI model formed the centrepiece of the CE template that defined the `ideal' 
prescriptive process that was applied to the SESAME pilot project. 
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3.5 SESAME Producibility Interactions 
Full details of the SESAME pilot project are set out in Appendix B. Sections B. 4.1 to 
4.3 cover the industrial circumstances and membership of the integrated development 
team, together with the meeting and monitoring arrangements. 
The monthly team meetings discussed project strategy and progress, reviewed the 
producibility issues raised, and helped to refine the PI model. Meanwhile, Design, 
Production and other specialists were free to exchange data and to discuss producibility 
issues outside the meetings, so that the design-to-manufacture process was not delayed. 
All such exchange activities were captured in separate log books by the designer and the 
production engineer. 
Three formal iterations of the design CAD model and associated data were made over a 
period of six months. This reflected the fact that neither the Designers nor the 
Production Engineers were dedicated only to SESAME, and gave the research team a 
good opportunity to review progress at each stage. 
A total of 13 technical issues were raised during the Producibility Interactions. These 
are tabulated in Appendix B Table B. 1, together with the team's assessment of their 
importance, method of communication and impact. 
It was observed that the PI Table served its purpose by encouraging the dialogue on the 
full range of subjects. It helped people to contribute their ideas, especially if they were 
junior or new to the project, when the Table called for them to take the lead on their 
specialist subject. Agreement on the format and method of communication of each 
subject helped people to get used to the idea of direct contact between team members, 
by telephone, fax, exchanging PC-viewable CAD model data, and (where available) e- 
mail. Communication and teamworking was also encouraged by the rotation of meeting 
locations, so that participants were able to show the others round their home site, and 
social activities such as regular team dinners. 
3.5.1 Refinements to PI model 
The PI table described in Section 3.3.1 had been used at each monthly team meeting 
during SESAME as a tool to prompt discussion and ensure that all subjects were 
covered. The sequence and content had been continually refined. Two examples of 
changes were: 
The subjects of Risk Assessments (Serials 4 and 5) and Quality/QA matters 
(Serials 27 to 29) in Table B. 1 had been added at an early stage. Machine 
Capability was expanded from a single item to cover the three aspects of 
Capability (processes), Capacity (size) and Capacity (throughput) (Serials 13 
to 15). Most of the subsequent changes in content involved the addition of 
remarks of the kind included in Appendix B. 
" The sequence was modified slightly to reflect what was seen as a natural 
order in which subjects would arise. In particular, `Inspection Requirements' 
was moved from the Initial CAD Model set (Serials 6 to 17) to later (Serial 
26) on the advice of the Quality Manager, who considered that the final CAD 
model or drawings would be needed for a useful input. 
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The structure of the table was found to be broadly satisfactory. Appendix C shows an 
additional column that was included to relate the 13 SESAME issues and the 25 issues 
from the civil aerospace studies (see Section 3.7) to the appropriate subject or subjects 
under which they were raised. 
3.6 Analysis of SESAME interactions 
3.6.1 Cost benefits to companies 
The impact assessments set out in Appendix B Section B4.4 were important aspects of 
the AEROEXTN Project. They were fed into the cost-effectiveness calculations for 
SESAME to produce the hard figures that demonstrated the significant savings in 
downstream costs that could be made by early supplier involvement in CE. Significant 
costs were avoided by preventing later changes. As the industrial collaborator remarked 
with regard to post-design queries and changes: "It costs £1000 to open the filing 
cabinet and look at the drawings, before any charges for further work. " 
These findings served to show that the SESAME dialogue could be guided successfully 
to avoid downstream problems. However, outside such a controlled pilot there was no 
certainty that the dialogue would take place. This concern, reinforced by the subsequent 
experience of the civil aerospace studies described in Chapter 3 Section 3.7 and 
Appendix D, led the author to consider what could go wrong and what opportunities 
might be missed. 
In SESAME, all of the inputs on the part of the supplier were considered general 
recommendations, and were not specific to the supplier's machine capability. The civil 
aerospace studies subsequently showed examples of requests from the supplier for 
design changes to favour a particular production process. 
The small number of `critical' issues reflects the experience of the Senior Designer and 
the design not being a radical departure from previous work. 
Most of the producibility issues shown in Table B. 1 are easements. In a conventional 
make-to-print scenario the production engineer would probably have said: "Yes, we can 
make this", without feeling impelled to raise a formal suggestion for a change to ease 
manufacture. Three issues (3,8 and 12) related to the provision of a tooling hole. First, 
the tooling hole was requested as a reference for manufacture. This was readily agreed, 
and its size and position were discussed. Then, when it appeared on the Key Features 
Drawing (KFD), the Production Engineers could see that a tight tolerance had been 
placed on it: a precise location was not needed for it to serve its purpose. Either 
additional production time would be needed to ensure the tolerance was met, or else the 
part might be rejected at inspection. In contrast to some of the other easements, a simple 
set of producibility guidelines would not have led the designer to provide the optimum 
tooling hole for a part of such complex geometry; these three issues demonstrated the 
benefit of the direct dialogue between Design and Production. 
There was only one issue of redundant design effort, but this illustrated two things. 
First, the designer's approach was `DFM-orientated', in that he knew that the way the 
model was constructed could affect manufacture. Second, he felt able to discuss the 
subject freely in the team forum, without attempting to hide behind the `mystery' of 
Design. 
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Of the 13 points raised, 11 were accepted by Design. One was not technically 
acceptable. The remaining issue resulted in the designer adopting a different easement 
from that proposed by the supplier, because the original suggestion could not meet the 
stress analysis requirements. SESAME did not produce any requests for easements that 
would have achieved the reduction of the manufacturing cost but compromised a 
performance parameter such as weight, requiring a `trade-off discussion of the kind 
later found in civil aerospace. 
3.6.2 Communications 
While only two issues are listed under the `personal contact' heading, this does not fully 
reflect the importance of personal contact in establishing the team atmosphere of co- 
operation and trust that encouraged the full use of the model and drawing information. 
Team membership promoted a sense of co-operation, with everyone willing to 
participate and contribute to the common purpose. 
A low-cost model viewer was very successful in allowing early sight of the design 
without the difficulty and expense of operating a full CAD workstation. Because the 
supplier was not sub-contracted to carry out any design work, there was no requirement 
to set up a high-capacity link for the rapid transfer of large CAD files. The nature of the 
defence work was such that suppliers would not have been given access to the full CAD 
files with assembly information. Instead of this, the designer was able to use the main 
CAD system to generate IGES or STL files for the low-cost viewer. The Production 
Engineers found that they could rapidly learn to manipulate this model on a PC, 
examine the features and interrogate approximate dimensions (these were accurate 
enough for producibility assessment, but would not have been adequate for Quality to 
use for inspection purposes on the finished part). Because it was easy to view sections 
of the model and look at it from all aspects, both internal and external, one Producibility 
Engineer exclaimed that it was "better than having a solid model, or even the real part! " 
Some aspects of the design could not readily be conveyed on the model, and were the 
subject of supplementary drawings, data sheets or standards. Because of the wish to 
involve the supplier as soon as the early design was available, no drawing was produced 
until the second iteration of the model. Discussion of the completeness of the 
information conveyed by the model led to the response that certain aspects would be 
defined on the KFD. There was no doubt that early communication with the supplier 
enabled Design to develop a package of information that helped the supplier to 
understand what was required as well as incorporating the supplier's suggestions for 
ease of manufacture. Many such suggestions would not have resulted from Design 
applying a standard DFM software package. In some instances, Design would have had 
to carry out a lot of work using a DFM package to evaluate alternative approaches, 
whereas the Production Engineer could make a rapid assessment and advise Design of 
the need for changes only when these would have a significant impact on production. 
The dialogue also stimulated requests for information that the CAD system made 
readily available to Design, such as the surface area for plating purposes, which 
traditionally had been worked out by the plating shop from the drawings. 
There were two other aspects that are not represented in Table B. 1, as a result of the 
discussions during the development of the PI Table. The first was the realisation by the 
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customer that their tolerance standards, based on a document some 30 years old, were in 
urgent need of review. The second was the offer of an alternative material that would 
work out cheaper for the small quantities needed than the material originally specified, 
which had a minimum order quantity of 100 kg. The offered material was actually to a 
higher aerospace specification, but was already used extensively for other work by the 
supplier. However, the designer would not have specified it from the catalogue without 
prompting from local knowledge. 
3.6.3 SESAME conclusions 
The overall conclusion drawn from SESAME by the AEROEXTN project team was 
that well-managed CE in the Extended Enterprise gave good results, benefiting both 
customer and supplier. The improved understanding of design intent was more 
significant than the direct savings in estimated set-up and machining times, because this 
was likely to result in the elimination of most, if not all, design queries and engineering 
changes. 
Much was learnt about the management, organisational, and cultural aspects necessary 
for the technical dialogue to take place effectively. Some of the explicit lessons learned 
from setting up a concurrent engineering project of this nature in the extended enterprise 
are set out in Appendix B Section B. 4.5. 
The author also gained a lot of tacit information about the way the design-to- 
manufacture chain worked in practice, which was very helpful in shaping his approach 
to the PhD work subsequent to AEROEXTN. For example, it was readily apparent how 
the pressures on designers to focus on their principal task of reaching a workable design 
solution meant that, once they had satisfied themselves that a part was manufacturable, 
they would not normally spend time considering the finer points of producibility. Also, 
it was very rewarding to see how the supplier's production engineers (long used to 
being on the receiving end of drawings subject to competitive tender) reacted positively 
when they recognised that they could have a dialogue with the designer. 
The potential problems in implementation led the author to see whether the PI model 
could successfully be applied outside the context of the defence aerospace industry. 
The need for further case studies prompted the author to approach two major civil 
aerospace contractors reported in the following Section 3.7. 
3.7 Civil aerospace studies 
3.7.1 Purpose of studies 
The purpose of the civil aerospace studies was to investigate whether PI model would 
be applicable to the design-to-manufacture chain outside the limitations of the 
AEROEXTN/SESAME small pilot project in a defence aerospace context. 
The civil aerospace sector was chosen to provide a different business environment from 
defence aerospace, while still requiring high value-added custom parts of a complexity 
that would justify producibility interactions. In addition, Cranfield University's close 
ties with the aerospace industry provided contacts willing to allow the author to conduct 
the research. 
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The aim was to study parts that were currently in production, and find out from the 
people directly involved what producibility interactions had already taken place, what 
problems had reached manufacturing, and whether the application of the AEROEXTN 
PI model could have been applied with advantage. 
3.7.2 Case studies 
The circumstances of the civil aerospace industrial case studies were as follows: 
" The customer (Company A) was a major civil aircraft Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (OEM), who outsourced the manufacture of approximately 70 
percent of parts, retaining design, assembly, systems integration and test; 
" Company A maintained an in-house capability for machining; 
" The supplier (Company B) undertook a wide variety of civil and military 
aerospace manufacturing tasks; 
" The distance between OEM design and supplier manufacturing sites was some 
180 miles by road; 
" The nature of the product required complex CAD-designed mechanical 
machined and composite parts to enable the aircraft to carry its full payload for a 
given range and speed; 
" The customer saw time-to-market as important in keeping to a demanding build 
schedule; 
" The parts were required in low volume, to match an aircraft production rate of 
one set per month; 
" Individual component cost was medium; however, design risk and potential 
project impact were high. 
Three sets of aircraft parts were studied: 
" Part A was manufactured in-house by Company A, milled from aluminium 
alloy plate in three stages by a five-axis high-speed machine. 
" Parts T were manufactured by Company B, using four- and five-axis machines 
to mill and drill three types of part from titanium forgings; 
" Parts C were manufactured by Company B, as a set of four types of composite 
panels. These were formed by placing epoxy-resin-impregnated layers of carbon 
fibre, aramid fibre (Kevlar), glass fibre and aluminium foil in a mould and 
curing them under heat and pressure in an autoclave. 
3.7.3 Data collection 
A week was spent on site for each of the two studies, full details of which are set out in 
Appendix C. In each case, an initial meeting with functional representatives was held 
for the author to explain the scope and purpose of the study. This was followed by semi- 
structured interviews with Manufacturing to identify manufacturing problems and other 
producibility matters relating to the selected parts. Visits were made to the 
manufacturing shopfloors, and also to the main structure assembly facility. 
32 
Report forms were raised to characterise each of the parts studied, as shown in 
Appendix D. Further interviews were conducted with Design, Quality and Procurement 
specialists who had been involved in the design-to-manufacture chain of the parts 
concerned. 
Each study was completed with a review meeting attended by representatives of the 
specialist functions. The context of each project was discussed and consensus obtained 
on the nature of every issue. The Producibility Interaction Model was then reviewed, 
and the issues related to the subjects in the PI Table. 
3.7.4 Issues & Analysis 
The unit of analysis for the civil aerospace studies was the producibility issue, raised by 
any functional specialist, which required a response by Design for clarification or 
change. A total of 25 such issues were raised in total for the three sets of Parts A, T, and 
C, and are set out in Appendix D. Tables D. 1, D. 2 and D. 3 summarise the issues, their 
importance, method of communication and impact in a similar manner to that used in 
Appendix B Table B. 1 for AEROEXTN. 
3.7.5 Civil aerospace studies conclusion 
The civil aerospace studies served four purposes: 
" They confirmed the benefits of producibility interactions in addressing 
manufacturing problems (e. g. three of the five issues raised during the in-house 
study of Part C were resolved at the review meeting, when the design specialist 
agreed to take action as a direct result of the discussion); 
" They showed that real-world problems were not always addressed in a timely 
manner (e. g. the lack of feedback from the previous manufacturers to correct 
queries on the drawings for parts now being manufactured in-house; delays in 
starting the producibility dialogue while awaiting strategic decisions on 
sourcing); 
They showed that real design teams were not always able to conform to 
company standards for the design process. E. g. for relatively new technologies, 
such as composite panels, the lack of a Design Handbook and the shortage of a 
Design Leader at the early development stage were reported as having a 
significant influence in increasing the number of producibility matters to be 
resolved. 
" They showed that the PI model developed for AEROEXTN was accepted as 
being both relevant and complete by the industrial practitioners, and could have 
been adopted as a tool to assist management to structure discussions between 
Design, Manufacturing and other relevant functions at an early stage in the 
development process. 
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3.8 Summary of live case study results 
3.8.1 Characteristics of AEROEXTN and civil aerospace parts studied 
Table 3.2 Characteristics of parts studied 
Characteristics SESAME Part A Parts T Parts C 
Aerospace sector Defence Civil Civil Civil 
Project Missile Airliner Airliner Airliner 
Supply Outsourced Internal Outsourced Outsourced 
Material Steel Aluminium Titanium Composite 
Part size (max dim) < 300 mm 3.2 m 640 mm 1.5 m 
Part classification New Change of 
manufacturer 
Derivative Derivative 
Batch size Small Small Small Small 
Manufacturing 
methods 
Manually 
machined 
5-axis 
machined 
from plate 
4& 5-axis 
machined 
forging 
Pre-preg lay- 
up autoclave 
cured 
Table 3.2 shows a summary of the characteristics of civil aerospace parts studied, 
compared with the SESAME parts in AEROEXTN. It should be noted that although 
there is diversity because each type of part is made from different materials and by 
different methods by different sets of people, and was designed by different teams, they 
were all made in small batches. It cannot therefore be assumed that all producibility 
matters common to these studies would necessarily apply to larger batches or mass- 
produced items. 
3.8.2 Summary of issues raised 
Table 3.3 summarises the importance, channel and impact of the issues raised in the 
prodücibility interactions of the four industrial case studies. Over half the issues raised 
were regarded as easements, but some 40% were classed as critical, i. e. manufacturing 
could not proceed without risk until the matter was resolved. 
The single case of redundant design was unusual, but it did demonstrate the designer's 
awareness that the 3D modelling method could have affected manufacturing, and under 
different circumstances might have made a significant difference to the design 
workload. 
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Table 3.3 Importance, channel and impact of issues raised 
Issues AEROEXTN Part Parts Parts Total 
A T C 
No of issues 13 5 7 13 38 
Critical to D/M 3 3 4 5 15 
Easements 9 2 3 8 21 
Importance: 
Redundant 1 0 0 0 1 
Design 
Personal contact 1 0 0 6 7 
Method of Model view 9 4 5 2 20 
communication: 
Drawing only 3 1 2 5 11 
Major change for 5 1 1 5 12 Design 
Minor change for 6 4 6 8 24 
Design 
t I mpac : 
Major change for 7 3 6 6 22 
Manufacture 
Minor change for 2 2 1 7 12 
Manufacture 
3.8.3 Summary of Producibility issues 
The producibility issues raised in the studies so far covered both problems and 
opportunities for improvement, as follows: 
Problems (What can go wrong? ) 
" Query on drawing/model: error/inconsistency; ambiguity/omission. 
" Part is impossible to make with existing processes: 
- Outside capability limits (e. g. size, weight, tolerances, wall thickness, 
throughput... ); 
- Inaccessible features. 
" Part is difficult to make with existing processes: 
- Near limit of process capability (e. g. high scrap/rework rate); 
- Time-consuming setup; 
- Lack of datums/clamping; 
- Proliferation of features/complex geometry; 
- Poor access for machining heads; 
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- Requires special cutting tools; 
- Requires complex tooling/jigs; 
- Materials are difficult to work; 
- Geometry liable to distort during processing; 
- Requires exceptionally skilled machine operator; 
- Difficult to inspect part for compliance with drawing/model. 
What could be improved? (What opportunities are missed? ) 
" Presentation of information by drawings or models: clear; complete; 
ambiguous; error-free. 
" Programme information combined with risk assessment could promote early 
trials, tests of capability and training of operators for developing and proving 
production processes to avoid surprises and enable early changes to modify 
design or process as necessary. 
" Part is optimised for manufacture: 
- Well within process capability, with operators of average skill; 
- Features standardised (e. g. avoid use of different-sized fastener holes, 
non-standard fillet radii); 
- Shape uses raw material efficiently (e. g. relationship to stock sizes); 
- Material is easy to handle at all stages; 
- Geometry is improved for ease of manufacture (e. g. minimum number of 
set-ups, use of standard tools, minimum number of tools, easy access for 
tool heads); 
- Minimises environmental impact (energy consumption, noise, toxic 
chemicals, special safety procedures); 
- Tolerances are modified for ease of manufacture (e. g. reduced area or 
length where close tolerance required, without compromising function) 
- Takes advantage of local conditions/opportunities; 
- Inspection requirements are limited to critical features; 
- Production process proved, rather than part inspected. 
3.9 Refining the Research Question 
Following the initial review of the literature, the best practice study, the workshop 
discussions with industrial collaborators on the AEROEXTN Project and the experience 
from the civil aerospace study, the author considered where his PhD research could 
most usefully be directed. He pursued the idea that, if producibility were the subject of 
greatest concern for industry in the context of CE, despite all the design tools available, 
then it would be important to explore the reasons that might prevent designs from being 
optimised for manufacture. 
The PI model prompted discussion between the relevant functions at the appropriate 
stage in development, on issues of the kind summarised in Section 3.8.3, but did not 
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compel people to solve them in the optimum manner. In most cases the necessary 
information was known, or the need to generate it could have been recognised at an 
early stage. The focus of the research therefore became to find out why people do not 
use the information available to them. Two aspects in particular needed to be addressed: 
1. What sources influence design? 
2. Why don't people use the available information? - Why can things go wrong? 
If it were assumed that: 
Information that would enable the design of a part to be optimised for manufacture 
existed somewhere, or could be generated in some way, and 
The design was not optimised for manufacture before manufacturing instructions were 
issued to the shopfloor for the part to be made. 
Then: 
Some influence or influences prevented the designer from receiving the information and 
acting upon it. 
This led to the final research question for this thesis being identified as: 
"Why do manufacturing problems reach the shopfloor when sources of 
information are available to prevent them? " 
Definitions: 
Manufacturing 
Manufacturing 
problems 
Reach the shopfloor 
Sources of information 
The making of individual parts 
Manufacturing information is missing, inconsistent or corrupt 
The parts are difficult or impossible to make 
Manufacturing could be done better 
Manufacturing instructions reach those tasked or contracted 
to make the parts 
Any means whereby information might be known or be 
generated. In Chapter 5 such sources are categorised as: 
" Training and experience 
" Standards, textbooks, reports, specifications and 
procedures 
" CAD Systems 
" Design for manufacture (DFM) tools and software 
" Communication and Teamworking 
Available The requisite information existed, or could have been 
generated, and a mechanism existed by which it could have 
been accessed during the design process 
Prevent Changes that could have been made in the design process to 
alter the manufacturing instructions before they were issued 
to the shopfloor 
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Chapter 4 Literature Review 
In order to obtain an understanding of material relevant to the pursuit of the research 
question, this chapter starts with a review of literature on the principles of concurrent 
engineering (CE), producibility, the design process, and the manufacturing information 
requirements for designers. 
The principal thrust of Sections 4.1 to 4.4 is to report on what writers on these subjects 
regard as the way to achieve a successful design-to-manufacture process. 
Section 4.5 looks at the sources of producibility information to influence designers, 
including material on engineering, social, communication and management subjects. 
Section 4.6 examines the shortcomings of current systems and considers the types of 
reasons for problems occurring in manufacturing, including material on human, social, 
communication and management subjects. 
Finally, Section 4.7 considers the gap in research that this thesis is aimed at filling. 
Use of literature 
The references contained in this chapter were not all found at the start of the research. 
This follows Silverman's argument that a literature review should mainly be written 
after the data analysis has been completed (Silverman 2000) p 231. The basic principles 
were looked at early, but it was in the nature of `grounded theory' qualitative research 
that the subjects to be explored should emerge as a result of the continuing compilation 
and analysis of data. Electronic databases were searched for relevant topics, and new 
material gathered, throughout the period of research. 
In addition to the literature referred to in this chapter, there are many more detailed 
references that form part of framework tables and notes in Chapter 6 to illustrate 
specific examples of the relationships between types of problems in manufacturing and 
sources of information and influence to prevent them. To avoid duplication, such further 
references have been omitted from this chapter. 
4.1 Concurrent Engineering (CE) 
The concept of CE is important because of its increasing use to bring together the 
people involved in the design-to-manufacturing chain and to overlap their activities in 
time (i. e. concurrency) to bring about significant improvements in effectiveness. 
RP Smith provides a useful history of the ideas and themes involved since the 19th- 
century, and shows how CE may be seen as a summary of best practice in product 
development, rather than the adoption of a radically new set of ideas. He suggests that 
the concurrent engineering ideas have existed for a long time, but were not put into 
practice both because older methods seemed easier and because the educational system 
did not advocate sufficiently a change to preexisting practices (Smith 1997) p76. 
4.1.1 Concurrent Engineering Principles 
The traditional attitude of designers had been `we design it, you build it', now termed 
the `over-the-wall approach'. This occurs where the designer is sitting on one side of the 
wall and throwing the designs over the wall to the manufacturing engineers who then 
39 
have to deal with the various manufacturing problems arising because they were not 
involved in the design effort. The teamwork resulting from consulting the 
manufacturing engineers at the design stage is known as `simultaneous' or `concurrent' 
engineering. The benefits claimed include reduction in overall cost, reduction in time to 
market (from design concept to production delivery) and improvement in quality 
(Boothroyd, Dewhurst et al. 1994). 
Cleetus traces the history from the first definition of the term `concurrent engineering' 
given in a report by Winner et al to the United States Institute of Defense Analyses 
(Winner, Pennell et al. 1988): 
"Concurrent engineering is a systematic approach to the integrated, concurrent 
design of products and their related processes, including manufacture and support. 
This approach is intended to cause the developers, from the outset, to consider all 
elements of the product life cycle from conception through disposal, including 
quality, cost, schedule, and user requirements. " 
In 1992 the Concurrent Engineering Research Center (CERC), set up by the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), put forward a new, more general 
definition: 
"Concurrent engineering is a systematic approach to integrated product 
development that emphasises response to customer expectations and embodies 
team values of co-operation, trust and sharing in such a manner that decision- 
making proceeds with large intervals of parallel working by all life-cycle 
perspectives early in the process, synchronised by comparatively brief exchanges 
to produce consensus. " 
Cleetus claimed that no single idea of CE was new in the late 1980s, but putting it all 
together resulted in new insights and inspiration for new approach. The uniqueness of 
CE lay not so much in fundamental insights as into their practical consequences 
(Cleetus 1998) pp 249-251. 
Dimanescu and Dwenger also quote the 1988 study, regarding it as a sharp conceptual 
break with long-held management practices. The old-style hand-off from design to 
manufacture "It's your problem now" was no longer acceptable, but few companies had 
by then found a `best way' of achieving concurrency in their development projects 
(Dimancescu and Dwenger 1996) p 44. 
A number of textbooks cover concurrent engineering principles, e. g.: Pahl and Beitz 
1984 and 1995; Pugh 1990 and 1996; Clark and Wheelwright 1995; Bralla 1986 and 
1996; Niebel and Draper 1974; Prasad 1996 and 1997; and Todd 1995. These each 
include broadly similar advice on the principles of improving producibility by applying 
various rules, most of which would be familiar to experienced design and 
manufacturing engineers. Software programmes are available to assist in the assessment 
of design-for-assembly and design-for-manufacture quality by reducing the number of 
parts (especially fasteners), reducing set-up requirements, adjusting tolerances, etc. 
While many references are made to involving suppliers as appropriate, there are few 
rules put forward as to how this should be done in practice. 
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4.1.2 Implementation of CE 
Kormos reports a few clear patterns that had begun to emerge from his experience of 
reviewing hundreds of CE and integrated product-development (IPD) programs, while 
judging award schemes over a number of years. He lists four key items for many 
companies to have a CE capability: 
9 Basic CAD and simulation tools, often in their second or third generation; 
" Cross-functional teams; 
"A formal and well-documented system for managing projects. 
"A robust program for integrating engineering and manufacturing, generally 
through early design reviews and use of various Design-for-X methods. 
It can take even a well-managed organisation years to get these four areas right. Others 
never seem to get there at all. Kormos regarded the vast majority of CE programs 
examined as having reached `stage-two maturity', but somehow found it hard to 
progress further. They had defined cross-functional teams that brought some measure of 
improvement. Products come out more or less on schedule, but with spotty market 
success. There were fewer producibility issues and more consistency from project to 
project. 
Kormos suggested a number of issues that characterised the product-development 
companies that had reached greater CE maturity. One focus was on methods for 
harvesting knowledge from completed projects to minimise `wheel spinning'. Qualities 
common to this advanced form of IPD maturity included advanced collaboration. 
Exemplary programs generally invested in technology that fostered communication and 
information sharing among team members. The best firms were well beyond e-mail and 
shared project schedules. They collaborated electronically across physical and 
organisational boundaries (Kormos 1998). 
4.1.3 Integrated product development teams 
Weber describes how aerospace companies had been moving to form integrated product 
development teams in order to improve their new product introduction process. These 
teams consisted of specialists from a wide range of disciplines who could interact early 
in the design process to speed up the timescale and also to reduce the risk of later-life 
problems incurring cost. The mix of disciplines would shift and change over the life of 
the team. At the start, it would be primarily design with some representation from 
manufacturing, tooling and other disciplines. By the time full rate production 
commenced, the IPD teams would shift to a major emphasis on production and support 
disciplines, with design engineering, manufacturing and tooling disciplines staffed to 
handle the required product and process changes (Weber 1994). 
Weber emphasises the importance of effective and sufficient horizontal communication 
between the IPD teams to avoid IPD `silos'. The traditional `silos' were the design 
engineers' silo, strength engineers' silo, tool designers' silo, manufacturing engineers' 
silo, etc: now IPD teams need to avoid the tendency to have IPD `silos', each silo 
consisting of a design engineer, a strength engineer, a tool designer, a manufacturing 
engineer, etc. Where significant components were outsourced, the suppliers' expertise 
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needed to be harnessed. People need persuading that the potential benefits outweigh the 
likely additional time and effort necessary to involve suppliers with Design. The 
problem was how to do this effectively in a manner that benefited both customer and 
supplier (the `win-win' solution) (Weber 1994) p 22. 
New and Burnes reported that the more an activity involved changes in both the 
customer's and the supplier's operations, the more there was likely to be an even 
distribution of costs and benefits. Similarly, the more an activity was focused on the - 
supplier, the more likely it was that the supplier would pay the costs and the customer 
would reap the benefits (New and Burnes 1998). 
In the context of better outsourcing, Quinn regarded the question as not just whether to 
make or buy, but how to evaluate and achieve the desired balance between the 
independence and efficiency incentives needed to stimulate a supplier and the buyer's 
needs for control and security (Quinn 1999) p 9. 
"A primary reason for outsourcing is to leverage the supplier's greater skills, 
knowledge bases, investments, and processes. If the buyer specifies how to do 
the job in detail, it will kill innovation and vitiate the supplier's real advantage. 
Time spent in early stages to investigate and ensure the congruence of the 
supplier's and buyer's value systems and incentive structures is invaluable.... 
Without goal congruence, control costs become excessive for both parties. With 
it, benefits multiply and costs plummet. With proper monitoring, companies 
repeatedly find that - instead of losing knowledge capabilities - the sum of 
outside suppliers' knowledge, the stimulation and insights they provide, and the 
solutions they develop will vastly exceed the potentials of any inside group, 
unless that group is the company's core competency. A most common error is to 
ignore the internal costs of non-innovation, missed opportunities, delays, 
management time expenditures, and inefficiencies due to internal suppliers' 
having an ensured customer. Some of the greatest values of outsourcing are the 
opportunistic ideas that the company otherwise would never see. " 
4.2 Producibility 
The concept of 'producibility' is fundamental to a consideration of problems that occur 
in manufacturing. Bralla defines this as being synonymous with 'manufacturability' 
(Bralla 1996): 
"By manufacturability we mean the ease with which a product or component can 
be produced, its simplicity, the straightforwardness of its configuration, the degree 
to which it minimises labour, materials, and overhead costs, and the freedom that 
its design has from inherent quality and processing problems. " 
The major influence on producibility is that of design. Bralla asserts that: 
" The most significant manufacturing-cost reductions and cost avoidances are 
those that result from changes to product design rather than from changes in 
manufacturing methods or systems (Bralla 1986) p XII; 
" The most producible designs are provided when the designer and manufacturing 
personnel, particularly manufacturing engineers, work closely together from the 
outset. (Bralla 1986) p 1. 
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4.3 Design - Definition, Models and Methods 
4.3.1 Definition of design 
Hubka and Eder distinguish between two interpretations of the word `design': as a 
noun, meaning the outward appearance and pattern of artificial objects, artefacts, 
systems and products, and as a verb, meaning the process of establishing which of 
several alternative ways (and with what tools) things could be done, which of these is 
most promising, and how to implement that choice, with continual reviews, additions 
and corrections to the work. The process interpretation is seen as more important in the 
context of engineering, although in some ways both object and activity must be co- 
ordinated (Hubka and Eder 1996) p ix. 
Alexander presented an error-reduction perspective of design: 
"Every design problem begins with an effort to achieve fitness between two 
entities: the form in question and its context. The form is the solution to the 
problem; the context defines the problem. In design, the real object of discussion 
is not the form alone, but the ensemble comprising the form and its context. Good 
fit is the desired property of this ensemble which relates to some particular 
division of the ensemble into form and context" (Alexander 1964) pp 15-16. 
The process interpretation was adopted in a survey carried out by Evbuomwan et al, 
who incorporated a number of definitions of `design' in describing it as (Evbuomwan, 
Sivaloganathan et al. 1996) p 302: 
"The process of establishing requirements based on human needs, transforming 
them into performance specification and functions, which are then mapped and 
converted (subject to constraints) into Design solutions (using creativity, scientific 
principles and technical knowledge) that can be economically manufactured and 
produced. " 
It is significant that the more recent approaches emphasise the design process rather 
than the design object. Hammer and Champy now state in their latest edition that 
`processes' is the most important word in their definition of reengineering, overtaking 
`radical', which had been regarded as more important in 1993 (Hammer and Champy 
2001)p38. 
4.3.2 Design process models 
Evbuomwan distinguishes between prescriptive and descriptive design models arising 
from various philosophies or strategies in the past. The prescriptive models tend to look 
at the design process from a global perspective, covering the procedural steps, i. e. 
suggesting the best way something should be done. The descriptive models are 
concerned with designers' actions and activities during the design process, i. e. what is 
involved in designing and/or how it is done. More recently, a third group of 
computational models has been developed. These place emphasis on the use of 
numerical and qualitative computational techniques, artificial intelligence techniques, 
combined with modem computing technologies. These three classes of design models 
all share some common characteristics. 
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The majority of the prescriptive models on the design process are based on the 
procedural steps of the design activities (analysis, synthesis, evaluation, decisions, etc. ), 
while others based their steps on what can be regarded as the phases/stages of design 
(conceptual design, embodiment design and detailed design). The models that were 
based on the phases of the design process include those of Asimow (1962), Pahl and 
Beitz (1984), Pugh (1990), VDI 2221 (transl. by Wallace 1987), Watts (1996), 
Wheelwright and Clark (1992), Hubka (1992) and French (1971). The models, except 
for those of French and VDI 2221, also contained in a more detailed form within each 
of the design phases/stages, the design activities that characterised a majority of the 
other models. The Watts model showed only the two ends of the design phase, i. e. 
abstract and concrete, with the interval between represented by a cyclic (iterative, 
refining and progressive) process. 
The models that were based on design activities included those by Jones (Jones and 
Thornley 1962), Marples (1960 pp 1-16), Archer (1984), Krick (1969), Cross (1991) 
and Harris (1980). It can also be observed that in all of the models, three key activities 
were predominant, i. e. analysis, synthesis and evaluation. Analysis was mostly related 
to analysing the design problem, requirements and specifications. Synthesis was 
concerned with generating ideas, proposing solutions to large or small design problems 
as well as exploring the design solution space, while evaluation involved the appraisal 
of design solutions in order to establish whether they satisfied the requirements and 
specifications and set corporate criteria. The sequence in general also tended to be 
analysis first, followed by synthesis and evaluation. In the model by Krick, synthesis 
was replaced by search and evaluation by decision. The model by Harris represented 
analysis, synthesis and evaluation by appraisal of the task, conception and appraisal of 
concepts respectively. 
It is not surprising that the three activities of analysis, synthesis and evaluation were 
predominant as they represent the core of the design process. If proper analysis of the 
problem or requirements is not carried out, synthesising solutions will be difficult and 
inappropriate solutions might be the result. Once plausible solutions are created, there is 
then the needed to evaluate, test and assess their fidelity to the originating requirements 
and specifications as well as set criteria. 
Besides the three activities, there are, however, other necessary activities that should be 
performed during the design process, such as optimisation, revision, data collection, 
documentation, communication, selection, decision-making, modelling, etc. Some of 
these activities were included in some of the models. 
4.3.3 Prescriptive models based on product attributes 
Suh reasoned that the majority of product or systems failures could be attributed to any 
or a combination of the following: 
" incorrect or excessive functional requirements; 
" continuing alterations to functional requirements; 
" wrong design decisions; 
" the inability to recognise faulty decisions early enough to rectify them. 
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The existence of unacceptable designs as well as good designs suggested that there 
should be some features or attributes that could distinguish between good and 
unacceptable designs. This led to Suh's axiomatic approach to design based on 
attributes of the design produced (Suh 1988). The two fundamental axioms that can 
guide decisions to maximise the productivity of the total manufacturing system are: 
" Axiom 1: In good design the independence of functional requirements is 
maintained. 
" Axiom 2: Among the designs that satisfy Axiom 1 the best design is the one that 
has the minimum information content. 
Some of the important design corollaries that follow from these axioms are: 
" Decouple or separate parts or aspects of a solution if functional requirements are 
coupled or become coupled in the design of products and processes. 
" Integrate functional requirements into a single Physical Part or solution if they 
can be independently satisfied in the proposed solution. 
" Minimise the number of functional requirements and constraints. 
" Use standardised or interchangeable parts whenever possible. 
" Make use of symmetry to reduce the information content. 
" Conserve materials and energy. 
"A part should be a continuum if energy conduction is important. 
Taguchi argued that the total costs at the point of production about the point of 
consumption should be minimum for good designs and this should be the goal of 
product development. He introduced a `loss function' as an attribute of the product 
design, which had to be minimised to achieve robust designs. Taguchi suggested that 
the following sequence of events in his design model, to achieve robustness (Taguchi 
1986): 
" System design - the physical embodiment of the functional requirements of the 
product, where special engineering and scientific knowledge is applied. 
" Parameter design - the process of identifying the optimal settings of various 
parameters under the control of the designer to limit variation. 
" Tolerance design - involves the control of the variation in critical parameters 
when everything else has failed to control the variation of performance within 
the required limit. 
Matousek recommends the following systematic working plan as the most practical for 
a designer (Matousek 1963) p 27: 
I. Exact formulation of problems and defining of all questions relating thereto. 
II. Setting out of all possible solutions capable of providing the action called for in I 
into a diagrammatic form (basic Design) and selection of the optimum solution. 
III. Selection of the most suitable material. 
IV. Consideration of production engineering problems. 
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V. Deciding on the most appropriate form design. 
VI. Ascertaining the overall cost. 
Overall cost always decides the final form taken by the work. If the cost aspect is 
unsatisfactory it will be necessary to re-examine the situation in the sequence: 
Material4manufacture4form4 cost 
In considering product design for manufacture and assembly, Boothroyd Dewhurst and 
Knight use the term `design' to refer to the detailing of the materials, shapes and 
tolerance of the individual parts of a product. This activity starts with sketches of parts 
and assemblies and progresses to the drawing board or CAD workstation where 
assembly drawings and detail part drawings are produced (Boothroyd, Dewhurst et al. 
1994) p 2. 
4.3.4 Descriptive design models 
Descriptive models cover the processes, strategies and problem-solving methods that 
designers use, usually emphasising the importance of generating one solution concept 
early in the process. This solution goes through a process of analysis, evaluation, 
refinement and development. Examples of the models of March (March 1984), Matchett 
(Matchett and Briggs 1996) and Gero (Hybs and Gero 1992) are given by Evbuomwan 
(Evbuomwan, Sivaloganathan et al. 1996) p 313. 
4.3.5 Computational design models 
Computational models are the basis of computer-generated design solutions, and hence 
lie within the boundaries of the prescriptive and descriptive models above. Although 
rapid advances in computer techniques enable repetitive or iterative tasks to be 
performed quickly, the human thought processes on which they are based remain the 
same. For the purposes of this thesis, they will not be examined further, except where 
they provide tools such as design-for-manufacture analysis and support. 
4.3.6 Generic design model 
In order to look for common elements in design models, the phases or stages of 22 
design models were tabulated and compared in a two-dimensional table (Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1 Comparison of Design Model Stages 
Model Model Phases/Stages 
Author 
1 2 3 4 5 6 Remarks 
Archer L. Programm- Data Analysis Synthesis - Develop- Communic- These 6 
B. ing collection outline merit of ation: stages 
(1984) design prototype preparation grouped into 
proposals designs; of 3 phases - 
validation manufacturi analytic, 
studies ng creative and 
documents executive 
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Model Phases/Stages 
Asimow Feasibility Preliminary Detailed Each of these 
M. study design design 3 stages is in 
steps of (1962) 
analysis, 
synthesis, 
evaluation, 
decision, 
optimisation 
and revision 
BS 7000 Feasibility Conceptual Embodiment Detail Manufact- Post design Derives from 
Part 1: study 
design design design uring support Pahl and 
(1990) - Design - concept - layout - detailed 
instructions Beitz and 
brief drawings drawings product French 
definition 
BS 7000 Feasibility Concept Embodiment Detailed Finalisation Design Includes refs 
phase design design design- for support for to Pugh, Part 2: 
- general product manufacture manufacture Wheelwright (1997) 
arrangement specification and delivery and Clark, 
- - product Topalian, and 
pre- package J. C. Jones 
production 
prototypes 
Cross N. Clarification Establishing Setting Generating Evaluating Improving 
(1991) of objective 
functions - requirements alternatives - alternatives - details - 
- objective function - morphology weighted value 
tree method analysis performance chart to objectives engineering 
specification generate method method 
complete 
range 
French M. Analysis - Conceptual Embodiment Detailing - Model shows 
J. identify nee design - of schemes - selected feedback 
(1971) as precisely 
broad develop into scheme between the 
as possible solutions greater worked into first 3 phases 
schemes details finite details 
Gero J. S. Formulation Analysis Synthesis Design Simulation Manufact- Evolutionary 
(Hybs & of design description of ure of design model 
Gero 1992) brief or environment product - iterative 
specification cycle 
Harris A. Appreciatio Conception Appraisal of Decision - Checking Used for civil 
J. of the task - tentative concepts - criteria may and engineering 
(1980) needs, 
form, critical include elaboration - design 
resources material and examination simplicity, models built teaching 
construction distinction and tested, 
method and construc analytical 
ability techniques 
applied, 
drawings 
and text 
produced 
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Model Phases/Stages 
Hubka V. Elaboration Conceptual Laying out- Elaboration 6 steps in 4 
of assigned design preliminary - detailing phases (1992) 
problem - functional l ayout - 
- clarify structures dimensional 
specification - concept layout 
Jones J. C. Analysis Synthesis Methods of Evaluation Evaluation by 
evaluation -- for operation manufacturin (1962) to detect manufacture g is a late 
errors and sales occurrence in 
this model 
Krick E. Problem Problem Search - Decision - Specification 
V. formulation analysis - generation evaluation, - detailed 
(1969) specification of comparison 
documentati 
, constraints alternative and on, 
and criteria solutions screening drawings, 
reports etc. 
March L. Productive Deduction - Inductive Cycle is 
(1984) reasoning - 
design reasoning - repeated to 
creates nove theories evaluates refine as 
composition predict suppositions necessary 
performance 
Marples D. Synthesis - Synthesis - Evaluation Decision on `Marples tree' 
L. search for examination of viable particular 
(1960) possible of possible solutions solution 
solutions solutions 
Matchett Thinking Thinking in Thinking Thinking Thinking 'Fundamental 
E. with outline parallel from several with with basic Design 
(1996) strategies planes viewpoints concepts elements method' (FDM) 
Matousek Problem Basic design Material Manufacture Form design Overall cost 
R. - define all - set out - select most - consider - decide on ascertain 
(1963) questions possible suitable production most 
solutions engineering appropriate 
- select problems 
optimum 
Pahl G. Clarification Conceptual Embodiment Detailed 
and W. of the task design design design 
Beitz 
(1984) 
Pugh S. Market Product Conceptual Detailed Manufacture Sales Total Design 
(1990) (user need) 
design design design activity 
specification (note: model shows 
concept may these 5 core 
come before elements 
specification within 
for fixed or iterative 
static framework of 
concepts) resources, 
constraints 
and analysis 
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Model Phases/Stages 
Suh N. Problem Ideation - Analysis of Checking Axiomatic 
definition- c onceptualisi p roposed fidelity of design model: (1988) functional ng and s olution - final seeks 
r equirement devising ar ationality s olution to i ndependence 
(FRs) and solution and original of FRs and 
constraints consistency needs minimum 
with problerr. info content 
definition of design 
Taguchi G. System Parameter Tolerance Integrates 
design - design - design - quality into (1986) 
physical optimal control of early design 
embodiment settings to critical stage - 
of of limit parameters `quality loss 
functional variation function' 
requirement 
VDI 2221 Clarification Determinati Search for Division of Develop- Develop- 
and n of required solution solution into ment of key ment of (transl. by definition of functions principles realisable modules into definitive Wallace, design task modules set of layouts and K. L. preliminary final 1987) layouts documentati 
on 
Watts R. Analysis Synthesis of Evaluation o Performed 
D. design feasibility, cyclicly from 
concepts optimisation abstract to (1986) 
revision and concrete 
communicati levels 
on (Helical 
model) 
Wheel- Concept Product Product/ Pilot Typical 
wright S. developmen planning process production/ phases of 
and K. - product - model engineering ramp up product 
Clark architecture building - detailed - volume development 
(1992) - conceptual - small-scale 
design of production 
design testing product and prove-out 
- target - investment 
Tools/ - factory 
market financial equipment start-up 
- building/ - volume 
testing increases to 
prototypes commercial 
targets 
Allowing for the use of different terms to describe essentially the same activity, and for 
the incorporation into many models of effectively a third dimension to provide for 
iteration or the influence of constraints, there was a general commonality in the 
approaches. 
For the purpose of this thesis, a generic design model was assumed that contained the 
following elements that were common to the methods in Table 4.1: 
" clarification of requirements/task concept; 
" development of the conceptual design; 
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" embodiment or layout design; 
" detailed design; 
0 IIkululactiinng instructions and production documentation. 
4.3.7 Design methods 
A number of design aids, tools and support systems are used during the various stages 
of the design process, in order to arrive at a realisable product and/or process. These 
tools and aids are what are generally regarded as design methods. They help to 
formalise and systematise activities within the design process and externalise design 
thinking, i. e. they try to get a designer's thoughts and thinking processes out of the head 
and into charts and diagrams (Evbuomwan, Sivaloganathan et al. 1996) p 315. 
I lubka defines a design method (I lubka 1983) as: 
"Any system of methodical rules and directives that aim to determine the 
designer's manner of proceeding to pertörm a particular design activity, and 
regulate the collaboration with available technical means. " 
4.4 Manufacturing information requirements for design 
ý, ý 
_', Material 
ýý 
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unKhan 
Pro ccss I 
Figure 4.1 Interaction of function, material, process and shape (Ashby) 
Ashby describes how function, material, shape and production process interact, with the 
aid of the diagram shown in Figure 4.1.1 le emphasises the importance to design of' 
knowing the material attributes, i. e. its physical, mechanical, thermal, electrical, 
environmental and economic properties (Ashhy 1999 p 2). 
Chen researched the basis fra knowledge-based computer tool for providing designers 
with manufacturing information. Ile found that designers were usually familiar with 
only a few methods of' production and tend to design for these, as they felt confident 
with them. When they needed to apply unfamiliar manufacturing methods, they often 
eneouiiterecl Iwo pruhfems: they did not know which manutacturing issues were 
important, and they did not have sufficient manufacturing information to address the 
issues (('hen I9Q») p ?. 
('hen investigated the characteristics of manutacturing information required in each 
design phase, using a set of-phases based on those ot'Pahl and Beit,.. He assumed that 
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this information depended on the specific design-for-manufacture focus of that phase 
and on the design information available in that phase as follows (Chen 1998) pp114- 
118: 
" Task Clarification Phase: (Production-related requirements) since no 
configuration information is generated, designers cannot analyse or improve 
product producibility. 
- Supports specifying production-related requirements. 
- Guidance information: checklists of requirements; (measurable) indices 
for the requirements; and guidelines for using the indices. 
- Analysis information: feasibility and clarity of requirements. 
- Redesign information: identification of defects; actions for correcting 
defects; and cost impacts of the actions. 
" Conceptual Design Phase (Configuration information on both joints and 
components available. Only characteristic assembly and component attributes 
specified. Provisional rather than determined. Broad rather than specific. ) 
- Supports generating producible characteristic configuration. 
- Information on both manufacturing and assembly processes is required. 
- Manufacturing information is seldom required. 
- General information is more useful than detailed information. 
- Class-level information (e. g. casting) is more useful than method level 
information (e. g. sand-casting). 
- General DFMA guidance that allows a large degree of freedom is very 
useful during this phase. 
- Information on fatal defects of characteristic configuration, i. e. 
uncorrectable errors without changing solution principle, is required. 
- Accurate producibility analysis is difficult to generate and of little use. 
- Redesign information on minor corrections is seldom required. 
" Layout Design Phase (Configuration information on both joints and 
components available. Information on joints is completed in detail. Information 
on assembly-related component attributes is detailed and completed. Information 
on non-assembly-related component attributes is broadly specified. ) 
- Supports generating product configuration for ease of manufacture and 
assembly. 
- Information on both manufacturing and assembly process is required. 
- Due to its high intensity of the generation of configuration information, a large amount of information is required. 
- Detailed information is more useful than general information. 
51 
- Method-level information (e. g. sand casting) is more useful than class 
level information (e. g. casting). 
- Both general and method-specific guidance is useful. 
" Detail Design Phase (Configuration information on both joints and components 
available. All information on components is detailed and completed. ) 
- Supports detailing component information for ease of manufacture while 
maintaining product assemblability. 
- Information on both manufacturing and assembly processes is required. 
- Substantial information on the manufacturing process is needed. 
- Most of the information required is detailed and method-specific. 
- Although general guidance is useful, detailed and method-specific 
guidance about manufacturing methods is essential. 
" Product Documentation Phase (Product documents containing design 
information and production instructions. ) 
- Supports document in design information and production instructions. 
- Guidance information: drawing standards; documents standards; and 
coding systems. 
- Analysis information: feasibility and clarity of documents. 
- Redesign information: identification of defects; actions for correcting 
defects; and cost impacts of the actions. 
Chen defined the manufacturing information (MI) required by designers as being either 
direct or indirect (Chen 1998) pp 120-122. Figure 4.2 shows his Manufacturing 
Information Model, as modified by Nowack to include the extended design environment 
(Nowack 1997) p 137. Both Chen and Nowack were seeking to provide manufacturing 
information guidelines to designers in an automated manner that could be accessed 
when manufacturing engineers were not available. Chen defined Indirect MI as the 
types of information needed by designers to address production issues: 
" Guidance information, including DFMA principles, important production 
issues and issue-specific guidelines. 
Producibility information, including information on production feasibility and 
costs. 
" Redesign information, including identification of design defects, specific 
design changes to correct these defects and evaluation of improvements in 
producibility. 
The above was named `indirect' MI because it was usually specific to design projects, it 
was seldom directly available from design handbooks or catalogues and was usually 
derived from analysis. To generate indirect MI, manufacturing engineers need to be 
provided with the following types of design information: configuration information, 
project information and rationale information. 
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Designer 
k_ý- Indirect Design Manufacturing Manufacturing 
Attributes Engineer Information 
Direct Manufacturing Information 
Figure 4.2 Manufacturing Information Model (Nowack, after Chen) 
In contrast to indirect MI, Direct MI was usually readily available from handbooks and 
catalogues, and not normally prepared for any particular projects. Direct MI: 
" included all information about production methods, manufacturing systems 
and engineering materials; 
" emphasised information about production methods and information on 
production resources. 
The author was privileged in April 2000 to have a brief discussion with Dr Ken 
Wallace, who had supervised both Chen and Nowack for their PhD work at Cambridge 
University, referred to in this section. He had been responsible for the translation from 
German into English of the standard work on design by Pahl and Beitz (Pahl and Beitz 
1984). While design guidelines could provide valuable assistance, Dr Wallace accepted 
that it might be 20 years before comprehensive automated systems could replace 
entirely the personal input of the manufacturing engineer. 
4.5 Sources of Information to Influence Design 
Designers are influenced by a number of sources of information to assist them in 
solving problems and help them to develop manufacturable designs. E. g. Slusher and 
Ebert recognised two reservoirs of information that project teams used in any design 
environment: the team's personal knowledge gained from its own experiences, and 
general design knowledge contained in books, computer databases, organisational 
documents, and in the minds of designers. If the team's current problem lay outside 
their existing repertoire, they would extend the search and explore other standard 
information sources. Only when familiar sources had been exhausted would the team 
expend additional effort to identify and exploit new information sources. The sources 
that would be tapped were constrained by knowledge, time, cost and access 
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requirements, and the search limited to accumulating a satisfactory amount of 
information rather than the maximum (Slusher and Ebert 1992) p 126. 
The following sections set out points from the literature relating to sources of 
information that could influence a designer. Chapter 5 Section 5.3.3 explains how such 
sources were divided into the five categories subsequently used for analysis: training 
and experience; standards, textbooks, reports, specifications and procedures; CAD 
Systems; design for manufacture (DFM) tools and software; and communication and 
teamworking. For ease of cross-reference, these categories are used as headings here. 
4.5.1 Training 
Hubka and Eder postulate that, because it is a rational (cognitive) activity, which can be 
decomposed into smaller (Design) steps, stages and/or phases, designing is teachable, 
conditioned by the existence of the theory (i. e. Design Science), and the right 
educational methods and media (Hubka and Eder 1996) p 50. 
Training is a source of information and influence for everyone, not just in respect of the 
technical knowledge possessed by the designer. Drennan emphasises the importance of 
training programmes in changing people's culture. The right sort of training can help 
everyone in the organisation, from top management downwards, to change his or her 
habits and behaviour (Drennan 1992) p 112. 
McMahon et al emphasised the importance of designers maximising the quality of 
information retrieved in the time allocated to information retrieval, by training and 
personal development to improve the value of personal and group memories. Their 
ability to connect with the highest quality information available to the organisation 
should be helped by the provision of suitable information storage and retrieval 
mechanisms (McMahon, Lowe et al. 1999) p 1653. 
4.5.2 Experience 
The `deepest' level of experience was the understanding shown by experienced 
designers with a wide-ranging working knowledge of the technology and issues in their 
specialist areas of design, acquired over many years and obtained from a number of 
projects (Marsh 1997) p 150. 
4.5.3 Standards, textbooks, reports, specifications and procedures 
From his direct observations of designers in aerospace, Marsh found that the use of 
formally-recorded information (e. g. reports or other design documentation) was 
hampered by: 
" In many situations, designers were unaware of, and unable to determine, what 
relevant information existed. 
There was little certainty about what knowledge might be obtained from any 
documentation obtained - i. e. what would be included and to what level of 
detail. 
These issues, where design processes were constrained by time pressures, were more 
significant than physical accessibility or convenience of acquisition in governing the 
consultation of recorded information. Personal contacts were used for getting to most 
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information relating to past design work, existence of design alternatives and 
recommending approaches to tasks or problems, including finding information from 
reports or other process documentation (e. g. change control notes, manufacturing 
concessions). Design reports were not observed to be retrieved directly (e. g. from 
bookshelves or filing cabinet) except by the author of a given report. Speculative 
searches to establish what, if any, documentation could be located and might be relevant 
were not seen to occur. Therefore where documents were retrieved directly, search time 
was minimal because the source was known and familiar (Marsh 1997) p 159. 
Standards, textbooks, reports, specifications, procedures and databases used by 
designers are, by nature, based on historical information. If they are not kept up to date, 
or if consulted in the wrong context, they may provide false guidance. 
4.5.4 CAD Systems 
McMahon and Browne provide a useful guide to the principles, operation and use of 
computer-aided design (CAD) systems, and their interface to computer-aided 
manufacturing (CAM) (McMahon and Browne 1993). 
Baker describes current CAD Systems as `reactive', because a designer typically has 
only a fraction of the information he needs when he starts a job. For example, he may 
know that certain components of a product will be milled, but he probably does not 
know which machine will be used or what the travel limits of the tool are. These factors 
might affect the design. But the designer does not find this out until the design has been 
sent on to Manufacturing. They alert him to a problem regarding tool travel and then he 
reacts, redesigning the part as necessary. Baker goes on to advocate a `predictive' CAD 
system of the future that would allow designers to incorporate manufacturing 
requirements and evaluate product performance early in the design process, when they 
could make those changes inexpensively, shifting the design engineer's role from one of 
reacting to that of predicting, or meeting in advance all of the requirements for the 
product. This cannot be done by a commodity geometry-centric CAD tool, but requires 
a high-end CAD system supported by a wide range of integrated, advanced knowledge- 
capture technologies. Knowledge-enabled CAD, the foundation of the predictive 
engineering environment, represents the next big step in the evolution of mechanical 
CAD technology. This is comparable with the change from drawing-based technology 
to feature-based digital models or the more recent shift to process-based solutions. The 
latter came about as the CAD vendors developed CAD/CAM/CAE implementations 
called `process threads. ' A process thread supplies all the tools necessary to move an 
idea from concept to finished product with no data translation (Baker 2000) p 96. 
4.5.5 Design for Manufacture (DFM) tools and software 
Checklists, guidelines, geometry-checking software, context-sensitive manufacturing 
advice software, and cost-calculating software are all examples of tools that may be 
used to assist in improving the producibility of designs. 
4.5.5.1 Checklists 
Lempiäinen regarded paper-based checklists as the most-used and easily-accessible way 
of utilising DFM methods. The basic lists could be easily created, copied and modified 
according to the product families and their special problematics. This tool was 
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extraordinarily cheap. The number of checklist questions was usually very limited, so 
the motivation for using this in a new product development project was rather high. It 
was easy to generate new very detailed questions, as the part families often had special 
design and production characteristics (Lempiäinen 1997). 
Gruenwald provided guidelines on the purpose and use of checklists (Gruenwald 1991): 
" The discipline of the new product checklist is to be certain that no consideration 
is overlooked. It is not to assure that all are implemented. 
" Countless new product failures are attributable to missed, ignored, misplaced, or 
purposely gap jumped essential steps or information. Almost every flop finds its 
cause in something that appears obvious after the fact and, in many cases 
obvious in the very early, least-costly phases of development. A comprehensive 
checklist system provides an early, regularly-modified detailed perspective. 
" The checklist should be comprehensive, including an evaluation of management, 
personnel, facilities and resources... and also provide space for appended areas 
that may be unique to your specific business. 
" It is critical that the checklist used accommodates all affected and affecting 
parties within the organisation. Each business is built differently, whether it be 
maker, processor, builder, servicer or seller, or any combination of these. It will 
be made up of any number of different departments, each with a different 
function. The checklist must allow input from all functions within the 
organisation. 
" Gruenwald's checklists set out the subjects for consideration as headings for the 
rows, and each business functional department was listed in the column 
headings. In this way, they could prompt inputs both from those departments 
most closely involved in the new product development and from less likely 
sources. 
4.5.5.2 Guidelines 
Manufacturability guidelines have been published for a variety of manufacturing 
processes. Minis et al reviewed a number of different approaches to evaluate the 
manufacturability of a given design, and classified them as follows: 
Direct or rule-based approaches evaluate manufacturability from direct 
inspection of the design description: design characteristics that improve or 
degrade the manufacturability are represented as rules, which are applied to a 
given design to estimate its manufacturability. Most existing approaches are of 
this type. Direct approaches do not involve planning, estimation, or simulation 
of the manufacturing processes involved in the realization of the design. 
Indirect or plan-based approaches do a much more detailed analysis: they 
proceed by generating a manufacturing plan and examine the plan according to 
criteria such as cost and cycle time. If there is more than one possible plan, then 
the most promising plan should be used for analysing manufacturability - and 
thus some plan-based systems generate and evaluate multiple plans. The plan- 
based approach involves reasoning about the processes involved in the product's 
manufacture. 
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The direct approach appears to be more useful in domains such as near-net-shape 
manufacturing, and less suitable for machined or electromechanical components, where 
interactions among manufacturing operations make it difficult to determine the 
manufacturability of a design directly from the design description. To calculate realistic 
manufacturability ratings for these latter cases, most of the rule-based approaches would 
require large sets of rules (Minis, Herrmann et al. 1999) p 384. 
Nowack discussed the use of design guidelines as follows (Nowack 1997) p 59: 
"A recent test revealed that the information accessed was often irrelevant in the 
eyes of the designer. 
" The primary use of design guidelines was for evaluating a design. Ackers et al 
noted that design guidelines were primarily used to check for omissions. 
Experienced designers were concerned about overlooking important issues and 
found that the database did not provide new information (Ackers et al. 1995). 
"A possible reason for Ackers observing little synthesis was because the tree 
structure in this set of guidelines made rapid retrieval difficult, especially when 
competing against the designer's mental store of guidelines. 
" Novice designers had different problems - often they found guidelines that 
appeared to be relevant, but the designer lacked the requisite knowledge to apply 
them (Ackers et al. 1995). Nowack suggested 'How'/'Why' & `Requires' 
relationships could help novices. 
"A major problem was that the guidelines did not bring design context to bear on 
guideline selection. 
" T. Lawlor-Wright also noted this problem on the early industrial tests of 
guidelines in Design for TestAbility project at the University of Salford, which led to the guidelines being provided with textual and graphical explanations 
(Lawlor-Wright 1997). 
4.5.5.3 DFM and DFA Software 
An increasing number of software programmes is available to assist designers in 
applying guidelines and checklists. Leaney compared from case experience the 
application of Boothroyd and Dewhurst Inc's (BDI) DFMA, Hitachi Assemblability 
Evaluation Method (AEM), and Lucas (CSE-TeamSET) (Leaney 1996a). Herrera 
describes the application of BDI DFMA on the Design of the AH64D Helicopter 
(Herrera 1997). It was noted that `DFMA' is a registered trademark of BDI (Boothroyd, 
Dewhurst et al. 1994) p 2, but is often applied by other authors to describe a variety of 
software tools for DFM and DFA. 
Minis et al regard traditional manufacturability evaluation approaches that consider 
typical costs and processing times (like DFMA20) as useful for comparing the relative 
cost and time when the manufacturing process is known and standardised. However, 
these approaches are insufficient and may lead to poor designs when there exist 
alternative process plans and a choice of subcontractors that have different capabilities 
(Minis, Herrmann et al. 1999) p 387. 
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In examining existing DFM and DFA tools, Chen concluded that most support methods 
for DFM and DFA were developed in isolation, and should be integrated to avoid 
shifting problems and costs between assembly and manufacture. Most computer-based 
DFM and DFA tools were not integrated into CAD systems - they relied on the 
designers' input of design information: often tedious and ambiguous. Therefore 
designers were discouraged from using the tools. Time-consuming search processes and 
the inability to provide precise immediate help for specific problems hampered the 
application of DFMA guidelines. Few methods were capable of providing redesign 
information after a producibility analysis, i. e. they could not show how designs could be 
improved. Research in knowledge acquisition and organisation was still needed, 
especially in practical ways to get information to designers in a useful and timely 
fashion (Chen 1998) p 36. The validity of Chen's point regarding the benefits of looking 
at DFM and DFA together is accepted. However, the earlier that Design is alerted to 
potential problems in manufacture of parts, the sooner any conflict with assembly 
considerations can be identified. The research for this PhD thesis is focused on DFM 
and Producibility in the context of optimising the design to avoid problems in the 
manufacture of individual parts, but in many cases the factors involved in allowing part- 
manufacturing problems to reach the shopfloor may apply equally to assembly 
problems. 
There is much scope for more widespread adoption of suitable tools by industry, in 
particular small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Bush and Rowbotham reported that 
often SMEs were not aware of many of the best design practices and so were not able to 
meet the demand for continuous improvement of the products. However, it was 
considered that if novice designers could successfully utilise design tools like QFD and 
DFMA to achieve improvements in design quality, then SMEs had no excuses for 
ignoring the benefits they could bring to their own product development activity (Bush 
and Robotham 1999) p 364. 
Leaney highlighted lessons from the Japanese approach to the integration of design, 
manufacture and assembly. Nissan recognised that the strict division of jobs according 
to function and duties of engineers in America and Europe has traditionally made it 
difficult to feed back information from the factory floor to the design process and carry 
out tasks jointly as done in Japan. Nissan considered that the use of design for 
manufacture and assembly tools, by themselves, did not appear to be a method for 
aggressively incorporating manufacturing needs in the product design because product 
design engineers could only guess what the impact of a product design might have on 
the manufacturing processes. In Japan the product design engineers were responsible for 
vigorously collecting from the production engineers all the information needed to 
execute designs for manufacture and assembly and for securing the latter's active 
involvement in the product design process. Production engineers for their part were 
responsible for presenting the production requirements in conjunction with conceptual 
studies of the manufacturing processes (Leaney 1996b) p 181. 
DFM software has limitations. Hubka and Eder describe a DFM computer program that 
can augment and partially replace the advice and co-operation needed in concurrent 
engineering, to design the product and the manufacturing process at the same time. 
Manufacturing enters and maintains its expertise in this knowledge-based system, and 
designers call on the expertise when needed. However, face-to-face negotiations are still 
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important, not just because the system can only maintain a limited range of expertise, 
but especially because personal interactions can improve the quality of considerations 
and ideas (Hubka and Eder 1996) p 144. 
4.5.6 Communication 
Francis defines communication as: "the medium through which managers lead, direct 
the activities of others, harness human creativity, co-ordinate specialists and control 
activities, and understand the needs and wants of those who work within the 
organisation and those who use the organisation's goods or services" (Francis 1987) p 
XI. It is to be expected from this that communication would be a relevant factor for a 
very wide range of issues. It will be seen in Chapter 5 that a number of aspects of 
communication were viewed as the reasons for problems, in addition to the use of 
communication to provide designers with sources of information. 
Drucker asserted that the effectiveness of an information system depended on the 
willingness and ability to think through carefully what information was needed by 
whom for what purposes, and then on the systematic creation of communication among 
the various parties. The effectiveness depended on the pre-establishment of 
communication (Drucker 1973) p 489. 
Ashkenas et al describe the importance of aligning the channel, or means for sharing 
information, and the message. When the channel matches the message, communication 
is improved. For example, memos, videos, and policy statements are all important 
channels for factual information. However, one-on-one or small-group meetings are 
much more useful channels for information meant to help employees change behaviour. 
Aligning the purpose and the medium allows managers to share information effectively, 
while misalignment produces communication failures. In one firm, managers held 
weekly staff `communication meetings' where each person described what he or she had 
done and would do that week. Although the information was useful, most staff members 
resented the time required when the same information could have been shared more 
efficiently through static media. 
Ashkenas et al povide the following guide to alignment of purpose and channel, in order 
of appropriateness for sharing factual information or shaping behaviour: 
" Face-to-face (one-on-one) - best for shaping behaviour; 
" Symbolic (meeting, rally); 
" Interactive media (telephone, voice mail, fax, e-mail); 
" Personal static media (letter, memo, report); 
" Impersonal static media (bulletin, flyers, newsletter, video) - best for sharing information. 
For example, if the purpose of communication is primarily to share factual information, 
then bulletins, flyers, and videos can be used successfully. Federal Express, for 
example, produces daily videos of the previous day's performance to pass along 
information to all employees about work flow. Conversely, if changing employees' 
behaviour is desired (for example, employees might need to be informed about a new 
performance assessment process), a memo is not the right way to communicate. Such 
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changes require some personal contact that makes employees part of the change 
process. 
Each organisation needs to decide what formats are best for it - reflecting its own 
resources and information collection systems, and the level of frequency that makes 
sense for its people (Ashkenas, Ulrich et al. 1995) p 75. 
Drisis reported the results of a global mechanical designer survey that took place in 
Nokia Mobile Phones Research and Development Centres. The target of the survey was 
to find the opinions and attitudes of mechanical designers with respect to their working 
environment, especially regarding computer aided design tools and support. The most 
interesting (and unexpected) conclusion from the survey was that the biggest problems 
identified were not connected to CAD software and directly related tools. These seemed 
to have reached a good level of functionality and ease of use, so that they did not 
present any big problems for the daily engineers' work, after an initial learning period. 
The biggest barrier was a cultural/mental and not a technical one: although the 
infrastructure was there, the designers still had difficulties in finding the information 
they needed. Communication in collaboration with others was therefore not as good as 
the tools used would suggest. It seems that the human way of acting and thinking cannot 
always keep pace with the latest changes in information technology (Drisis 1999, p 
570). 
4.5.7 Teamworking 
Swink et al emphasised that teams provide the primary integration mechanism in CE 
programmes, and three types of teams appeared frequently in these projects: a program 
management team, a technical team, and numerous design-build teams. Depending on 
the project's complexity, an integration team may be needed to consolidate the efforts of 
various design-build teams. Task forces also maybe formed to address specific 
problems, such as investigating an emerging technology. Some projects emphasised 
collocation and face-to-face communication. Others relied on phone conversations, 
documents, and electronic mail. Projects focusing on design quality relied on formal 
presentations and periodic review meetings. Projects emphasising development speed 
required frequent, informal communications. Programs addressing design quality 
required extended product definition and performance testing, with input from design 
engineering, marketing, and customers. Efforts to reduce development time involved 
small, informal teams led by design engineers and managers. Aggressive product cost 
goals necessitated intensive interaction between product designers and manufacturing 
personnel. Highly innovative products required early supplier involvement and joint 
engineering problem solving. Formal design reviews and shared design data systems 
aided information sharing between internal and external design groups. (Swink, Sandvig 
et al. 1996). 
GP Pisano expressed concern that the speed of internal and external changes of an 
organisation asked for a complex mix between parallel and sequential development 
strategies. Apart from that, expert knowledge from all over the world was used in these 
complex creative activities. No longer could creative and decision-making processes be 
dealt with by using teams that worked together physically. Unity of time, place and 
action had now become far too time-consuming (Pisano 1997). Loeffen and Wortmann 
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quoted Pisano, and stated that much more effort had to go into making systems a lot 
more user-friendly to meet the following challenges (Loeffen and Wortmann 2000): 
" How to make information that used only to be available for staff members 
and line managers available for use on the shopfloor; 
How to make information systems user-friendly so that people can get used to 
them quickly... they do not have time to gain familiarity or take lots of 
lessons. 
4.6 Published shortcomings of CE 
Current approaches, as exemplified particularly by Concurrent Engineering, suffer from 
problems in their practical implementation. 
Maslow et al challenge many of the commonly held views on modem management, 
claiming that the general principles that Drucker and others talk about are for the most 
part far too general. Certainly managing women is different from managing men. They 
argue that it would not be realistic to apply Drucker's principles in Colombia, Iran, 
Syria, and South Africa, and that there are many places around the world where only 
authoritarian management, cracking the whip over fearful people, can work. 
Authoritarian characters confronted with human relations principles in management 
based on all sorts of benificent and benevolent assumptions would consider the manager 
certainly weak in the head and the very least sentimental, unrealistic, etc (Maslow et al 
1998) p 43. 
Cleetus, who has done considerable work at the Concurrent Engineering Research 
Center (CERC) set up by the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA), reviewed the workings of CE and presented some of these shortcomings, as 
set out in the following sections. 
4.6.1 CE lessons 
General lessons (Cleetus 1998) p 253: 
" CE does not work without a mandate from above. 
" CE does not work without a strong team leader. 
" CE works best with physical collocation of the entire team. 
" Technology-based CE is best achieved by integrating the tools employed by 
several perspectives. 
4.6.2 Teamwork Can Lead to Chaos 
Teams, though, result in chaos more often than not. There are many reasons (Cleetus 
1998) p 252: 
0 Teams are often a sham, never destined by their originators to coalesce. 
" Teams rarely invest enough in achieving a common vision before setting out on 
the detailed work. 
" Customer focus is more easily stated than subscribed to in practice. 
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" Teams do not keep practising and working on team processes. 
" Co-ordination is not given sufficient importance. 
" Motivating factors are geared to recognise individual work, rather than team 
achievement. 
" The leader of the team is not up to the job. 
4.6.3 Poor Task Co-ordination 
Project management may fail to provide collaboration support for new product 
development. The difficulty is to comply with techniques for interactive, distributed, 
task, and data management. There is a need to go beyond the standard metrics of time 
and cost to provide unique project assessment tools. All the metrics can be evaluated for 
single tasks, for sub-projects containing several tasks, or for the entire project. Cleetus 
recommends that (Cleetus 1998) p 254: 
" The task network should be visible to all. 
" Progress should be reportable by each individual from his or her workplace via 
computer. 
" The data sharing should be via network databases. 
" The flow of instructions, drawings, and work authorisation should take place 
without paper. 
" Questions should be handled electronically. 
" The whole project history should be stored. 
Jaganathan et al describe how computer support for multidisciplinary teams is critical 
for group decision-making and negotiation, especially over a geographically dispersed 
network. While systems such as bulletin boards and electronic mail can provide an 
initial underpinning to support group working, they are very limited and informal. 
Fundamentally, they only allow for the exchange of messages, although they are being 
adapted to support brainstorming and group discussions. However, they do not support 
structured decision group working. Particular features of task-coordination systems to 
support concurrent engineering include common visibility of activities and data, 
planning and scheduling of activities, change notification, and constraint management 
across multiple perspectives. An advanced system could contain a number of teams' 
membership profiles, constraints, common workspaces and tasks, and so may it possible 
for a person to belong to any project, serve any role, and participate in all the team 
interactions at once, without leaving the workstation (Jagannathan, Reddy et al. 1998) p 
264. 
4.6.4 Lack of Communication and Data-Sharing 
As discussed elsewhere in this thesis, lack of communication and data sharing may be 
the result of cultural and organisational problems, rather than the absence of the 
technical means to do so. Huang makes the point that co-operation and communication 
do not simply mean sharing computer workstations and exploiting network facilities. In 
the same way that design for assembly was once pushed by automation technology, but 
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it is now manual assembly where great savings are achieved, the important factor is 
human communication and co-operation in contrast to computers (Huang 1996) p 149. 
However, where the will to communicate exists, techniques and software to share 
information include Acrobat, Notes, EDI, Web, PDM, DMS and ISS (Cleetus 1998) p 
256. Jaganathan et al describe a number of aspects of technology for information 
sharing, including the use of Web-based tools and the Common Object Request Broker 
Architecture (CORBA) standard to promote interoperability between computer 
platforms using different operating systems and architecture (Jagannathan, Reddy et al. 
1998) p 268-270. 
4.6.5 Inadequate Record of Design Rationale 
Cleetus regards the capture of design rationale as being of prime importance, but the 
support for this is quite poor in engineering organisations. The best that is done in a 
systematic fashion is to annotate drawings when they are revised to state on the drawing 
the nature of the revision and its cause. However, this has many weaknesses in a 
complex project. However, when it is first made, the drawing does not contain the 
justification for each of its constituent parts, and that situation will persist through all its 
revisions. Much of the design rationale and original design intent will never be 
captured. Further, when a change is made to one part of the product, consequent small 
changes may need to be made to other parts. Unless the link between the parts is 
maintained and examined whenever the changes are made, it is possible that a revision 
will be made that is inconsistent, unsafe, or inefficient. When variant products are 
designed, what can be changed and should be changed to suit the numerous 
requirements, and what may not be changed without severe disadvantage and redesign, 
is not clear. Indeed, a design process involves alternatives that were considered and 
rejected, and the memory of the unselected alternatives is lost in conventional records, 
since it may not even have been recorded 
The idea was mooted long ago that these things could be cured if only the designers 
captured their daily work electronically. Many so-called electronic design notebooks 
(EDN) were prototyped so that the steps of the design work done by individual 
engineers could be captured in documents with CAD images, analytic results, 
annotations, design criteria, and so on recorded, along with indexes by which they can 
be retrieved in future. Since a great deal of product-development work is done on the 
computer, it might be possible to add the additional support to capture the important 
results and annotate them without too much added effort for the working engineers, 
whose aversion to documentation is itself a difficult barrier. 
EDNs have not come into vogue, probably because they are still clumsy to use and 
demand a lot of work for little payoff -a payoff, moreover, that accrues not to the 
documentor, but to some future engineers on another project. It remains one of the 
aspects of collaboration that has the least satisfactory support, perhaps because the goal 
is to encourage collaboration between people over unknown expanses of space and time 
and with unspecified projects lying in the future (Cleetus 1998) p 257. 
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4.6.6 Effect of late changes 
If a manufacturing problem reaches the shop floor, this means that action is needed 
before manufacturing can be satisfactorily completed or that an opportunity for 
improvement will have been missed. The range of actions may include anything from a 
query for clarification to a major design change for the part. Even a simple query may 
prove expensive, because the original design team may have moved to another project 
and the answer may involve extensive inquiries. Redesign is almost certain to be 
expensive, and good ideas for ease of manufacturing that might have been adopted with 
little effort at an earlier design stage may be refused because of their effect on costs, 
timescale, the interface with other parts for assembly, or even the sheer complexity of 
the change task. 
Boothroyd, Dewhurst and Knight quote the figure (from 1989 Munro & Associates, Inc) 
of over 70% of the final product cost as being determined during design as a reason why 
careful consideration of manufacturing and assembly should be given early in the 
design cycle (Boothroyd, Dewhurst et al. 1994) p 2. More recently, Farineau et al 
quoted 80% of the costs of a project as being determined by decisions taken by the 
designers (Farineau, Rabinasolo et al. 2001) p 79. 
4.6.7 Types of reasons for problems 
Chapter 5 Section 5.3 explains the rationale behind the selection of `human error', 
`culture and social', `knowledge', `organisation', and `technical' as the concept 
categories for the types of reasons for manufacturing problems. The following sections 
include examples from the literature on the general principles of these subjects. 
4.6.7.1 Human Error 
This category covers mistakes of commission or omission. James Reason provides a lot 
of useful background on the subject of human error, e. g. a study that showed that many 
highly intelligent people, when presented with simple deductive problems, almost 
invariably got them wrong. This was because their reasoning was governed more by 
similarity-matching than by logic (Reason 1990) p 39. 
McCormick describes a number of types of human errors in system tasks, stating: 
"people are quite inventive in the kinds of bloopers they perpetrate. " He suggests that 
figuring out what kinds of mistakes people make may help to reduce their frequency or 
severity (McCormick and Sanders 1982) p 25. 
Reason also examined industrial accidents and their causes. Most accidents results from 
a sequence of events, the last and least manageable part of which may be short lived 
mental states -a preoccupation, distraction, forgetfulness, or inattention. People will 
always make errors and commit violations. While we cannot change the human 
condition, we can change the conditions under which people work so as to make these 
unsafe acts less likely. Blaming people for their errors - though emotionally satisfying - 
will have little or no effect on their future fallibility. Since errors are largely 
unintentional, is very difficult for management to control what people did not intend to 
do in the first place (Reason 1997) p 153. 
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4.6.7.2 Culture/Social 
In contrast to errors, which are unintentional, Reason also discusses intentional 
violations of procedures or accepted behaviour. He regards violations as social and 
motivational problems that are best addressed by changing people's culture - norms, 
beliefs, and attitudes - on the one hand, and by improving the credibility, applicability, 
availability and accuracy of the procedures, on the other. He warns that violations act in 
two ways. First, they make it more likely that the violators will commit subsequent 
errors and, second, it is also more likely that these errors will have damaging 
consequences (Reason 1997) p 153. 
Drennan defines culture as "how things are done around here". This is made up of a 
number of elements. Over time, people develop ways of handling the organisation and 
this becomes the `accepted' way of doing things. Methods of work tend to get repeated, 
supervisors make them procedures and they are then taught to subordinates. These 
become habit and become part of the organisation's personality. Attitudes are also part 
of culture. Attitudes show in how an organisation treats its customers, suppliers and 
employees. The standards laid out in Personnel Practice Manuals are not necessarily 
real culture. Real culture is what employees see fellow workers do and what they find 
their managers accept. Culture is what is typical of the organisation, the habits, the 
prevailing attitudes, and the grown-up pattern of accepted and expected behaviour. 
Culture does not grow overnight, and cannot be changed overnight either (Drennan 
1992) pp 1-4. 
Ranky regards Concurrent Engineering as very much an issue of team management, 
people, communications, sound technology and `culture'. The most important principles 
are about the total design-and-manufacturing cycle and implementing it using 
appropriate (not necessarily the latest) technologies and excellent people equipped with 
multidisciplinary skills. The heart of a problem is that engineers in design, 
manufacturing, quality assurance and maintenance do not speak the same language. 
Most of the obstacles are cultural and organisational. New technologies provide the 
excellent communication systems that the small family business always had, as well as 
new methods and tools for creating, analysing, testing and implementing products that 
the customers need. Both the Concurrent Engineering team and the management need to 
be committed to the new methods and must be prepared to change the company culture 
to take advantage of them (Ranky 1994) pp 23-27. 
For the purpose of this thesis, the term `culture/social' is used to cover the more 
subjective aspects of culture and social issues. More objective matters, which could be 
regarded as `organisational', have been segregated and put into a separate category (see 
below) to avoid creating a broad `culture and social matters' category that included 
more than half the reasons considered. 
4.6.7.3 Knowledge 
Knowledge plays a vital part in `getting things right'. Miller and Morris explain how 
capability is affected by tacit and explicit knowledge. Knowledge comes about through 
the integration of information derived from data, plus theory that puts the information in 
the proper context, plus experience of how things work in the real world. This process 
of integration is also called learning (Miller and Morris 1999) p 76. 
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This category covers problems that occur through lack of knowledge. 
4.6.7.4 Organisation 
Organisation covers the more objective aspects of Company culture, such as procedures, 
and who is responsible to whom for what. It includes facts, such as the physical 
problems resulting from a firm operating from two sites. However, subjective matters 
such as the reluctance of people to talk to someone from the other site would be covered 
under the Culture and Social heading. 
Duffy and Salvendy found that effort spent in terms of time determining the Task and 
Work Structure was the largest predictor of success in implementing concurrent 
engineering (Duffy and Salvendy 1995). 
4.6.7.5 Technical 
Technical problems are those that relate to the equipment or software rather than the 
people using it. For example, a mismatch that prevented model data from one CAD 
system being correctly represented on another. Owen concluded that, despite all the 
expertise utilised in generating STEP protocols, problems would arise even when data 
exchange was undertaken using two performance-tested processes of a well-defined 
standard written using formal methods. He considered product data exchange was 
unlikely to become `appliance' or `black box' technology in the near future, if ever 
(Owen 1997) p 131. 
4.7 Gap in Research 
4.7.1 Gap in the literature 
Engineering management literature is largely tied up with hard issues such as 
procedures and practices. Where soft issues such as human factors are covered, they are 
usually grossly oversimplified - for example, "establish early contact with suppliers. " 
If an industrial firm sought to tackle its manufacturing problems by optimising its CE 
and DFM processes, it would find that many different CE and DFM solutions were 
available, but no single approach would necessarily best fit the circumstances of their 
own products, projects, people and manufacturing requirements. The potential answers 
to any particular problem were likely to be spread among various sources and methods. 
The author was unable to find any approach that started with a comprehensive guide to 
potential manufacturing problems and then proceeded to relate them to possible causes. 
In attempting to fill this gap in the research, the author worked to provide a guide to act 
as a key to `decode' the manufacturing problems that previous research `coded' into 
various sources. An analogy is with addressing the problem of finding a list of remedies 
for a particular illness: a medical directory where you could look up the illness to find 
the medicines would be more useful than a directory of medicines that showed all the 
illnesses each would treat. Both directories have their uses, but each is of limited value 
if you need the other. 
To identify the gap in research, the author adopted Silverman's critical approach to the 
literature review by answering questions under the following headings (Silverman 
2000) p 231: 
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4.7.2 What do we already know about the topic? 
Concurrent engineering techniques have been developed with the intention of bringing 
together functional disciplines to allow downstream activities such as manufacturing to 
influence upstream activities such as design. Producibility, or manufacturability, is a 
recognised consideration for design and is included in some form in a wide range of 
models of the design process. 
Recent research (Nowack 1997, Marsh 1997 and Chen 1998) includes examination of 
the requirements of designers for manufacturing information, how designers use their 
experience, and how design guidelines on manufacturability can be presented on a 
database. This work towards providing manufacturing information to designers in a 
readily accessible form reflects recognition of the limited time that designers are 
observed to spend on searching for information. 
4.7.3 What do you have to say critically about what is already known? 
Manufacturability guidelines, however presented, are necessarily derived from existing 
processes and previous applications. They may not cover the required geometrical 
features, processes, materials and local conditions - and hence may not be applicable 
directly to the current design context. A designer may have to expend considerable 
effort loading data into a DFM software tool in order to obtain an assessment of the 
manufacturing cost, then repeat the exercise to compare alternative design solutions. An 
`expert system' maybe a valuable support tool, but is unlikely to provide the complete 
answer (e. g. Gammack and Jenkins 1997, p 86). 
Typical textbook approaches to concurrent engineering and design methods are 
prescriptive, setting out the elements of what is needed to ensure a successful design-to- 
manufacture process. Potential problems and obstacles may be mentioned, but coverage 
is often in general terms. For example, Prasad emphasises the early involvement of 
suppliers as being critical in providing vital inputs and in influencing the product's 
design as it evolves (Prasad 1996 p 174), but does not include amongst his barriers to 
concurrent engineering (Prasad 1997 pp 367-373) any reference to subjects such as 
trust, contracts and intellectual property rights that may give rise to problems when 
working with suppliers. 
Journal and conference papers tend to highlight particular problems, often gaining 
material from case studies. Each paper may cover a limited field, but taken together they 
can provide important illustrations over a wide range of potential problems. 
Problems, however, are usually made public only when exposed by a failure or disaster, 
and those most closely involved will tend to report them in the context of how they 
were successfully overcome. For a critical examination of the factors that can lead to 
problems, it is helpful to go beyond the engineering literature and look at the softer 
issues, such as: human aspects (e. g. Reason 1990 & 1997; de Bono 1971); cultural 
matters (e. g. Drennan 1992); management, organisation and communication (e. g. 
Maslow et al. 1998; Miller and Morris 1999; Francis 1987; Ashkenas et al. 1995 and 
Hargie et al. 1999). 
The technology clearly exists (e. g. Jagannathan, Reddy et al. 1998) to enable any form 
of communication to be provided to promote communication and teamworking. As 
Smith points out, technology may lower the barriers for cross-functional co-operation 
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(Smith 1997) p 75, but it does not guarantee the necessary communication will occur: 
the softer issues may prevent this. 
The major gap in the literature is the absence of material specifically linking the reasons 
for manufacturing problems to the sources of information available to designers. 
4.7.4 Has anyone else ever done something exactly the same? 
The author could not find anything published that was exactly the same. 
4.7.5 Has anyone else done anything that is related? 
Several authors cite examples of barriers to DFM and explain their prescriptive methods 
for developing the organisation to overcome them. Although presented in a manner 
entirely different from the relationship framework in this thesis, the following two 
works included material that was particularly helpful. Many of their points contributed 
to the formulation of ideas used during framework development, and several have been 
cited in the framework to illustrate factors. 
Liker and Fleischer researched the organisational context of design and manufacturing 
with the hypothesis that in many large US corporations this presented serious barriers to 
DFM. In the context of primarily traditional, bureaucratic organisations, organisational 
barriers included structural complexity of the formal organisation, divergent political 
interests of design and manufacturing, and incongruent cultural values and symbols. 
Organisational structure complexity meant the numbers, geographical separation, 
organisational boundaries, and structural differentiation of personnel involved in 
product and process design and manufacturing (Liker and Fleischer 1992). 
Wheelwright and Clark drew on many years of in-depth, systematic, worldwide 
research to present principles for developing the critical capabilities for speed, 
efficiency, and quality that have worked well for many fast-cycle firms in a range of 
different industry sectors in Japan, America and Europe. They contribute many valuable 
points on aspects such as communication and teamworking, dealing at length with the 
need to tailor upstream and downstream communications in the product development 
chain to the nature of the project (Wheelwright and Clark 1992). 
4.7.6 Where does your work fit in with what has gone before? 
It makes extensive use of existing literature to identify relevant factors. 
4.7.7 Why is your research worth doing in the light of what has already 
been done? 
Producibility problems in manufacturing exist despite so much material being available 
in the literature to provide advice on aspects of the design-for-manufacture process, 
human factors, culture, management, organisation and communication. It was therefore 
considered worthwhile to combine the experience from involvement in industrial case 
studies with that of examining the literature so as to structure the relevant information in 
a manner that would mean the practical effect of how sources of information and 
influence can be related to the reasons for manufacturing problems reaching the 
shopfloor. 
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4.7.8 What are the critical success factors? 
For this research to be successful, the answer to the research question must be: 
- complete, within the producibility of mechanical parts boundaries in this thesis; 
- presented in a form that can be used both by industrial practitioners to review 
their producibility processes, and as a basis for further academic research; 
- illustrated by references both to literature and the evidence of practical case 
studies, offering users the opportunity to "resonate with the experience of others 
and help them make sense of that experience" (Stacey, Griffin et al. 2000) p 203. 
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Chapter 5 Framework Development 
This chapter describes how the data from industrial studies and literature were analysed 
and used to develop the framework to model the relationships between the reasons for 
manufacturing problems and the sources of information and influence. This covers steps 
9 to 12 of the methodology set out in Chapter 2. 
Data from the continuing literature study and the Case Study research were used to help 
formulate and categorise ideas for the types of reasons for problems in manufacturing 
and for the sources of producibility information. Several iterations of a two-dimensional 
matrix were used to test relationships between the categories of reasons and sources, 
using examples of problems to illustrate the factors involved. The steps taken to develop 
the final format for the framework are described. 
Examples are given of how the framework was populated to show the relationships. 
5.1 Approach to the final research question 
The final research question had been developed after the author reflected on the 
experiences gained through the best practice study, AEROEXTN pilot project and the 
civil aerospace studies. It became, as stated the end of Chapter 3: 
"Why do manufacturing problems reach the shopfloor when sources of 
information are available to prevent them? " 
The manufacturing problems and opportunities for improvement listed at the end of 
Chapter 3 maybe regarded as the answers to the questions "what can go wrong? " and 
"what opportunities could be missed? " To answer the research question, the approach 
taken was first to identify and group into categories reasons for these problems and the 
sources of information and influence available to prevent them, and then to identify 
factors that could relate the sources to the reasons in a framework in order to show 
why the problems reach the shopfloor. 
Within the limitations of the research context, the aim of the framework is therefore to 
present as complete as possible a set of answers to the Research Question `Why? ' It was 
recognised that the there would be residual problems, which further research could 
reduce - possibly with an industrial psychologist playing a major part. 
5.2 Process for formulating reasons and sources 
Figure 5.1 shows the process used to formulate lists of types of reasons and sources of 
producibility information and influence. The rationale behind the steps shown is set out 
below; and the implementation of the process is covered in Section 5.3. 
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Figure 5.1 Formulation of Reasons and Sources 
5.2.1 Input data 
The material used to generate and categorise the reasons and sources was drawn 
primarily from the literature studied and from the research carried out on the industrial 
cases - AEROEXTN (including the Best Practice study) and the civil aerospace studies, 
especially the discussions with practitioners in Design, Manufacturing, Quality and 
Purchasing. The author also attended a number of conferences, seminars and industrial 
exhibitions relating to design and manufacturing. In addition, valuable advice was 
derived from discussions with colleagues working on other research projects in the 
Department of Enterprise Integration. 
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The following provides an indication of the volume of data considered during the 
research: 
" The minutes of the AEROEXTN project meetings amounted to more than 
60,000 words, covering 220 pages. The civil aerospace studies provided a 
further 12,000 words of reports and minutes. Eight conference papers (included 
in the list on page iii) were written and presented by members of the academic 
team. 
" The total bibliography consisted of more than 360 books, conference papers, and 
journal, Web-based and newspaper articles. The thesis as a whole contains 278 
citations, referring to 148 different works. The framework of Chapter 6 includes 
132 citations, covering 85 different works. 
There was some direct read across from the AEROEXTN data, adapting ideas based on 
specific subjects addressed in the Producibility Interaction model, and the issues and 
enablers used in developing the CE template. However, much of this work concentrated 
on the `hard' technical aspects concerning the mismatch of product and process rather 
than the `sofft' considerations such as motivation and co-operation. Both hard and soft 
areas are important, but the subjective nature of the latter can make it particularly 
difficult for management to recognise their effect and know what action to take to 
improve matters. The approach taken was aimed at generating ideas for reasons and 
sources that would both illustrate what could go wrong and stimulate thinking about 
why this could happen. 
No specific date limits were set on the material researched, although there was a 
tendency to place emphasis on the more recent material. However, early books and 
papers were often found to have an up-to-date message that was still relevant. 
5.2.2 Ideas for Reasons 
In order to be considered, a reason would have to satisfy the conditions that it should be: 
" Relevant to the design-to-manufacture chain in the context of: 
- complex, custom, CAD-designed parts; 
- mechanical machined parts, or composite parts; 
- an organisation large enough to have separate design and (internal or 
outsourced) manufacturing facilities; 
" Capable of introducing or allowing a producibility-related production problem 
(of the kind set out in Section 3.8.3) that could have been avoided by a change 
in the design of the part, e. g. by: 
- failing to make information available 
- failing to generate or collect information 
- introducing errors or false information 
Ideas that passed the above tests were then considered for their level of granularity, i. e. 
to ensure that they were not too broad or too narrow in concept. Ideas that were too 
narrow might cover a single specialised issue that could be combined with others to 
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form a clearer concept with greater generalisability that would be of more use in helping 
others to recognise its influence. Conversely, ideas that were too broad would not be 
helpful in providing specific guidance and were better split into separate reasons. 
However, broad ideas could be considered as possible categories covering a number of 
types of reasons. 
Ideas with the appropriate granularity were likely to have general applicability without 
justifying a separate category. These were put together to form an initial list of reasons. 
5.2.3 Categorisation of reasons 
Reasons from the initial list were grouped to form categories, using ideas that came 
from the literature (e. g. human error) as well as those considered too broad in the 
granularity test. The aim here was to identify categories that would help to stimulate 
thought as to whether there should be additional reasons to complete that category, and 
whether there should be additional categories to complete the field of all possible types 
of reasons within the context of the research. Additional ideas for reasons and categories 
generated in this way were fed back for consideration to meet the same criteria as 
before. 
5.2.4 Ideas for sources 
Ideas for sources were generated from the input material by addressing the questions: 
" How do designers know their business? 
" How might designers obtain information on producibility? 
" Is the source distinct from other sources in character, or in the way producibility 
information is made available to Design? 
This led to an initial list of sources. 
5.2.5 Grouping of sources 
From the initial list of sources, the intention was to find a limited number of groups that 
would be useful for: 
" Subsequent company action; 
0 Sensitising, so as to help identify relevant factors; 
". Containing sources of a similar nature, to avoid duplication of factors and help 
look for common threads. 
This resulted in an initial list of categories of sources. The limited number of categories 
also had the advantage that the number of columns for sources was not so great as to 
result in an unwieldy representation when it came to constructing the two-dimensional 
matrix. 
This procedure resulted in an initial list of categories of sources. Further ideas for 
sources identified as a result of considering the membership of each category were fed 
back for consideration as above. 
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5.2.6 Refinement and final lists of reasons and sources 
Testing the interaction between reasons and sources refined the categorised list of types 
of reasons and the categories of sources to produce the final lists. This was done using a 
number of iterations of draft two-dimensional matrices, as described in Section 5.3. In 
the final form (set out in Chapter 6), a table was constructed for each category of 
reasons, with each type of reason becoming the heading for a row and each category of 
source the heading for a column. This framework of tables is shown as the output in 
Figure 5.1. 
5.3 Formulation of reasons and sources 
5.3.1 Initial list of reasons 
As a first attempt at identifying the reasons for problems, the initial list of 35 possible 
reasons for problems reaching shop floor covered: 
(1) Inappropriate reward system. 
(2) Lack of feedback. 
(3) Changes in circumstances (manufacturing equipment). 
(4) Constraints of CAD system. 
(5) Compatibility of CNC tool path generation. 
(6) Wrong standards, when correct standards available. 
(7) Inappropriate standards - existing standards do not match requirements. 
(8) Not cost optimising. 
(9) Not optimised for process. 
(10) Failure to convey design intent. 
(11) Wrong advice given to designer. 
(12) Wrong advice given to manufacturer. 
(13) Lack of training. 
(14) Lack of experience/ability. 
(15) Error in database information. 
(16) Sub-optimal solution from DFM software. 
(17) Lack of knowledge of machine tool behaviour. 
(18) Lack of knowledge of work piece behaviour during machining. 
(19) Design's error in constructing CAD model/drawings. 
(20) Manufacturing's error in reading CAD model/drawings. 
(21) Wrong information entered into CNC tape generation programme. 
(22) Errors in CNC tape generation software. 
(23) Malfunction of machine (e. g. tool breakage). 
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(24) Machine operator error. 
(25) Wrong or defective material. 
(26) Lack of teamwork. 
(27) Failure to recognise that advice is needed. 
(28) Failure to obtain best advice. 
(29) Prejudice in Design. 
(30) Prejudice in Manufacturing. 
(31) Personal antagonism. 
(32) Information not shared by Design for commercial/political/parochial reasons. 
(33) Information not shared by Manufacturing for commercial/political/parochial 
reasons. 
(34) Communication problems. 
(35) Failure to consult/involve third parties (e. g. material suppliers, sub- 
contractors). 
5.3.2 Concept categories for reasons for manufacturing problems 
In order to analyse these reasons, they were grouped into categories according to type. 
They were first separated into `human' and `technical', which immediately led to the 
realisation that reasons such as `communication problems' would need to be qualified 
further according to the circumstances. For example, difficulty in knowing the right 
person to contact could be regarded as a human communication problem, while 
difficulty in translating model data from one CAD format to another would be a 
technical communication problem. 
It was also apparent that far more factors were human rather than technical in origin, so 
the `human' category was divided. Since any of the human beings involved in the 
design-to-manufacture chain could make mistakes, one division could be `human 
error'. The remainder might be regarded as coming into the category of `culture' 
covering the way human beings interact with each other, but this appeared too general 
and would embrace such a wide variety of matters that it would be an advantage to 
distinguish between the personal and impersonal aspects of human interaction. The 
personal aspect was termed culture and social, to cover how particular individuals or 
groups of individuals related to others. For example, people who had got to know and 
trust each other might communicate far more effectively than those who had never 
previously made contact. The impersonal aspect might include how people were 
organised and related to each other as members of functional specialisations or teams, 
and was called organisation. This category would include subjects such as work 
incentives and rewards. 
The types of reasons were now grouped under the appropriate category, as shown in 
Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1 Initial Categories of types of reasons 
Human Technical 
Human Error Culture and Social Organisation 
Wrong advice given Lack of effort. Not cost optimising. Changes in 
to designer. Lack of teamwork. Not optimised for 
circumstances 
Wrong advice given Rejection of good . process. 
(manufacturing 
equipment). to manufacturer. advice. Inappropriate Constraints of CAD Design's error in Prejudice in Design. reward system. system. 
constructing CAD Lack of feedback 
model/drawings. Prejudice in Failure to convey 
' 
Manufacturing. ... design intent. s Manufacturing 
error in reading Personal ... Compatibility of 
CAD antagonism. CNC tool path 
model/drawings. generation. 
As the research proceeded, matters relating to what people knew (or did not know) did 
not appear to fit comfortably into any of these four categories. This led to the addition 
of a fifth category, labelled knowledge. 
Chapter 4 Section 4.6.7 covers general points from literature relating to these 5 concept 
categories, which helped to clarify the scope of each. These points were useful when 
defining the categories and deciding to which category each of the 35 reasons should be 
assigned, and also in leading to some of the factors that were later incorporated into the 
tables in Chapter 6. 
5.3.3 Initial list of sources of producibility information 
Ideas for sources influencing producibility information could embrace matters affecting 
any part of the organisations and functions involved in the design-to-manufacture chain, 
not just those directly touching the designers at their workstations or drawing boards. 
The initial list of sources developed as described in Section 5.2.4 covered: 
(1) Training. 
(2) Experience. 
(3) DFM tools and software. 
(4) Standards & procedures (company, national and international). 
(5) Specifications. 
(6) Technical reports. 
(7) Textbooks. 
(8) CAD Systems. 
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(9) Communications. 
(10) Teamworking. 
5.3.4 Concept categories for sources 
Concept categories for sources of information and influence were considered on the 
basis of grouping factors and considering their utility as described in Section 5.2.5. The 
reasoning that governed the transition from the initial list of sources to the final list of 
categories of sources is set out below 
Firstly, people are given a job to do and responsibilities to bear by virtue of their 
training and experience. For example, a designer would not be a designer, or a 
toolmaker a toolmaker, without some training or experience or a combination of both. 
Although training and experience were considered originally as separate categories, for 
the purpose of this research it was found more useful to combine them, as training 
might be needed for those without the right kind of experience, and vice versa. 
Designers may be hired or selected for a particular project team on the basis of their 
qualifications and experience. It should be noted that training is used as a general term 
to cover the acquisition of skills and knowledge from a course of instruction, whether 
this is undertaken at an educational establishment or in an industrial firm. Training 
should therefore be regarded here as embracing education in the broadest sense. 
Secondly, people can look up formally recorded information in standards, procedures 
(including company design manuals), textbooks and reports of research or earlier 
projects. Requirements may be laid down in functional and technical specifications. 
Conduct may be directed or influenced by company rules and procedures. This concept 
category might be regarded as `doing things by the book'. Increasingly, such 
information may be held in electronic databases rather than on paper, and may contain 
DFM guidelines. However, specific DFM tools and software were regarded as 
particularly significant for this research, and so were treated as a separate category, and 
were therefore excluded from that of `standards, procedures, specifications, reports and 
textbooks. ' Consideration was given to finding a generic title for this category, such as 
`Pre-existing design information', or `Briefing material. ' However, it was felt that such 
terms could be misleading, and retaining the elements standards, specifications, 
reports and textbooks would be more useful in helping to focus the users' attention on 
the influence that these materials could bear on the design process. `Procedures' was 
omitted because it could be considered implicit in company standards, and this resulted 
in a less cumbersome category title for use as a column heading when it came to setting 
out the framework tables. 
The aerospace industry was now developing designs as 3-D models on high-end CAD 
systems. Providing manufacturing instructions from such a model might require a lot 
more than supplying geometrical data for programming numerically controlled (NC) 
machines or generating automatically produced 2D drawings. Annotations on the model 
or additional drawings may be needed to define special tolerances or processes. A 
category for CAD systems was adopted to sensitize the author to collect data on matters 
such as the ease with which designers could generate or change geometry and 
associated information. 
78 
If a person was unaware of information that could improve manufacturability or prevent 
problems, and it was not brought to their attention by any of the mechanisms in the 
above four concept categories, then communication would be needed before they could 
know it or act upon it. Such communication could be by any means and with any 
person. Teamworking was a very powerful means of sharing information, encouraged 
by CE, which could also be used to generate solutions to problems where no individual 
either knew sufficient or had the authority to decide on the best course of action. 
Consideration was given to creating separate categories for different modes of 
communication and teamworking, e. g. face-to-face versus telephone, teleconference, e- 
mail, CAD data transfer, drawings, sketches, facsimile or letter; one-to-one versus 
meetings or conferences of three or more people. However, it was decided to start with 
one category of communications and teamworking that could be split if this is turned 
out to be more useful in the light of data collected. As the research progressed, it was 
found that the need or will to communicate appeared much more important than the 
mechanism for doing so, although the latter could make a difference in helping or 
hindering the process. The single concept category was therefore retained. 
5.4 Framework to relate reasons to sources 
5.4.1 Format development 
A two-dimensional table was constructed in the form of Table 5.2 to relate the 
categories of human and technical types of reasons for problems to the categories of 
sources of information and influence. 
Table 5.2 Relationships between categories of sources and reasons 
HUMAN 
SOURCES of 
INFORMATION Culture TECHNICAL 
and Error and Knowledge Organisation 
INFLUENCE Social 
Training and 
Experience 
Standards, 
Specifications, 
Reports, 
Textbooks 
CAD Systems 
DFM Databases 
and Tools 
Communication 
and 
Teamworking 
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Several iterations were made to Table 5.2 before arriving at a configuration suitable for 
presenting individual factors to show how the reasons in each category could be related 
to one or more of the categories of sources of information and influence. Once it had 
been decided to retain the sources categories without dividing them, switching the rows 
and columns became a more satisfactory arrangement that could easily allow the 
addition of rows as further reasons became apparent. The format adopted is shown as a 
concept matrix in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 Concept matrix for relating reasons and sources 
SOURCES of INFORMATION and INFLUENCE 
CATEGORY W 0 
of TYPES of TYPES of bö ö 
REASONS for REASONS Q ",; 
bvo0 >% .01: 
3 
PROBLEMS . i. X Ä A 'fl 
Fy 
W zn E. Ü 
U 
0 
E- U 
a b c d e f g 
Human error Reason 1 Factorl c Factor Id 
Reason 2 Factor 2c Factor 2g 
Reason 3 Factor 3e 
Reason N 
Culture/ Reason 1 Factor Ie 
social Reason 2 Factor 2c 
Reason 3 Factor 3c Factor 3f 
Reason N Factor Ng 
Knowledge Reason 1 Factor 1c 
Reason 2 
Reason 3 
Reason N Factor Nc 
Organisation Reason 1 Factor Ig 
Reason 2 Factor 2d 
Reason 3 Factor 3c Factor 3f 
Reason N Factor Nc 
Technical Reason 1 Factor 1e Factor If 
Reason 2 Factor 2c Factor 2d 
Reason 3 Factor 3f 
Reason N Factor Ng 
5.4.2 Populate framework 
The 35 reasons for problems from the initial list were entered in the appropriate row 
within each category. Each cell was therefore related by its position to its type of reason 
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and its source category. Any entry in a cell was stated as a factor, to answer the 
question "what problem of this type (row) might be caused by this source (column)? " 
Individual factors were inserted in the form of brief notes in the table to show how one 
or more sources could relate to each reason. The practical advantage of this was firstly 
that each cell could be examined to stimulate thought, and secondly that any ideas for 
factors being considered could be `pigeon-holed' in a cell and subsequently rearranged. 
However, these notes made the table expand to such an extent that it was decided to 
divide it and create a separate table for each category of reasons. As an example, by this 
stage the table for Human error contained the factor notes shown in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4 Human error table - intermediate stage of development 
Standards 
Training and Specifications CAD 
DFM Communication 
HUMAN Error Experience Reports Systems 
Databases 
and Tools 
and 
Teamworking 
Textbooks 
a b c d e f g 
1 Wrong advice Mistake, based Wrongly Failure to obtain 
given to on lack of assumed full background 
designer. appreciation of paper 
problems or information 
over- correctly 
simplification* applied to 
current case 
2 Wrong advice Mistake, based Wrongly Failure to 
given to on incorrect or assumed convey design 
manufacturer. outdated paper intent, or warn 
information information of known 
correctly problems with 
applied to similar 
current case processes or 
materials on 
other projects* 
3 Design's error Lack of System 
in constructing training or not easy to 
CAD experience to use, and/or 
model/drawings avoid errors or difficult to 
omissions check or 
verify 
4 Manufacturing's Lack of Model/ Poor medium 
error in reading training or drawing for 
CAD experience in difficult to representation 
model/drawings. interpreting interpret No contact to model/ (error- help or explain drawings prone) interpretation 
*Note: the asterisks indicate that there were footnotes to the notes, to expand on what 
could be fitted in the box. 
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As an illustration, the first type of reason considered in the category of 'human error' 
was that of 'wrong advice given to designer'. This had been put on the list of reasons 
because any such wrong advice could lead to a design that was suboptimal, and cause 
problems in manufacturing. After considering all five of the source categories, three 
cells were filled as follows: 
" Training and experience would be relevant when a mistake in the advice given 
to a designer was the result of lack of appreciation of problems, or 
oversimplification, that could be related to the training and experience both of 
those who sought advice and those who gave it. For example, an inexperienced 
person might confidently state that there would be no problems with a particular 
process, when they had failed to look closely at the requirement and had not 
recognised that the part was impossible to make with the existing machinery. A 
more experienced person would have known what to look for; a more 
experienced questioner might have probed more deeply, knowing that the design 
might be beyond the process limits. 
" Standards and specifications would be relevant because it might be wrongly 
assumed that paper information correctly applied to the current case. The 
increasing complexity and variety of standards and specifications that are needed 
to follow more complex products and processes may cause correspondingly 
more errors and additional work. 
Failure to obtain the full background or context for the advice that is sought is a 
failure of communication and teamworking. For example, a production 
engineer might correctly answer questions on precision capability, but fail to 
point out that the closest-tolerance machine required a larger clearance for the 
machining head. Direct contact might have alerted either party to question the 
context further. 
5.4.3 Final framework format 
Even with five separate tables, the addition of further notes made the table format 
unwieldy. The notes were therefore removed from the tables and replaced with crosses 
to indicate each filled cell. Full details of each factor, together with any references and 
examples, were then set out in sections beneath the table and cross-referred to the cell. 
This final format is used for the presentation of results in Chapter 6. 
5.4.4 Review for completeness and saturation 
The framework was reviewed for completeness in that all factors could be 
accommodated. There was at least one completed cell in each row. Although it was 
possible for all five cells to be completed, in many cases there was only one factor to 
relate that reason to one of the sources. The author did not seek to force a relationship 
where none had been found, although a suggested relationship would be entered as a 
`marker' if this appeared appropriate - often this would be supported by an example 
found later. Because one of the functions of this framework was to indicate likely 
relationships that may later be built on by others, these markers were left in place. 
The factors entered were checked for duplication and saturation. The research notes 
from the Best Practice study (BPS), the rest of the AEROEXTN Project (AXP), the civil 
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aerospace studies (CAS) and the literature, were reviewed to see where they could 
enhance the entries by providing additional examples and references to broaden the 
relationships. It was recognised that the BPS, the AXP and the CAS, had already served 
as the major source of concepts and ideas for developing the framework. Therefore, 
only minor adjustments and some additional examples resulted from this review. 
5.4.5 Summary table 
A summary table was prepared to show the total number of relationships identified in 
each category of reasons (one row for each of the 5 tables) against the 5 categories of 
sources. This is in Table 6.6 at the end of Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6 The Relationship Framework 
This chapter presents the Relationship Framework that is the output of this PhD 
research, covering step 13 of the methodology set out in Chapter 2. It presents the 
answers to the research question as a set of five tables relating the possible reasons for 
manufacturing problems reaching the shopfloor to the sources of information and 
influence that may cause or prevent them. 
Because these results are central to the thesis, they have been included in the main text 
rather than being relegated to appendices. Many of the references quoted to define the 
problems or provide examples were not included in the main literature review in 
Chapter 4, so as to avoid duplicating points of detail. 
Each cross in the tables below shows where a specific factor was identified that shows 
how the type of reason for problems in a row might be related to one of the sources of 
information or influence in a column heading. The nature of this factor is then set out in 
the sections that follow. Selected examples are amplified by references to particular 
literature, or to industrial experience from the AEROEXTN project (AXP), the `best 
practice' study (BPS), or the civil aerospace studies (CAS). Where specific issues from 
Tables 7.1, B. 1 or D1-3 illustrate a factor, the reference to the serial number is included, 
with the prefix S for stainless steel SESAME parts, A for aluminium Parts A, T for 
titanium Parts T, and C for composite Parts C. 
A summary table at the end of this chapter shows the overall number of factors in each 
category in each column. 
6.1 Human-Error 
Table 6.1 Human error problems related to sources of information and influence 
V 
ou 
Q 
0 
.5 
4: O 
o :2 L) 
41 
En 
A 
p 
H E- 
TYPE of REASON for PROBLEMS w ý rn w E": Ü Q9 
U9 
a b c d e f g 
1 Wrong advice given to designer x x x 
2 Wrong advice given to manufacturer x x x 
3 Design's error in constructing CAD 
model/drawings x x 
4 Manufacturing's error in reading CAD 
model/drawings x x x 
5 Wrong information entered into CNC tape 
generation programme x x x 
6 Machine operator error x x 
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6.1.1 Wrong advice given to designer 
Reason stated that errors arise from informational problems. They are best tackled by 
improving the available information - either in the person's head or in the workplace 
(Reason 1997) p 153. Factor lc is the mistake, based on lack of appreciation of 
problems or over-simplification, which can be related to the training and experience 
both of those who seek advice and of those who give it. For example, an inexperienced 
person might confidently state that there would be no problems with a particular 
process, when they had failed to look closely at the requirement and had not recognised 
that the part was impossible to make with the existing machinery. A more experienced 
person would have known what to look for; a more experienced questioner might have 
probed more deeply, knowing that the design might be beyond the process limits. 
Dimancescu and Dwenger quote Einstein: "things should be made a simple as possible 
but not simpler" (Dimancescu and Dwenger 1996) p 194. Klein warns against `ideal' or 
`Utopian' solutions, which can only be sustained at the expense of some relevant data. 
This can cause two things to happen: first it creates the next generation of problems, so 
that those problems are solved at the expense of the data previously included; second, 
the idea gets to be defended in ever more fundamentalist and intolerant ways. The idea 
may then get killed off, with the risk of losing a potentially valuable solution (Klein 
1994). 
Factor ld is that of errors caused by the complexity and variety of standards, 
specifications and products. Ehrlenspiel contends that increases in the complexity of 
products and processes lead to correspondingly more errors and additional work 
(Ehrlenspiel 1997) p 482. 
Factor 1g is the failure to obtain the context. For example, a production engineer might 
correctly answer questions on precision capability, but fail to point out that the closest- 
tolerance machine required a larger clearance for the machining head. Direct contact 
might have alerted either party to question the context further. Dimancescu and 
Dwenger benchmarked Japanese methods of communication in NPD, and emphasised 
the importance of direct contact to discourage loss of meanings that would otherwise 
occur if information travelled up and down formal channels (Dimancescu and Dwenger 
1996) p 53. 
6.1.2 Wrong advice given to manufacturer 
Factors 2c and 2d are similar to 1c and 2d. Mistakes may be based on incorrect, 
outdated or wrongly selected information. Again, these can be related to training and 
experience and the complexity of standards etc. The civil aerospace study contained 
examples of wrongly selected information, from a look-up table specifying bearing 
tolerances and from material specification numbers (CAS A3, T6, C11). 
Factor 2g covers the failure to convey design intent, or to warn of known problems 
with similar processes or materials on prototypes or on other projects, so that the 
manufacturer does not correctly anticipate the difficulties to be faced in production. 
Wheelwright and Clark detail the case of a manufacturer who was unable to produce 
shafts to the roundness required using the specified fixturing, until the designer 
discovered that the subcontractor that had produced the prototypes had used a modified 
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fixturing. The prototype shop operator had recognised that the fixturing specified by the 
designer would never have met the roundness standard required, and changed it as a 
matter of good engineering practice, but had never reported the change (Wheelwright 
and Clark 1992) pp 290-292. 
6.1.3 Design's error in constructing CAD model/drawings 
Factor 3c is the lack of training or experience to avoid errors or omissions when 
building CAD models or preparing drawings. Wheelwright and Clark pointed out that 
many engineering changes and much expensive time is wasted due not to lack of 
knowledge of constraints or capabilities, but simply to outright mistakes - e. g. errors in 
copying figures or sending a document to the wrong location can be costly and time- 
consuming to correct if not caught early, are often very difficult to track down once they 
have been propagated in the system, and erode the mutual respect needed for groups to 
work as peers (Wheelwright and Clark 1992) p 180. The civil aerospace in-house study 
reported numerous errors on drawings that had previously been used by external 
suppliers to manufacture parts accepted for aircraft use. Any clarification, corrections, 
concessions or work-arounds that had been used by the suppliers to overcome these 
errors had not (for whatever reason) been fed back and the necessary drawing changes 
made (CAS A3). A simple design error in placing a radius resulted in scrap when it was 
found on assembly that an outsourced part would not fit (CAS T7). 
This may be compounded by factor 3e, where a CAD system or drawing protocol is not 
easy to use, and may be difficult to check or verify. Such problems were evident from 
the best practice study, where industrial practitioners advised that design offices or 
consultants that used multiple types of CAD Systems were likely to suffer from the `use 
it or lose it' problem of increased errors or suboptimal models when designers were 
working with a seldom-used system (BPS). In the civil aerospace study, in-house 
Manufacturing had many queries on drawings that had been prepared some years earlier 
using a 2D CAD System (CAS A3). The error that led to a part (referred to in the 
paragraph above) being scrapped was not picked up by Design because it was a late 
requirement that had not been subjected to the clash detection routine. Arguably, if the 
clash detection had been readily available for the CAD draughtsman to apply, this 
mistake would have been detected before the manufacturing instructions were released 
(CAS T7). 
6.1.4 Manufacturing's error in reading CAD model/drawings 
Just as the designer may have difficulty in generating a satisfactory representation of the 
part, factor 4c is the manufacturer's lack of training or experience in interpreting 
models and drawings. This is related to factor 4e, where the designer's CAD system 
produces models or drawings that are difficult to interpret. Where such a poor medium 
for representation exists, factor 4g is the lack of contact to help or explain the 
interpretation (BPS and CAS). The best practice study also found that a supplier might 
need the capability to assess older designs that were not in model format. The ability to 
read and understand drawings efficiently was seen as very important, especially in an 
industry where new working practices can be adopted on old designs for the purpose of 
cost minimisation (BPS). 
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6.1.5 Wrong information entered into CNC tape generation programme 
Factor 5c is the lack of training or experience in tape generation, including the failure 
to appreciate constraints. For example, McMahon and Browne describe the computation 
of offsets to compensate for the tool nose radius as being "tedious and a source of error" 
(McMahon and Browne 1993) p 305. 
Factor 5e covers errors arising from difficulties in translating models or drawings 
between the CAD software and the tape generation software - here integrated systems 
may go a long way towards reducing errors, but may not be practicable where a 
manufacturer works with several design offices (BPS). Further aspects of 
format/translation problems are covered in Section 6.5.10. 
As with 4g, factor 5g is the lack of contact to help match or interpret the design model 
for tape generation (BPS and CAS). 
6.1.6 Machine operator error 
Factor 6c is the Operator's lack of training or experience on the equipment and/or 
working with the specified materials. Peklenik observed the stochastic behaviour of 
objects being machined as an essential characteristic of the complexity, resulting from 
various internal as well as external sources of random nature. He cited grinding tool 
wear as an example of a very complex process which included random breakage of 
grains, softening of the grain tips and the formation of grain flatness. The wear process 
was considered as an internal secondary source of disturbances, of the type that could 
suddenly trigger major perturbations that may lead to catastrophic events such as 
burning or tool breakage. The training and experience for machine operators was of 
high importance in avoiding such problems (Peklenik 1999) p 38. 
These problems may be reduced by improving the robustness of the design using 
methods such as the stochastic simulations described by Kazmer and Roser. Their goal 
was to enable the designer to understand and account for not only the negative effects of 
manufacturing variation, but also the positive impact of manufacturing flexibility 
wherein instantaneous corrections in the manufacturing process could frequently 
improve the product quality and eliminate flaws in the product design (Kazmer and 
Roser 1999). 
Deming states that an operator has completed the learning of a particular job when that 
person has brought their work to the state of statistical control, whether they were 
trained well or badly. It is not economical to try to provide further training of the same 
kind. They may nevertheless, with good training, learn very well some other kind of 
job. Conversely, if a person's work has not yet reached statistical control, further 
training will help them. If, however, there is a state of chaos (poor supervision, bad 
management, nothing in statistical control) it is impossible for anyone in the 
organisation to develop his or her potential ability and capacity for uniformity of quality 
(Deming 1986) p 249. 
Reason points out some of the consequences of taking advantage of the capabilities of 
computers to reduce operator errors by automating production processes as much as 
possible. He quotes the engineering psychologist Lisanne Bainbridge (1987) "The 
ironies of automation" (Reason 1997) p 42: 
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" By taking away the easy parts of the human operator's task, automation can 
make the difficult parts of the job even more difficult. 
" Many systems designers regard human beings is unreliable and inefficient, yet 
they still leave people to cope with those tasks that the designer could not think 
how to automate - most especially, the job of restoring the system to assay state 
after some unforeseen failure. 
" In highly automated systems, the task of the human operator is to monitor the 
system to ensure that the `automatics' are working as they should. But it is well 
known that even the best-motivated people have trouble maintaining vigilance 
for long periods of time. They are thus ill suited to watch out for these very rare 
abnormal conditions. 
" Skills need to be practised continuously in order to preserve them. An automatic 
system that fails only very occasionally denies the human operator the 
opportunity to practise the skills that will be called upon in an emergency. Thus, 
operators can become deskilled in just those abilities that justify their 
marginalised existence. 
" And, as Bainbridge pointed out, "perhaps the final irony is that it is the most 
successful automated systems with a rare need for manual intervention which 
may need the greatest investment in operator training". 
Adler points out that the knowledge intensity of new technologies dictates a greater 
problem-solving component to operators' jobs than traditional Taylorist approaches 
would suggest. With automation, the number of operators per unit output might fall, but 
there is typically no net reduction in average operator skill requirements; on the 
contrary, higher skills of a new type are usually called for. Training, organisation, 
remuneration, etc, will need to evolve to reflect this change. Conversely, if the operator 
is modelled as a problem solver, rather than an effort-supplier, machine design may 
have to be adjusted to reflect these new tasks (Adler 1989) p 92. 
Factor 6g occurs where designers do not receive feedback on problems and 'work- 
arounds' from previous jobs, and hence fail to avoid features requiring error-prone 
activities. Further aspects of feedback problems are covered in Sections 6.4.9 and 
6.4.10. 
When seeking to reduce errors, it is helpful to consider the performance level of the 
activity being undertaken. Reason (Reason 1990) relates errors to Rasmussen's three 
`skill-rule-knowledge' levels (Rasmussen and Jensen 1974). These distinctions of 
performance correspond to decreasing levels of familiarity with the environment or task. 
" Errors at the skill-based level are related to the intrinsic variability of force, 
space or time co-ordination. 
" The rule-based level is applicable to tackling familiar problems in which 
solutions are governed by stored rules of the type `if (state) then (diagnosis)' 
or `if (state) then (remedial action)'. Here, errors are typically associated with 
the misclassification of situations leading to the application of the wrong rule 
or with the incorrect recall of procedures. 
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" Novel situations come into play at the knowledge-based level, for which 
actions must be planned on-line, using conscious analytical processes and 
stored knowledge. Errors at this level arise from resource limitations and 
incomplete or incorrect knowledge. 
6.2 Culture and Social Factors 
Table 6.2 Culture/social problems related to sources of information and influence 
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1 Lack of teamwork x 
2 Rejection of good advice: Disagree on technical grounds x x x 
3 Rejection of good advice: Disagree on economic x x 
grounds (not cost-effective) 
4 Rejection of good advice: Insufficient time/resources to 
make change 
x 
5 Rejection of good advice: Cannot be bothered with 
minor changes 
x x 
6 Rejection of good advice: Unwilling to carry out test 
programme to prove new/modified process 
x 
7 Prejudice in Design x 
8 Prejudice in Manufacturing x 
9 Personal antagonism 
10 Failure to obtain best advice x 
6.2.1 Lack of teamwork 
Factor lg is the need for leadership and the setting of team goals. Leadership is the 
subject of no fewer than three out of Deming's 14 principles of good management 
(Deming 1986) p 23.1 
Thamhain describes it as a myth that the assembly of talented and committed 
individuals automatically results in synergy and renders such a team impervious to 
many of the barriers commonly found in the project team environment. High team 
performance involved four primary factors: managerial leadership; job content; personal 
goals and objectives; and work environment and organisational support. Management 
insight had been gained from studies that showed the 12 most significant work- 
environment factors to be: professionally interesting and stimulating work; recognition 
of accomplishment; clear project objectives and directions; sufficient resources; 
experienced management personnel; proper technical direction and leadership; mutual 
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trust, respect, low conflict; qualified project team personnel; involved, supportive upper 
management; professional growth potential; job security; and stable goals and priorities 
(Thamhain 1998) pp 2091-2. 
Francis describes a supportive team as one that thrives on respecting differences 
between people. He defines ten different distinct roles of team members from which a 
balanced team may be constructed, after Meredith Belbin, Richard Boyatzis and Charles 
Margerison (Francis 1987) p 130: 
1. Process manager - channels resources, good chairman. 
2. Concept developer - transforms ideas into practical proposals, thrives on 
complex problems, and enjoys challenges. 
3. Radical - sees new possibilities, unconventional approach, generates insight, 
refuses traditional wisdom. 
4. Harmoniser - builds morale, supports, encourages, understands, sociable, 
promotes commitment and co-operation. 
5. Technical expert - specialist contribution, represents expertise, provides 
informed opinion. 
6. Output driver - ensures jobs get done, sets targets, delivers products, completes 
actions, strong commitment to quality, responsive to time limits, may be 
autocratic. 
7. Critic - stands back, judges, considers possibilities, looks for possible pitfalls, 
sounds caution, questions proposals, judges ideas; sceptical, decisive, accurate, 
stable contributors - objective. 
8. Co-operator - diligent observer, actively assists team, adaptable, generous, 
enthusiastic, lacks concern for protocol, broad capabilities, and co-operative. 
9. Politician - shapes schemes and collective viewpoints by being opinionated, 
results-orientated, high in influence, building allowances, guiding others being 
power conscious and persuasive; confident they know the right thing to do, 
deliberately try to influence other people. 
10. Promoter - links team to others by being outgoing, sociable, building 
relationships, investigating resources, sensing out ideas and possibilities; `fixer'. 
Francis goes on to describe how transactional analysis (after Eric Berne) can give useful 
insights into team relationships. Three basic ego states are defined: 
" `Parent' is authoritarian, critical and harsh, but may also nurture others. 
Strong defence of tradition, unwillingness to consider fresh ideas, and 
creativity is stifled - subordinates feel judged and they `close-up'; the truth is 
often kept from the boss. 
" `Adult' is logical and rational, collects facts, weighs opinions, relates ideas, 
and comes to reasonable conclusions - invaluable to supportive teamwork. 
" `Child' is spontaneous, joyful, sad, frustrated, demanding, angry or loving - 
children communicate feelings in an instant, learn to manipulate people and 
situations to suit their needs, but are made to comply (often rebelliously) with 
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the directives of others. The destructive and manipulative side of the child ego 
states is hazardous in several ways - people become excessively excited and 
over-optimistic, irrationally distressed or disheartened, actions are taken 
impulsively, data are ignored, difficulties are taken personally, and debates 
degenerate into childish arguments. 
Francis provides a case example of how the executive in charge of a construction 
project would adopt the critical `parent' ego state when anything went wrong. Members 
of his team hid from him the serious technical problems that were found, because they 
were frightened to expose themselves to ridicule and humiliation: they reacted from 
their `child' ego state. 
Such psychological games are subtle but powerful ways for team members to maintain 
their own integrity through defence or attack. Much behaviour takes place below the 
level of consciousness, but the resulting communication blockages destroy the 
possibility of mutual support and can be immensely expensive and time wasting. 
There are only two remedies with a chance of success: first, it helps for teams to learn to 
recognise games; secondly, team leaders can set the tone by demonstrating that "the 
way to get on around here is to play it straight". These measures can help develop and 
maintain `adult' attitudes. Supportive teams develop their capability under good 
leadership, but are often helped by a deliberate team building process that hastens the 
development of respect for difference and promotes honest dealing (Francis 1987) pp 
130-140. 
Golzen reports on a number of aspects of teamworking (Golzen 2000): 
" While they can provide a dynamic meeting place for sharing ideas and expertise, 
they can take up so much time that managers cannot get on with core tasks. 
" Forming teams and having meetings must not be an end in itself, irrespective of 
purpose. There is also the danger of a hidden agenda to prolong the life of the 
team. People feel the need to belong, and team membership can provide a 
psychological prop in fragmented organisations. 
" Clarity of purpose and goals are more important than the composition of the 
team and the classification of the roles to be played by members, especially in 
the case of virtual teams, operating globally and communicating via the Internet. 
Such teams do not have the benefit of the regular face-to-face communication 
that is so essential to getting a task done, but they are effective in setting 
common objectives and highlighting cultural or procedural barriers that may 
hinder implementation. 
" Different tasks also need different kinds of teams. Boats offer a good analogy: 
members of a rowing crew have a task requiring everyone to be going in the 
same direction, while people crewing a yacht have different roles, but a common 
objective. 
" In a lot of situations a small task force would be much more effective than a 
team. 
These teamworking factors are involved in many of the issues raised elsewhere in this 
thesis. 
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6.2.2 Rejection of good advice: Disagree on technical grounds 
The term `good advice' used in this and the following sections refers to advice that 
would - perhaps with hindsight - have led to improved part producibility. 
Factor 2c is the strong adverse influence exerted by the experience of previous poor 
performance on the willingness of individuals to adopt new methods. 
Miller and Morris contend that the difference between the acceptance of and resistance 
to change can be framed in terms of expectations for the future. Those who believe that 
success in the future will be a logical extrapolation of the trends of the past and present 
may resist innovations and the changes they bring. On the other hand, those who 
recognise that the only way to achieve or sustain success is through innovation 
understand that this will necessarily bring change, and they are psychologically 
prepared to accept it, or even to welcome it. Here the critical aspects are nearly always 
at the tacit level, as those who resist change may have been strongly influenced by 
negative experiences in the past that have never been fully analysed and discussed. As 
long as they remain tacit, they will exert tremendous power even as they are 
inaccessible and perhaps dangerously obsolete. In the decision-making process, 
knowledge leads to decisions, which lead to action. The challenge in this process is to 
make explicit the decision-making models that serve as filters so that they can be 
evaluated and perhaps revised in the light of new knowledge. 
Because of the enormous complexity of dynamic sociotechnical systems, people have 
false expectations about the usability of information, about the difficulty of translating 
information to knowledge and knowledge to action. As results, people tend to wait for 
clarity of information, but with the achievement of full clarity, opportunity is gone. To 
overcome this tendency, stochastic models of information such as those using the 
forecasting and scenario-based planning are needed. These tools are used in conjunction 
with capability development activities in the form of training and practice in individual 
and group decision-making, with the emphasis on situations characterized by fuzzy 
options. Sports practice and military war games are examples of necessary investments 
in developing `situated' tacit knowledge linked to particular activities and environments 
(Miller and Morris 1999) pp 195-201. 
Maccoby emphasises the need to upgrade leadership and team membership skills and 
recommends training in brainstorming, listening, asking clarifying questions, and 
seeking consensus (Maccoby 1999). 
Factor 2d is that published material may contain conflicting standards or reports, and 
further work may be necessary to identify the correct information. 
Factor 2g occurs where insufficient expertise exists within the team, and there may be a 
need to call in additional specialist. This factor may be worse where there should be 
disagreement with a proposed scheme that is unwise or impracticable, but `group think' 
has prevented objections being raised. Several authors describe the effects of group 
think, a term coined by Janis in 1971 (Janis 1972), and the need for having a team made 
up of divergent individuals to avoid the effect, e. g. (Reason 1997) p 217; (Hargie, 
Dickson et al. 1999) p 56; and (Thamhain 1998) p 2092. 
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6.2.3 Rejection of good advice: Disagree on economic grounds (not cost- 
effective) 
The assessment of cost effectiveness, as used for decision support, depends on what 
factors are taken into account and how they are assessed. Costing tools that are part of a 
DFM package may not provide the complete picture (factor 3f). Also, the value of 
developing a new method may lie in its application to future projects (factor 3g), so that 
the team may need to engage a champion to support it. This applied particularly to the 
adoption of CE, where the current project might not expect to save cost, but would act 
as a pilot for sorting out the problems and benefit future projects (BPS). 
In the civil aerospace in-house study, Manufacturing had requested 3-D modelling for 
the parts they had been asked to make from 2D drawings. This had been rejected on 
grounds of cost, partly because external suppliers had previously made the parts and no 
significant problems were anticipated. With hindsight, it became apparent that some 
aspects of geometry relating to the proposed 5-axis machining could not been conveyed 
by the 2D drawings; this aspect, together with a number of errors and omissions that 
would have been shown up by 3-D modelling, cost significantly more in queries, scrap, 
rework, and concessions than it would have cost for the 3-D modelling (CAS A2). 
A further aspect is the reluctance of designers to initiate changes that compromise 
performance, for example where the `ideal' shape would not allow the use of a high- 
speed cutting tool without leaving excess material that would add weight to the part. 
This has two important effects: first, it may require considerable effort in meetings or 
other communications to negotiate the trade-off between manufacturing cost and 
performance; second, the resulting delay in deciding to make such changes may add to 
the total design and tooling effort and extend the project timescale. See also Section 
6.5.12g(CASA2,4,5; T1-4; C1,2,5,6,7,9,10). 
6.2.4 Rejection of good advice: Insufficient time/resources to make change 
Factor 4g occurs where there was insufficient communication to identify the need for 
change at a stage when it would have involved minimal effort. Prasad asserts that most 
trade-off studies at the initial stages of the design cycle are done quickly with crude 
early product data and hence many important analysis steps cannot be performed. When 
enough design checks are ignored due to lack of time, it is likely that the design, when 
passed on for downstream operations, may remain unchecked or incomplete. It is much 
more cost-effective to carry out more iterations and trade-offs during an early part of the 
design cycle than later (Prasad 1997) p 371. Prasad also recognises the difficulties of 
dealing with incompleteness and ambiguity - such as having to decide whether to use 
an approximate analysis early, or to wait until information is complete (Prasad 1996) p 
415. 
Wheelwright and Clark point out that support groups not directly involved in detailed 
engineering often find themselves with substantial new responsibilities, but no new 
resources to carry them out. Restructuring of tasks may be necessary to give support 
organisations the time and energy to participate in the crucial up-front work that will 
make their work more effective later on (Wheelwright and Clark 1992) p 334. 
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6.2.5 Rejection of good advice: Cannot be bothered with minor changes 
If a minor change to ease manufacture is identified, it may be resisted by Design if the 
CAD software is configured so that it involves considerable rework, especially for 
features entered early in the model build-up sequence (factor 5e). 
Factor 5g is the failure to make changes to the design that could avoid repeating 
problems later with design reuse. Busby points out that designs will often not be 
changed when bugs were found in them: either because downstream functions (like 
Manufacturing) had fixed the bugs and not informed the designer, or because the 
designer was reluctant to spend effort in changing the original design and re-issuing it 
through a cumbersome change procedure (Busby 1997) p107. The importance of 
making even minor changes for ease of manufacture should not be underestimated in its 
effect on Manufacturing morale and the promotion of teamwork. 
Wheelwright and Clark's example quoted in Section 6.1.2g of a prototype shop failing 
to communicate a necessary change of fixturing is equally applicable here. 
The effect of not bothering to communicate minor changes and workarounds is 
amplified when there is a change of manufacturer. In the civil aerospace studies, the in- 
house manufacture of a part that had been produced previously by more than one 
supplier revealed a number of queries on the supposedly mature drawings (CAS A3). 
6.2: 6 Rejection of good advice: Unwilling to carry out test programme to 
;, prove new/modified process 
Factor 6g is when there is no risk assessment for a process that is not already familiar 
to both Design and Manufacturing, or the assessment fails to identify and accept the 
need for testing. 
The best practice study contained examples of suppliers who were keen to expand their 
capability. However, major customers had experience of unfulfilled promises from 
overoptimistic suppliers, and urged caution when adopting untried sources (BPS). 
6.2.7 Prejudice in Design 
Factor 7g occurs when Design are prejudiced against the views and expertise of other 
disciplines. For example, they may not appreciate the value of employing the expertise 
of Manufacturing. Francis describes the phenomenon of `prejudice' as a set of attitudes 
that predisposes a person to think well or badly of an identifiable group, based on 
logically invalid generalisations, which cannot be supported objectively. Prejudice 
occurs when one group believes that another is inferior, and is so deeply ingrained that 
we must expect to see it in organisations. Because it undermines co-operation, provokes 
conflict and inhibits genuine communication, prejudice is an important consideration for 
managers (Francis 1987) p117. 
One of the barriers to teamworking is the tendency to stereotype and devalue `other' 
views (Thamhain 1998) p 2091. `Class distinction' between Design and Manufacturing 
engineers must be overcome. 
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Liker and Fleischer suggested that conscious team-building exercises could help 
uncover differences in functional perspectives and help members constructively use 
these differences to encourage creativity (Liker and Fleischer 1992). 
Ashkenas states that intense socialising experiences go a long way toward removing 
barriers between people and breaking down stereotypes (Ashkenas, Ulrich et al. 1995) 
page 301. 
Durand and Cremadez explain how a major deficiency in attitudes can destroy the 
whole ability to innovate of an otherwise efficient company. Transforming the culture 
of the organisation in order to generate new attitudes, more compatible with the specific 
needs of innovation, in turn means unlearning part of the existing cultural base. To 
generate new learning and some form of unlearning in a context where the pre-existing 
competence base tends to deny and reject new representations, one way may be to 
organise the contextual conditions which would make it possible for entrenched routines 
to appear insufficient. A key element is then to make sure that the new context does not 
render the previous representations and routines fully obsolete, but only partially unfit 
to cope to the new challenges. The former and the new representations, as well as the 
former routines (operations orientated) and the new processes (innovation focused) have 
to operate simultaneously, if not harmoniously. The challenge for management is to 
design the new processes in such a way that the individuals can cope with the rhythm, 
the timescale, the pressure of both the normal operations and the newly required 
innovative processes. One of the best triggers may be to use some external force, 
suddenly presented as a major threat to the firm. Creating a feeling of urgency may thus 
be used as a catalytic shock to the organisation (Durand and Cremadez 1999) p 361. 
6.2.8 Prejudice in Manufacturing 
Factor 8g is that Manufacturing must be able to see that their advice is respected and 
responded to, even where it cannot be adopted. If not, there will be a communication 
problem because they will stop offering suggestions if they feel ignored. 
Thamhain highlights the possibility of lower-status individuals being ignored, thus 
eliminating a potentially valuable resource. While some struggle for power is inevitable 
in a diverse group, it must be managed to minimise potentially destructive consequences 
(Thamhain 1998) p 2091. 
Ettlie states that a critical and still unresolved problem is the issue of availability of 
qualified, well educated, professionals, capable of claiming equal status with other team 
members and well experienced manufacturing personnel that can be taken away from 
operations responsibilities (Ettlie 1995) p 108. 
Wheelwright and Clark regard the management of distrust as crucial. Actions to break 
down barriers of distrust may include transferring people across boundaries, 
establishing working teams so that people can build up relationships that will support 
trust, and taking extraordinary measures to encourage individual creativity 
(Wheelwright and Clark 1992) p 334. 
Todd explains how attitude problems, when people persistently fail to give the 
commitment and co-operation expected by management, will often have their roots in 
fear, but there can be other causes that need to be recognised and tackled. The three 
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most commonly found are resentment of criticism because "I know best how to do my 
job"; a deep-rooted commitment to traditional priorities, so that overcoming today's 
problems always takes precedence over efforts to improve future performance; and a 
feeling that any improvements achieved will primarily benefit `management' - often 
expressed as "What's in it for us? " (Todd 1995) p110. This aspect is strongly related to 
both Teamworking (Section 6.5.1) and Metrics and Rewards (6.7.8). 
6.2.9 Personal antagonism 
Factor 9g is where antipathy between individuals can compromise performance. Team 
leaders or facilitators must recognise any such problem and take steps to overcome it. 
Maslow states the general assumption that people get more pleasure out of loving than 
they will out of hating, but warns that the pleasures of hating are real and should not be 
overlooked. For fairly well developed people, the pleasures of loving, friendship, and 
teamwork, of being part of a well-functioning organisation are real and strong - and 
greater than the pleasures of disruption, destruction, antagonism etc. However, for 
people who are not highly developed, i. e. for deeply neurotic or psychotic people, there 
is the fair number of instances in which the pleasures of hatred and destruction are 
greater than the pleasures of friendship and affection (Maslow, Stephens et al. 1998) p 
20. 
6.2.10 Failure to obtain best advice 
The people best placed to advise should be included in the team, or brought in to advise. 
Factor 10g occurs when a prime specialist was absent from the discussion or 
represented by a deputy - team leaders or facilitators must recognise the importance of 
following up topics for completeness and balance in such circumstances. A team 
member's absence may be related to conflicting priorities, which may in turn reflect the 
attitude and commitment of the individual. Todd warns of the need to anticipate and 
manage this problem, for example by emphasising senior management commitment, 
setting time management targets, monitoring achievement and setting a good example 
(Todd 1995) p 110. 
Conley reported the case where, as a result of their regular absences from development 
meetings, the marketing function was unaware that year one production of an innovative 
product was to be limited to only 30,000 units. Tooling was not designed to handle 
marketing's projected volumes of 100,000+ engines in year one, so that sales orders 
could not be satisfied. The resulting difficulties disappointed many members of the core 
team, and most of them eventually left the company. The considerable know-how 
acquired during the development program left with the core team members (Conley 
1998). 
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6.3 Knowledge 
Table 6.3: Knowledge problems related to sources of information and influence 
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1 Lack of Know-how x x x x x 
2 Lack of knowledge of manufacturing x x x x 
processes 
3 Lack of knowledge of material behaviour 
during processing 
x x x x 
4 Failure to recognise that advice is needed x x 
6.3.1 Lack of Know-how 
Factor lc is the lack of know-how that can be improved by training and experience, 
which covers CE principles as well as people's own specialisation. The following points 
should be considered: 
" In a joint study with industry, Beitz and Helbig reviewed the future education of 
product developers and found "massive deficiencies in the fields of non- 
technical basic knowledge, methods- and system-competence as well as in the 
social competence. " In contrast, they found deficiencies in fundamental 
technical knowledge to be very small. (Beitz and Helbig 1997). However, 
Ashkenas pointed out that if employees want to act and are trained to act but 
then are not allowed to act - to make decisions with good information - they are 
highly likely to become frustrated (Ashkenas, Ulrich et al. 1995) page 51. 
" Much knowledge is tacit and needs to be learned through experience. 
Narasimhan contends that commonsense behaviour is essentially underpinned 
by tacit knowledge (Narasimhan 1997). 
" Professor Ghoshal of the London Business School is reported (Dearlove 2000) 
as stressing the importance of addressing human capital at a more profound level 
than that of creating an internal market for knowledge: "Often we make the 
mistake of thinking of human capital as just knowledge. A second important 
aspect is social capital - networks and relationships. The third dimension is 
emotional capital - the ability and willingness to act. There is no solution other 
than a trust-based culture. It's not so much a case of "I have this knowledge 
which I give to you, " it's more how you shape questioning and frame learning. 
At BP, for example, a quarter of the knowledge management budget is spent on 
coaching people. " 
" People need to be coached into asking the right questions so as to share 
knowledge. Marsh pointed out that designers needed to be confident of the 
validity of their question before placing trust in the answer obtained. The 
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questions asked, or information sought, frequently did not represent the 
knowledge ultimately required (Marsh 1997) p 109. 
Ehrlenspiel regards one of the consequences of the knowledge-explosion as an 
increase in the barriers of communication between specialists, because new 
`interface problems' are arising as new technical terminologies are developed, 
which are not understandable by others. So, in spite of knowledge-explosion, 
lack of knowledge for the product-development may cause time-consuming 
modifications (Ehrlenspiel 1997) p 482. 
The sharing of education and training may help to integrate suppliers into the new 
product development process. In a study of the management practices of 60 companies, 
Ragatz et al cited this management factor as a significant differentiator between the 
most and least successful efforts (Ragatz, Handfield et al. 1997). 
Factor Id is the need to appreciate the range, scope and currency of published 
information available, and the importance of knowing where to look. 
McMahon stressed the vital importance of the way information is processed when it 
comes into an organisation - e. g. supplier information, standards, journals, customer 
feedback and so on. Strategies for information filtering, indexing and management 
should be in place. Rapid connection to information will be enhanced by encouraging 
design staff to develop specialisms for which they collate and publish information, and 
by maintaining directories of specialist expertise. Experience can often be organised in 
the context of the incremental development of established design concepts. 
Organisations should adopt formal strategies for the organisation of information about 
precedent designs - such as QFD and FMEA charts, in-service records, `best-practice' 
. 
Fand `lessons-learned' databases and so on (McMahon, Lowe et al. 1999). 
Factor 1e covers shortcomings caused by the complexity of CAD Systems. Full- 
featured CAD system training is expensive, and is not normally given to those needing 
only occasional access to models. CAD skills learned can be lost if not regularly 
applied. Major customers often require component models from their suppliers in their 
own CAD system and software revision level. Suppliers may have difficulty in 
maintaining their proficiency in working with several different CAD systems (BPS). 
Factor if is the lack of understanding of the context, capability and limitations of DFM 
tools and software. Lack of familiarity may discourage or limit its use (BPS). 
Factor 1g results from of lack of knowledge of communication and meetings skills, and 
the need to gain confidence in communications media and working as a team player. 
Ehrlenspiel et al studied the way design students worked in teams, and found that most 
of the disadvantages of teamwork in design occurred because of problems of 
communication between the team members (Ehrlenspiel, Giapoulis et al. 1997). 
Communication media requiring extensive training may discourage participation. 
6.3.2 Lack of knowledge of manufacturing processes 
Factor 2c is the need for training of engineering designers to include the characteristics 
of different manufacturing processes to avoid the problem of DFM mismatches. 
Peklenik emphasises the role of education and training in giving an individual the 
chance of getting relevant knowledge and experience. For the human operator to control 
99 
the manufacturing activity, he must possess several abilities, enabling him to do these 
jobs with competence, reliability and with the sense of responsibility. The subject must: 
understand the organisational structure of the workstation, the operations involved in 
the manufacture of the specified output, and the art of control of the workstation in 
order to accomplish set of objectives; have the ability to trust, to communicate, to share 
the knowledge, and to work in a team; be able to adapt quickly to unpredictable 
situations (Peklenik 1999) p 38. 
In the AEROEXTN Project there were three examples of issues that the designer might 
have been expected to avoid by applying `textbook' producibility principles: a geometry 
mismatch likely to leave machining marks on an adjacent face; a rectangular slot that 
could have been specified with semicircular ends for easy machining; and holes to be 
drilled at an angle to the surface, which would be awkward to machine without spot 
faces (AXP S1, S5 and S9). 
In the civil aerospace studies it was found that overstretched design departments were 
reluctant to release people for updating training or to attend seminars and conferences 
unless these were deemed essential. In particular, it was unusual for contract hire staff to 
be released for what might be regarded as general career development (CAS). 
To avoid the selection of sub-optimal company standards or processes (factor 2d), 
publications should reflect all currently available methods (BPS). In the civil aerospace 
study, Design reported that the company Design Handbook for composite materials was 
in course of preparation. The designer responsible for composite panels stated that he 
would have been prepared to accept a `wish list' from the supplier (based on their 
experience from manufacturing panels for earlier aircraft). This might well have 
reduced the need for some of the producibility interactions, especially those regarded by 
Design as being supplier site-specific (CAS C2,3,5,6,9 and 10). 
Factor 2f is that databases and tools may contain only absolute process limits without 
guidance on optimum application or alternative processes (AXP). 
Factor 2g is where feedback of information on difficulties in manufacture does not 
reach designers effectively. Busby cites the following (Busby 1997) p107: 
" People such as test engineers, manufacturing engineers and installation 
engineers sometimes had limited diagnostic abilities, and tended to attribute 
problems to a product's design in the absence of better information. 
" Such people also tended to communicate their diagnoses to designers, not the 
symptoms - so designers typically had to make corrective decisions with 
surprisingly poor information. 
" People in other functions often categorised problems in different ways from 
designers. 
" Designers' preferred ways of receiving feedback (usually written channels, to 
avoid interruption and distraction) differed from others' preferred mechanisms 
for giving feedback (usually verbal, direct and immediate). 
The civil aerospace study showed that considerable delay in resolving minor queries 
could arise for a mature part on the change of manufacturer. The original design team 
had moved on, and the paper-based works query note (WQN) system received low 
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priority from a design office support team dealing with a range of other matters (CAS 
A3). 
6.3.3 Lack of knowledge of material behaviour during processing 
Factor 3c is when new applications of materials and processes have not been tested to 
reduce the risk of production problems. 
During the AEROEXTN project it was noted that engineers from the design team for an 
earlier missile project had spent considerable time working with the supplier to develop 
processes on the new 5-axis workstations so as to produce acceptable parts (AXP). 
Factor 3d is that effort is wasted and projects are delayed because reports often do not 
include details of unsuccessful trials, or methods investigated and rejected, as well as 
successful solutions (AXP & BPS). 
Factor 3f is where databases and tools apply geometrical constraints without regard to 
`live' process characteristics (BPS). Brissaud and Tichkiewitch describe the 
development of design synthesis tools to constrain part definition, and point out the 
advantage of coupling the design engineer's and the process planner's activities so that 
(for example) rigidity is considered globally by the rigidity of the part in use and the 
rigidity of the part while machining (Brissaud and Tichkiewitch 2000) p 118. In the 
civil aerospace study, one of the composite panels had a greater degree of double 
curvature than the flatter panels on previous aircraft: the original `ribbon direction' 
would not allow the honeycomb insert to conform to the shape correctly. The ribbon 
direction parameter had not been included in the database (AXP C3). 
, Factor 3g 
is the need for advice and feedback between Design, Manufacturing and 
Tooling (as Busby in 6.3.2g above). 
6.3.4 Failure to recognise that advice is needed 
Factor 4c is where people do not have the training and experience to recognise the 
limits of their knowledge. De Bono describes the concept of `unique rightness' whereby 
people believe they are right because they cannot imagine any alternative explanation 
that fits the facts available. It is impossible to exclude an alternative explanation simply 
because no one can think of one - at the moment. People with feeble imaginations are 
the most sure of their conclusions. What is only a tentative explanation for lack of a 
better one can quickly become dogmatic certainty, especially when the idea is taken 
away from the originator and passed from mind to mind becoming less tentative with 
each passage. A person may go to great lengths to demolish alternative explanations in 
order to strengthen their feeling of rightness, even when the little evidence available fits 
all the alternative explanations equally well (de Bono 1971) pp 118,123. 
Factor 4g is where team members are not familiar and up-to-date with the environment 
of their fellow members. They should be encouraged to visit each other's workplaces to 
help them understand the background and circumstances under which designs are 
developed and parts are made. Designers often are not familiar with the shop floor, or 
have been away from it for a long time. They may not appreciate the constraints that are 
obvious when the facilities and work in progress are seen at first hand. Production or 
Manufacturing, who work with these constraints every day, see them as so obvious that 
101 
either they do not think to raise the subject, or they regard Design in a poor light for not 
being aware of them (AXP & BPS). 
6.4 Organisation 
Table 6.4 Organisation problems related to sources of information and influence 
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1 Communication: Did not know whom to contact x x 
2 Communication: Cumbersome/time-consuming procedure x 
3 Communication: Contact not available x 
4 Communication: Contact could not understand problem x x 
Communication: Combination of factors involved required 
5 complex interaction between parties to resolve - no forum 
existed with right level of participation by appropriate x 
specialists to address 
6 Not cost optimising X. x 
7 Not optimised for process x 
8 Inappropriate metrics and reward system x 
9 
Lack of feedback - no learning from previous projects to 
avoid problems x 
10 Lack of feedback - no learning from queries and 
concessions on current work x 
11 Wrong standards, when correct standards available x x x 
12 
Information not shared by Design for 
commercial/political/parochial reasons x 
13 Information not shared by Manufacturing for 
commercial/political/parochial reasons x 
14 Failure to consult/involve suppliers, including third parties (e. g. material suppliers, sub-contractors) x X. 
15 Failure to anticipate problems x x x X. 
16 Lack of ability x 
17 Lack of effort x 
18 Lack of time x 
6.4.1 Communication: Did not know whom to contact 
Factor Ic is where there is a lack of clear guidance on responsibilities and specialist 
interests in the organisation. This can be reduced by publishing contact details, 
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establishing focal points, and emphasising their importance in the induction courses for 
a new employees and staff who move between departments. Backhouse and Brookes 
reported that, when Rolls-Royce developed a new concurrent engineering process, one 
of the essential features that differed from previous work practices was the database of 
contacts at suppliers, to which designers could have direct access. Without rapid access 
to experts at relevant suppliers, designers would never have time to consider alternative 
technologies, but would revert to consulting their `little blue books' of helpful contacts. 
The essential benefits of the corporate database were: it could ensure that suppliers had 
acceptable terms of business before they were entered onto the database; `make or buy' 
policies could be enforced; and designers could be preferentially directed to the best- 
performing, commercially-compatible suppliers. Creating and maintaining such a 
database was not a minor task - data had to be sufficiently detailed to ensure that the 
appropriate suppliers were registered against the correct component types or 
manufacturing concepts, and data on contact names, telephone and fax numbers needed 
to be kept up-to-date (Backhouse and Brookes 1996) p 200. 
Factor lg is where people who need to communicate do not know each other. In a 
study covering several different industries, Swink et al found that some projects 
emphasised collocation and face-to-face communication. Others relied on phone 
conversations, documents, and electronic mail. Projects focusing on design quality 
relied on formal presentations and periodic review meetings. Projects emphasising 
development speed required frequent, informal communications. Programs addressing 
design quality required extended product definition and performance testing, with input 
from design engineering, marketing, and customers. Efforts to reduce development time 
involved small, informal teams led by design engineers and managers. Aggressive 
product cost goals necessitated intensive interaction between product designers and 
manufacturing personnel. Highly innovative products required early supplier 
involvement and joint engineering problem solving. Formal design reviews and shared 
design data systems aided information sharing between internal and external design 
groups (Swink, Sandvig et al. 1996). 
Drucker emphasises that the effectiveness of an information system depends on the 
willingness and ability to think through carefully what information is needed by whom 
for what purposes, and then on the systematic creation of communication among the 
various parties to the system as to the meaning of each specific input and output. The 
effectiveness depends on the pre-establishment of communication (Drucker 1973) p 
489. 
6.4.2 Communication: Cumbersome/time-consuming procedure 
Factor 2g is where organisations prohibit direct contact, or make it difficult for people 
who need to discuss complex issues or trade-offs to communicate (e. g. require all 
queries to be submitted in writing through an intermediary). This may be overcome by 
developing a management policy that allows direct contact in appropriate cases, and 
monitors matters to ensure that Design advice is accessible without designers being 
pestered with trivia (BPS). 
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6.4.3 Communication: Contact not available 
Factor 3g is lack of immediate contact, or deputy prepared to look into the 
query/problem, that may frustrate the originator. Drisis found that designers looking for 
information and documents tended to follow the following sequence: they searched their 
own documents and folders first when they thought they had the information themselves 
somewhere (this was the least probable case, however); then they spontaneously asked 
some `well-known experts' or the colleagues next to them for help; finally, they kept 
asking until somebody could provide an answer or until they were bored (Drisis 1999) 
p. 568. Clearly, if they got bored before contacting the person with the best answer, 
their subsequent actions would not be based on the best information. 
Crabtree et al report that expertise among more senior people is always in demand at a 
company. Many of the older employees are veterans of many years, and have stores of 
knowledge the importance of which even they do not appreciate. When the more junior 
members need to find out something from the senior people, they very often are 
inaccessible, due to the amount that they are in demand, and their knowledge therefore 
does not benefit the others in the way it could. In addition to this, the moment that such 
an employee walks out the door on retirement, most of their knowledge walks out the 
door with them. The results of this knowledge may be present at the company in the 
form of designs, reports, drawings, etc., but the process that generated the work is not 
recorded, and therefore not retrievable. This information is a tremendous asset of the 
company's, but the company can no longer benefit from it after the retirement of the 
employee within whom the knowledge resides (Crabtree, Fox et al. 1997). 
Two points arise from this: the importance of capturing information from experienced 
people before they leave the company; and, where such information has not been 
captured and been made available to those who need it, making sure that access is 
granted to those with the knowledge - however senior they may be. 
6.4.4 Communication: Contact could not understand problem 
Factor 4c is the lack of the ability to understand, which can be reduced by training and 
improved by experience. Miller explains learning as knowledge brought about by a 
process of integration of information derived from data, plus theory that puts the 
information in the proper context, plus experience of how things work on the real world. 
(Miller and Morris 1999) p 77. Safe environments must be created for positive learning 
experiences to occur, whose essential elements include (Miller and Morris 1999) p 266: 
(1) Opportunities for training and practice; 
(2) Support and encouragement to overcome the fear and shame associated with 
making errors; 
(3) Coaching and rewards for efforts in the right direction; 
(4) Norms that legitimise the making of errors; 
(5) Norms that reward innovative thinking and experimentation. 
Factor 4g occurs because people with different perceptions may fail to grasp each 
other's point of view, however carefully it is explained. 
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Drucker's emphasis on the need to pre-establish communication for greater 
effectiveness, referred to in 6.4.1g above, is equally importnt here (Drucker 1973) p 
489. 
Coleman and Day reported that a survey of industrial designers suggested that the two 
factors ranked most highly for improving the effectiveness of design decisions relating 
to manufacturing issues were: to provide more opportunity to see the physical product 
(considered significant by 57% of respondents) and more opportunity to see 
manufacturing processes at first hand (47%) (Coleman and Day 1999). 
The AEROEXTN Project showed how a low-cost viewer on a PC could enable a 
supplier to view, use a red line mark-up facility, and comment on a 3D model of the 
design, readily generated from the main CAD system. This was especially useful where 
the supplier did not have a compatible CAD workstation, and it could also enable 
production engineers and shopfloor personnel to see and manipulate the model without 
formal training and without having to leave their normal workplace (AXP). 
6.4.5 Combination of factors involved required complex interaction 
between parties to resolve - no forum existed with right level of 
participation by appropriate specialists to address 
Factor 5g is where the organisation has not developed their communication and 
teamworking to match the complexity of the CE task. 
Wheelwright and Clark define four modes of communication, appropriate to varying 
degrees of product development, maturity and time pressure. Where problem solving 
between upstream and downstream groups is intimately connected, the practice of 
`throwing the design (blueprints) over the wall' will not support timely mutual 
adaptation of product and process design. What is needed to capture the nuance and 
detail important for joint problem solving is face-to-face discussion, direct observation, 
interaction with physical prototypes, and computer-based representations. 
The essence of mutual adjustment is real-time co-ordination between upstream and 
downstream engineering groups. In this way design engineers take into account the 
preliminary results of process engineering problem solving in order to make products 
easier and less expensive to manufacture (Wheelwright and Clark 1992). 
Adler discusses the selection of co-ordination mechanisms, emphasising that the more 
interactive mechanisms can be very burdensome in meeting time. He gives the example 
of an explicit set of criteria developed by one company that distinguished four levels for 
deciding how much interaction a given project would need: 
1. Rely on standards, then use manufacturing prototypes to resolve residual fit 
issues. 
2. Conduct a meeting with manufacturing staff early in the design phase to set some 
general parameters, then rely on the sign-off to ensure that they have been 
respected. 
3. Designate liaison people to conduct occasional in-progress design reviews. 
4. Implement a full product-process design team. 
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However, if the product-process fit issues embody exceptions with respect to prior 
experience, the organisation would need to plan for some design changes. If the number 
of exceptions were high, advance planning would not be able to anticipate them, and the 
manufacturing function would subsequently need to propose fit-enhancing changes. A 
transition team that brought design engineers into manufacturing could be very useful 
where the novelty was particularly high. Another aspect of DFM fit uncertainty is 
analysability - the difficulty of the search for the answer to the given DFM problem. 
High novelty of DFM fit problems creates the need for more interaction during the 
given phase, but low analysability forces the project to postpone the resolution of some 
of those fit problems to later phases, where new information will be created (Adler 
1992) pp 146-147. 
In a study of 10 high-tech companies Jassawalla and Sashittal concluded that how new- 
product-related technology transfer and human interactions were managed in high- 
technology firms remained under-studied. They found managers challenged by the 
prospects of linking together diverse functional groups that otherwise work separately, 
of increasing production's and marketing's stake to equal that of R&D's, and of 
ensuring that the exchange of information added value and resulted in creative new 
products. The study showed that creating a culture of interdependence, mindfulness and 
transparency was critical for sponsoring high levels of synergistic NP-related human 
and interpersonal interactions (Jassawalla and Sashittal 2000) p 49. 
6.4.6 Not cost optimising 
Factor 6f is that analysis tools may enable designers to see where the costs of 
manufacture lie for a given model and processes, but will not normally recommend 
alternative geometry or processes. The designer would then have to devise an 
alternative scheme for the tool to cost. Minis pointed out that most of the rule-based 
approaches would require large sets of rules to calculate realistic manufacturability 
ratings for cases where interactions among manufacturing operations make it difficult to 
determine the manufacturability of a design directly from the design description (Minis, 
Herrmann et al. 1999) p 384. 
Factor 6g is where designers have not developed teamworking with the other 
departments to combine their skills in looking for innovative ways to optimise costs and 
achieve the greatest cost reductions. Todd emphasises the importance of designers 
combining their skills with the skills of all the other departments involved, to achieve 
`better than ever' cost reduction. It is important to recognise that some of the key people 
involved may feel that their professional ability is being challenged, and their (often 
unspoken) fears may have to be laid to rest by pointing out that they had not previously 
had the opportunity to apply their professional skills to the full because of the emphasis 
previously placed on achieving other goals (Todd 1995) p 257. 
6.4.7 Not optimised for process 
Factor 7f is that tools that are generic in their application may not be optimised for 
specific processes. However, where process-specific tools are available, decisions on 
process may not be made (or may be changed) after significant design work is complete, 
resulting in a sub-optimal solution. Lempiäinen points out that examples used in 
training to motivate designers tend to refer mainly to mass production products, and 
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thus show exceptionally good results in terms of lead time and cost savings. However, 
the case stories can seldom point out how the designer can solve problems in the 
flexible small batch production environment (Lempiäinen 1997) p 577. 
In the AEROEXTN project there had been nothing to prompt the designer to include a 
tooling hole, which the production engineer considered would significantly improve the 
manufacturing process. There were no rules to guide the SESAME designer, so that it 
took three producibility interactions for the appropriate size, placement and tolerances 
of the tooling hole to be agreed (AXP S3,8,12). 
6.4.8 Inappropriate metrics and reward system 
Factor 8g is that rewards may depend on metrics or criteria that are too narrowly 
focused, especially where they may actively discourage working for the common good 
of the organisation. 
Wheelwright and Clark emphasise the need for managers to be sensitive to those aspects 
of their systems that get in the way of the kinds of change that new capabilities require. 
The process engineer who said "that's not my job" when required to get involved early 
in the design phase of a product lacks information on the purpose of such involvement 
and the incentives to undertake it. Indeed, what the engineer means is "... that is not 
what I get paid for, that is not how I get rewarded, there is nothing in it for me. " 
Individuals need to understand the value awaiting them in working with the new or 
improved approach. Experience has shown that once product and manufacturing 
engineers get involved in working together in an integrated fashion, the benefits become 
apparent. Getting involved can create opportunities for them to substantially improve 
their performance, the quality of their work, and the performance and quality of others' 
work. It also influences their quality of life at work (Wheelwright and Clark 1992) p 
334. 
Deming emphasises the damaging effects of the fear that may result from the way 
individual performance is assessed and merit is rewarded. He cites the example of a 
person afraid to contribute their best efforts to a partner or to a team, because their 
contribution may lead to someone else getting a higher rating than them (Deming 1986) 
p 60. Deming strongly decries the evaluation of performance for an annual review, or 
merit rating. He considers that `management by fear' would be a better name than 
`management by objective' or `management by numbers', because such measures 
nourish short-term performance, annihilate long-term planning, build fear, demolish 
teamwork, and nourish rivalry and politics (Deming 1986) p 102. 
The challenge for management lies not so much in motivating people as in building an 
environment where motivated people are willing to make a maximum contribution 
(Maslow, Stephens et al. 1998) p 68. 
Ashkenas et al consider it a myth that the broad sharing of rewards creates healthy 
hierarchies. People also require competence, information, and appropriate authority to 
act. They warn that rewards alone often encourage random or even counter-productive 
behaviour (Ashkenas, Ulrich et al. 1995) p 51. 
Lonsdale and Cox (Lonsdale and Cox 1998) p 151quote Burt and Doyle's six principles 
of the philosophy of measurement: 
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" There should only be a small number of measures; 
" The measures must be straightforward; 
" The focus of a measure must have a significant impact on the business; 
" Measures must be assigned to a named individual or individuals; 
" Measurement report distribution must be agreed and formalised; 
" Responses to various levels of performance must be agreed in advance (Burt and 
Doyle 1993) pp 185-186. 
While this provides the broad rules of the measurement challenge, they suggest 
(Lonsdale and Cox 1998) pp 151-152 the more detailed framework that recognises the 
importance of innovation provided by Kaplan and Norton's `balanced scorecard'. This 
tool involves the four perspectives of. financial; internal business; customer; and 
innovation and learning. This scorecard brings together many of the seemingly disparate 
elements of the company's competitive agenda and allows the Board to assess whether 
improvements in one aspect of the business's performance is causing lower 
performance elsewhere (Kaplan and Norton 1992) p 71. 
Measures frequently address short-term local goals rather than corporate goals: for 
example, where a designer is tasked with completing a model or drawings by a given 
date, with no account being taken of the errors, queries and design changes that may 
result from the work being hurried. In a UK Department of Trade and Industry 
presentation in 1998, following an American tour by a group of specialists looking at 
best practice, it was reported that the Chrysler Corporation had moved to a reward 
system that depended only 50% on performance in the specialist task, while giving the 
other 50% for communicating with others. 
Cooke, McMahon and North suggest a system of metrics for the design process, based 
on the analysis of design changes during development, that can be used as an aid to 
improving design quality (Cooke, McMahon et al. 1999). 
Cleetus recommends project assessment tools that generate metrics to assist in task co- 
ordination, perhaps displaying colours on Gantt charts to provide a useful qualitative 
view for managers. For example, an understandability metric of project tasks might be 
displayed with green for the perfectly understandable tasks (all outstanding questions 
satisfactorily answered), yellow for those with of over half the questions answered, and 
red for those with less than half (Cleetus 1998) p 255. 
Teschler reports on the metrics used by a developer of surgical products. Because 
metrics could grow stale, they regularly convened a special team of group leaders, 
support partners, and others involved in product development to decide whether the 
current metrics by which teams got measured still made sense. Corrective action reports, 
products released, resource allocations, and customer feedback issues had all, at one 
time or another, been used as process measurements. If teams found better indicators, 
old ones got jettisoned to make way for new yardsticks of performance. They were 
moving toward metrics to predict performance rather than to react to problems. They 
also had to work to get developers past the idea that metrics would be used against 
them, rather than a tool they could use themselves. One early insight was that it made 
no sense to apply the same norms to all projects regardless of their complexity. Now, 
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efforts revolving around technological breakthroughs got measured separately from 
others (Teschler 1999). 
Lynn and Reilly claim that a lack of useful metrics is undoubtedly one reason that the 
success rate of new product development has not improved appreciably over the past 40 
years. If companies could measure their innovation process-if they had reliable metrics 
to gauge their performance-then specific problem areas could be addressed and 
managers might see the same improvement in their innovation efforts that they have 
come to expect from their quantifiable TQM programs. The `Innovation Report Card' 
was being developed as a new method for measuring new product team performance 
and comparing that performance to a standard to determine if and where improvement is 
needed. The most important factors would depend on the goals of the new product team 
(Lynn and Reilly 2000): 
" If the team wants to reach market quickly, they found that having a good NPD 
Process, a Stable Vision and a Stable Team were particularly important; 
" If the team is trying to develop self-correcting, self-directed teams (information 
implementation) then NPD Process, Team Stability, Management Support, 
Recording, and Reviewing were critical; 
" If the goal is simply successful innovation, then NPD Process, Management 
Support, Reviewing, and Vision Clarity were crucial. 
Kormos reported that most management teams vastly underestimate the time needed to 
design and implement a strong metrics program. Experts recommend planning on years, 
not months, to get metrics functioning effectively. One of the least utilized tools was 
predictive metrics to measure activities or results critical to the major goals, such as 
whether a project will come out on schedule. Metrics tracked in this regard have 
included requirement changes, design changes after prototype, and time-to-achieve-full- 
staffing. All these can help identify problems early. For motivational metrics, Kormos 
reports Arthur M. Schneiderman's `half-life metrics' - the time required to achieve 50% 
reductions in a performance gap. These are aimed at managing the wasted effort and 
elapsed time spent on error corrections. Making gap reduction an objective during the 
product development cycle will have immediate and measurable bearing in almost every 
case on the cost of the project, the cycle time, and the quality of the output delivered to 
a customer. Teams seeking to make 5x and l Ox type improvements must be able to 
assess root causes and arrive at remedies expeditiously, using structured problem- 
solving approaches. During the 1980s, NEC delivery teams used the metric of `Problem 
anticipation rate' = Number anticipated x 100 %/ (Number anticipated + Number not 
anticipated) for PC software from approximately 25% to almost 100 percent, for 
microcomputer systems from 10% to over 50%, and for microcomputer modules from 
just under 60% to about 65% (Kormos 1998). 
R. J. Might reported, as one possible measure of project technical success, the ability of 
the project team to identify technical problems before they reached crisis proportions 
(Might 1984) p 128. 
In contrast to the experience of `what gets measured gets done', Mariotti cites Hewlett- 
Packard's `muddled teams' concept, described in Fortune by Stratford Sherman (1996), 
as an example of successful efforts that defy measurement in the normal sense. In this 
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instance, by agreeing to levels of improvement previously thought impossible, the HP 
team leaders `bought' the freedom to design the new processes through an uncontrolled 
and near-chaotic team process. When asked how often they reported progress to the 
corporate management at HP: "Not very often, if we could avoid it. It was very hard to 
honestly represent the situation in those early days in a way that would mean anything 
to people from outside the team. " (Mariotti 1997) p 259. Pugh highlights the 
significance of the interaction between types of control and patterns of communication 
(Pugh 1996) p 508, quoting Might: "Unfortunately for the project manager, the 
implementation of certain control systems can interact with communication patterns to 
produce a negative impact on success... If project team members know what has to be 
done, how difficult it is, and that they will be pressed to get it completed in a 
satisfactory manner, the added burden of supporting a reporting system on the 
accomplishments may be too much (Might 1984) p 131. " 
In a study of how a vehicle manufacturer was measuring the co-development 
performance of over 300 suppliers, Johnson and Evans found that very few 
organisations effectively measured their product development capability and that the use 
of subjective measures was more extensive than objective measures. Industry and 
academics found product development a hard area for measurement. The amount of 
time and effort required to pioneer in a `difficult' area was high, and not knowing if the 
benefits were less than the input effort could cause practitioners not to bother (Johnson 
and Evans 1997). 
6.4.9 Lack of feedback - no learning from previous projects to avoid 
problems 
Factor 9g occurs when organisations do not provide a mechanism for recording and 
accessing problems and solutions from previous projects, or for communication 
between teams. Weber emphasises the importance of effective and sufficient horizontal 
communication between the Integrated Product Development (IPD) teams to avoid IPD 
`silos'. The traditional `silos' were the design engineers' silo, strength engineers' silo, 
tool designers' silo, manufacturing engineers' silo, etc: now IPD teams need to avoid 
the tendency to have IPD `silos', each silo consisting of a design engineer, a strength 
engineer, a tool designer, a manufacturing engineer, etc (Weber 1994). 
Kormos stresses the importance of knowledge archives, quoting the example of a 
business equipment manufacturer who captured lessons learned from every project in a 
structured Lotus Notes database: "Our rule is you're not done until the team has 
captured what they've learned. " (Kormos 1998). 
Busby found that there were repeated errors where design organisations had failed to 
embody past experience in new products. The motivational function of feedback was 
vitiated by the absence of objective outcome measurements and little systematic 
guidance to designers on effective behaviours. Designers also believed there was a 
strong bias towards negative (that is critical and unfavourable) feedback in their day-to- 
day work. Several of these problems have more general explanations: (1) a general 
under-estimation of the extent to which knowledge of results contributes to job 
satisfaction among designers; (2) a similar under-estimation of the extent to which 
designers are uncertain about the consequences of their decisions and their general 
performance; and (3) a strong current-task orientation which discourages both 
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individual and collective investment in acquiring knowledge for future application 
(Busby 1999). 
Petroski warns that there is clearly no guarantee of success in designing new things on 
the basis of past successes alone, and this is why artificial intelligence, expert systems, 
and other computer-based design aids whose logic follows examples of success can 
only have limited application. It is imperative in the design process to have a full and 
complete understanding of how failure is being obviated in order to achieve success. 
Without fully appreciating how close to failing a new design is, its own designer may 
not fully understand how and why a design works (Petroski 1994) p 31. In the civil 
aerospace studies an example of an obsolete process had been included in the design 
(CAS C4). 
6.4.10 Lack of feedback - no learning from queries and concessions on 
current work 
Factor 10g is that systems for dealing with design queries and concessions are often 
bureaucratic and cumbersome, and may be dealt with by a separate department. This 
can have a number of consequences: 
" People on the shopfloor may be reluctant to raise queries, knowing that 
responses are slow and work in progress must be quarantined until answers are 
received; 
" The post-Design service department may address the symptom rather than the 
cause, treating each query or change request in isolation. They may fail to grasp 
the opportunity to look for similar errors or omissions in manufacturing 
information for other parts in current production. In the worst-case, their 
solution may compromise the original design intent; 
" Because the subjects were not raised, or were dealt with by others, the original 
design team may not become aware of difficulties in production, and hence 
perpetuate them in future designs, as for Section 6.4.9 above. 
This factor was found during the civil aerospace study (CAS A3). 
Busby expresses concern that the error-correcting function of feedback was 
compromised by the poor diagnostic abilities of people in other functions, and by the 
superficial level of peer reviews. Delays in detecting errors also meant that designers 
were disinclined and had too few resources to correct them thoroughly. In terms of the 
learning function of feedback, post project reviews were mostly absent and delayed 
outcomes (like product cost) made it hard for designers to associate important design 
criteria with specific design decisions or practices (Busby 1997) p 107. However, Busby 
also made the point that there are several ways in which feedback can positively 
interfere with good cognitive performance. The first is that simple knowledge of 
outcomes distracts people from applying correct decision models in uncertain situations 
- for example when estimating the properties of materials or performance of structures. 
It seems that knowledge of specific outcomes is a distraction to which people attribute 
too much predictive content. Secondly, outcome feedback can lead to over-confidence 
in the decision strategies - not so much leading to wrong predictions but to unwarranted 
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belief in one's predictions... such as the bias towards attending to information that 
confirms rather than contradicts initial beliefs (Busby 1998) p105. 
6.4.11 Wrong standards, when correct standards available 
Factor 11c is where training and experience are needed to prevent out-of-date or 
inappropriate standards being called up (AXP). 
Factor 11d is where specifications unnecessarily limit the permitted standards 
appropriate to the processes that may be used. Boston et al emphasise the importance of 
the efficient and effective management of design information, including standard 
supplier information. If this is not current or accurate, then innovation may be 
constrained or mistakes or misjudgements maybe made on aspects of the products' 
design. This could result in products that are suboptimal or are built around 
discontinued technologies, or even lead to catastrophic failure. If information is poorly 
structured, then it may be overlooked, or engineering designers may be unable to locate 
it in the available time. In either instance, design decisions may be based on incomplete 
data and assumptions, and they are therefore likely to be suboptimal (Boston, Culley et 
al. 1999). 
Factor hg is where Manufacturing or Quality fail to query standards that appear out of 
date or inappropriate, as part of their normal communication and teamworking. During 
both the AEROEXTN project and the civil aerospace studies it was noted that 
Manufacturing and Quality accepted that they had been working for many years with 
tolerance standards that were no longer the most appropriate for the type of work they 
were doing (AXP and CAS). 
6.4.12 Information not shared by Design for commercial, political, or 
parochial reasons 
Factor 12g occurs when Design will not share information. Willingness to share 
information may be more important than the mechanism for doing so. Ashkenas et al 
categorise barriers to communication as follows (Ashkenas, Ulrich et al. 1995) p 204: 
" Legal and regulatory tradition - collaboration is often viewed as collusion or 
restraint of free trade. Not all arrangements will be viewed as having pure 
motives, and some may require costly lobbying or time-consuming justifications 
to dissuade regulatory bodies from seeing restraint of trade. 
Competitive confusion - the potential to force companies to place their bets 
with one value chain as opposed to another or, at least, to cause confusion about 
who is an ally and who is not. Identifying these potentially contradictory 
relationships and weighing the trade-offs is a major but essential task for 
companies that want to establish boundaryless relationships with customers and 
suppliers. 
" The trust barrier - the chasms caused by the lack of trust across companies can 
be much deeper than those from the internal conflict between functions or 
departments, yet a great deal of cross-company interdependence is required if 
the overall value chain is to succeed. That interdependence is based on trust, 
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which must be nurtured and encouraged, so that lack of it does not poison 
relationships and weaken the entire value chain. 
The control barrier - executives must become comfortable with control 
sharing: collaborative, collegial, consultative arrangements with a range of 
business partners. When the external boundaries are loosened, no one member of 
the value chain will be able to dictate arbitrary terms and conditions to others. 
With limited numbers of strategic partners, companies cannot afford to force a 
one-sided agenda that might weaken the chain by causing a partner to walk out 
or collapse. Participants should focus on creating a collaboration with suppliers 
and customers that would control the entire process from beginning to end, 
rather than each seeking to control just its own `internal' piece of the value chain 
process. 
The skill barrier - the need to develop a new set of managerial skills to replace 
the traditional use of authority, reward and punishment, and control of resources. 
Specifically, managers must spend more of their time on the interface between 
links in the value chain, managing relationships there rather than negotiating 
terms and conditions. In this role, managers need superb listening skills, a 
variety of problem-solving techniques, and an ability to build consensus. 
" The complexity barrier - no matter how straightforward the business interests 
and the content of a collaboration, there are always a multitude of variables that 
can influence success, and many of them cannot be fully controlled or predicted 
in advance. They include shifts in the business climate, changes in government 
regulations, and developments or frustrations in technology. Collaboration also 
requires an ongoing match between the business goals and needs of the partners. 
It is not enough merely to establish a customer-supplier partnership; that is only 
the beginning. Once initiated, the partnership must be continually re-calibrated, 
adjusted, tested, assessed, and reworked. Otherwise, the complexity may 
become overwhelming. 
In the case of the civil aerospace study of external supply, there had been a degree of 
uncertainty regarding the strategic sourcing of parts. This had made Design reluctant to 
incorporate site-specific changes for the benefit of a particular supplier while there was 
a possibility that the work may be done elsewhere, perhaps at a later stage in production 
as part of an offset arrangement or as a result of multiple sourcing to increase 
production capacity. This could have had an influence on the composite parts where 
Design considered the requests for change to be site-specific (CAS C2,3,5,6,9, and10). 
6.4.13 Information not shared by Manufacturing for commercial, political, 
or parochial reasons 
Factor 13g embraces the same considerations as 12g above, and is especially 
significant when manufacturing is outsourced. Suppliers may not wish their customers 
to reveal their processes to rival suppliers. The CEO of a microchip design firm 
discussed the difficulty of how the intellectual property from multiple vendors could be 
brought in and merged into one design, and claimed that this problem was slowly being 
solved (Takahashi 2000). 
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6.4.14 Failure to consult/involve suppliers, including third parties (e. g. 
material suppliers, sub-contractors) 
Factor 14c is the need to train people to make full use of their suppliers' expertise. The 
organisation may not train designers to be aware of the details of the supply chain, or its 
significance in the manufacture of their particular design. Suppliers can be a rich source 
of information and ideas, and they in turn can benefit from their suppliers. 
In the AEROEXTN project, Design showed the team a CAD model of the SESAME 
assembly, illustrating how the associated parts fitted. After seeing this, the production 
engineer proposed a design change that would have made a significant improvement for 
Manufacturing. In this instance, Design agreed that the proposal had considerable merit, 
but the change could not be accepted for other technical reasons. However, this issue 
did illustrate the potential benefit of fully involving the supplier and inviting radical 
suggestions (AXP S13). 
In the civil aerospace study, the supplier of hard metal parts was able to provide the 
benefit of their expertise in preventing the risk of damage to the main part, by proposing 
the insertion of a bush to retain a grease nipple (AXP T4). In the case of composite 
finishing, the supplier was able to advise on the use of Synskin to reduce the overall 
cost of finishing the panel surface (CAS C13). 
Contact with third party suppliers is likely to become more remote as current trends 
towards reducing the number of first-tier suppliers continues. The consultancy AT 
Kearney recently reported that the big aerospace companies were planning to cut by 
80% the number of suppliers they used and were bringing in experts from the car 
industry to help them achieve this. The report, supported by the Society of British 
Aerospace Companies (SBAC), warned that component suppliers would have to be 
fewer in number and further removed from the main manufacturer, and may have to 
accept a lower position in the supply chain, rather than a direct relationship with the 
prime contractor (Renton 2000). Training courses may therefore need to emphasise the 
importance of learning to follow changes in the supply chain as far down as may be 
necessary to ensure that the processes involved in manufacture are fully understood and 
taken into account during design. 
A manufacturer of robots for the automobile industry was enthusiastic: "We may be 
smart in applying robots, but we don't know a lot about product design. However, we 
might give you some ideas you have not thought of yourself. Similarly, when you talk 
to us about your designs coming forward, we can look at what we would really be able 
to do. We're doing some of that with material suppliers. They're using different kinds 
of materials, and proposing them for different parts of the automobile and for other 
products. That gives us a chance to develop a robot that can apply a new coating in a 
new way, for example, or that can do welding in different ways. " (Chief Executive 
1999). 
Recognising the increasing importance of environmental regulations, Plaut points out 
how an `environmental manager' may help the design department by warning of 
products or processes, such as those using cadmium or arsenic, which may cause 
problems for the company or its customers. It would be part of his job to spend time 
educating the designers, helping them understand that there are alternative materials and 
that they may have to work hard to find them. The end result may often be higher 
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efficiency, safer manufacture, easier regulatory clearance, greater customer receptivity, 
and avoidance of costs and liability (Plaut 2000) p 470. 
Factor 14g is the difficulty in organising the communication and teamworking to 
ensure proper involvement of Design with Manufacturing and Purchasing so that the 
significance and impact of decisions on the supply chain are appreciated. Such 
involvement should be matched to the context. Bensaou proposed that the product 
exchanged, its technology and the capabilities of the suppliers available should be 
included as key environmental factors to define the contextual profile of the 
relationships to be managed. Some relationships may benefit from investing in building 
trust through frequent visits, guest engineers, and cross-company teams, while for 
others the product and market context might call for simple, impersonal control and 
data-exchange mechanisms (Bensaou 1999). 
6.4.15 Failure to anticipate problems 
Factor 15c is the failure of Managers and supervisors to ensure that all concerned have 
appropriate training or experience to anticipate problems in the relevant area. 
Factor 15d is company procedures that do not have checklists or review meetings that 
are effective in prompting people to anticipate problems. 
Factor Of is the inability of tools to anticipate problems outside the historical database 
from which they have been derived, or to take into account local conditions unless they 
:. ' have been specially developed for this purpose. 
Factor 15g is where teams do not actively look for and discuss possible problems. In 
this respect, the proportion of unanticipated problems may be set as a team metric (see 
Section 6.4.8). 
The aerospace industry appeared from the best practice study to have a different 
approach from the automobile industry to maintaining the development schedule: a 
launch date for a new car may be regarded as sacrosanct, especially if it is planned to be 
unveiled at a particular motor show. The idea of `baring your chest' - volunteering 
problems and highlighting early slippage for communal recovery effort - can encourage 
team members to anticipate problems and plan alternative approaches before the 
programme is jeopardised. However, the barriers listed in Section 6.4.12g may have to 
be overcome to prevent potential slippages from being declared, e. g. for contractual 
reasons (BPS). 
Conley reported that the project advisor to a company developing a new small 4-stroke 
engine regularly interjected his fundamental operating philosophies: "The biggest 
problem we have is the one we don't know about" and "If this design fails, do you have 
a fall back plan to keep us on schedule? " (Conley 1998) p 28. 
6.4.16 Lack of ability 
Factor 16g is because team members with the highest level of ability cannot be 
allocated to every project. It is, however, possible to make the most of the available 
abilities. In his notes on self-actualisation, Maslow explains how identification with important causes, or important jobs, enhances self-esteem and is a way of overcoming 
actual shortcomings in IQ, in talent, in skill etc. If we believe in the potential of people 
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and that people are most important organisational assets, he asks why do we frequently 
design organisations to satisfy our need for control and not to maximise the 
contributions of people? Lack of ability can therefore be seen as an organisational 
problem related to the development of communications and teamworking, since this 
should foster self-esteem (Maslow, Stephens et al. 1998) p 11. 
6.4.17 Lack of effort 
Factor 17g is lack of motivation to encourage effort, even amongst the most able, and is 
very much influenced by leadership, teamwork and communication. The motivation of 
the project leader is particularly important. R. J. Might commented on a study in which 
there was a clear correlation between responsibility and project success: only one 
project manager who was not given some increase in responsibility was associated with 
a project whose technical performance was above the median (Might 1984) p 129. 
Maslow supports the connection between motivation and responsibility, but warns that 
there is a balance to be struck. He states that everyone, but especially the more 
developed persons, prefers responsibility to dependency and passivity most of the time. 
This lessens if the person is weak, frightened, or sick or depressed etc., therefore 
responsibility must be set at the right level for them to manage it well. Too much 
responsibility can crush the person just as too little responsibility can make them flabby. 
Pace, level etc., must be taken into account (Maslow, Stephens et al. 1998) p 20. 
6.4.18 Lack of time 
Factor 18g is where sub-optimal processes or procedures have to be adopted because 
people involved in downstream activities were prevented from raising matters 
concerning long-lead-time processes, owing to lack of early awareness of the project 
programme. 
Designers and others may claim they do not have time to examine or discuss certain 
possibilities, but when things go wrong everyone finds the time to sort matters out 
('fire-brigading'). Aviation Week and Space Technology reported a case of extensive 
investigation and rework following production problems at a major civil aerospace 
manufacturer. These should have been avoided by greater co-operation and teamwork to 
ensure the correct procedures and processes had been specified and understood 
(McKenna 1999). 
To encourage people to address issues early, L. R. Smith et al suggest allocating 
engineers by disposition/job - using `fire-fighters' only at the end of programs, and 
people with `prevention' mentality up-front on programs. `Certified' engineers or 
former quality office engineers should form more than 20% of the population in any 
new model program (Smith, Zlotin et al. 1999). 
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6.5 Technical 
Table 6.5 Technical problems related to sources of information and influence 
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1 Changes in circumstances (manufacturing equipment) x 
2 Constraints of CAD system x 
3 Failure to convey design intent x 
4 Compatibility of CNC tool path generation x x 
5 Inappropriate standards -- existing standards do not 
match requirements 
x 
6 Inadequacy of database information x x 
7 Sub-optimal solution from DFM software x 
8 Errors in CNC tape generation software x 
9 Malfunction of machine (e. g. tool breakage) x 
10 Formattranslation problems x x 
11 Difficulty in representing features on model/drawing x x 
12 Material not best matched to process and geometry x x x x 
6.5.1 Changes in circumstances (manufacturing equipment) 
Factor lg is the lack of notification of change in process, equipment, or capability since 
previous work or supplier. The timeline is vitally important here: with so many changes 
resulting from rationalisation, reorganisation, re-equipment and loss of traditional skills, 
there may be significant differences between the advice given during the early design 
stages and that which would be appropriate when the time comes for manufacture. 
While some changes may be documented and circulated or put on a database available 
to all concerned, there may be no trigger to initiate design action to allow for them. This 
may be overcome by communication and teamworking to bring the right people 
together from amongst Design, Manufacturing, Procurement, Quality, Transportation, 
Packaging and Finance as necessary to anticipate the consequences and take action 
accordingly. Examples of problems to be overcome in this area include: 
" Phasing out of machinery/process - derivatives based on earlier design concepts 
can no longer be produced. Anticipating this may allow the production batch to 
be completed before the facility is dismantled, or allow time for a redesign to 
take advantage of new processes and a cost-reduction exercise. 
" Introduction of new machinery/process - designs may not be optimised to take 
advantage of the new capability. Conversely, the new process may not live up to 
its expectations and extra cost may be incurred in redesign or scrap and rework. 
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" Changes in capacity - manufacture may be outsourced (or brought back in 
house), the supplier may change (or sub-contract to a third party), so that 
different facilities are to be used. This may have a variety of implications, 
including that of data exchange standards, material sourcing, packaging and 
transportation between sites. 
" Change in personnel - those who have to implement what was previously agreed 
may contradict advice given earlier. 
In the civil aerospace in-house study, Manufacturing had requested a number of 
Engineering Changes to allow the use of 5-axis machining features in place of using 
angled cutters in 3-axis, or 5-axis scanning. Manufacturing did not use special cutters, 
owing to the cost and difficulty of maintaining them (CAS Al). 
In the best practice study, an aerospace company had produced a full set of 2D drawings 
from their 3D design model at the request of their chosen supplier, who did not have a 
3D capability. When the parts were required, however, the supplier was short of 
capacity and subcontracted the work to a machine shop that could work directly from 
the 3D model. Considerable design effort might have been saved by an early decision to 
sub contract these parts (BPS). 
6.5.2 Constraints of CAD system 
Factor 2e occurs where the CAD software favours particular build-up sequence, 
geometry or features that do not favour the production processes. Stacey and Eckert 
concluded that designers could only create what their tools make possible, and they 
were pushed strongly towards creating designs that their tools made relatively easy. 
Some effects stemmed from inherent limits of software, but others were due to 
inadequate human computer interface (HCI) design. For example, design tools may bias 
designs by influencing the process by which they are created (e. g. if designers were 
forced to make certain decisions before others). Tools that were poor, or were used in 
unanticipated ways, could push designers into premature commitments to decisions, that 
were based on inadequate information or were purely arbitrary - these were likely to be 
biased towards what is simple, obvious, standard, or what the designer liked. This could 
force the acceptance of suboptimal designs. CAD system development involves making 
a trade-off between minimising unevenness and bias and maximising simplicity and 
ease of use. Adding features and parameters to a tool has two kinds of costs: complex' 
tools are harder to learn, and each action is harder or slower to make because it has to be 
selected from a wider range of alternatives (Stacey and Eckert 1999) p1414. 
In the AEROEXTN project, the SESAME designer had modelled four symmetrically- 
arranged features on the circumference of a cylindrical part using the CAD `rotate' 
facility, on the assumption that these features would be made by rotating the work piece 
before each cut. The supplier, however, was happy to accept such features generated by 
mirroring, which would have been much easier to model on that CAD system (AXP 
S4). 
6.5.3 Failure to convey design intent 
Factor 3g is where missing or inadequate information results in Manufacturing failing 
to meet design requirements or wasting resources (e. g. working to unnecessary 
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tolerances). Pahl and Beitz provide a checklist for evaluating embodiment designs at an 
early stage for potential problems. The production aspects include looking at risk-free 
methods, setting-up time, heat treatment, surface treatment and tolerances (Pahl and 
Beitz 1995) p 311. Production engineers can be encouraged to offer recommendations 
for improvement by designers explaining the design intent during teamworking, where 
otherwise they would not have queried the manufacturing information with which they 
were tasked (AXP S2). 
The problem of interpretation (so-called `grey areas') was discussed at length during the 
AEROEXTN Project, where Quality offered an example of a part that had failed sample 
approval because of distortion. They had found that some 30 to 35% of mechanical part 
rejections were for plating, painting, and finishing - e. g. obscure paint processes; 
interpretation of `gloss' or `substantially free of defects' (is a mark a defect? ); thickness 
of paint; part marking (if the correct ink and varnish was used, but the writing was 
illegible, was the part correctly marked? ). The requirement for a particular missile to be 
painted inside and out had involved more time to mask up the complex parts than it had 
taken to machine them. In the case of the SESAME parts, the production engineers 
queried the design intent for the alignment of the bores of pairs of piston holes: they 
wanted to know whether it was important for the axes to coincide, because this would 
determine their choice machining set up (AXP S7). Further information was also sought 
on the engraving of nozzle numbers and of part marking for SESAME (AXP S 10, S 11). 
A solution adopted by civil aerospace to the problem of defining surface finish 
standards in a readily-understood manner was for the customer to provide 
Manufacturing with go/no-go sample panels, showing an acceptable finish on one side 
and an unacceptable finish on the other (CAS). 
6.5.4 Compatibility of CNC tool path generation 
Factor 4e is the adverse affect that the sequence of generating CAD model geometry 
may have on the ease of CNC programming. 
The CAD model for the part can make a big difference to the ease with which the 
subsequent NC programme can be generated to create the tool path. It may also be 
difficult to match the CAD surface geometry without using special tools; e. g. a smooth 
concave surface with a double curvature might need a barrel/ball cutter for accurate 
reproduction, whereas a design permitting a ruled surface could be produced more 
quickly and cheaply with a rectangular cutter. McMahon explains the use of 3-axis and 
5-axis machines to produce a double curvature form, including the trade-off between 
cusp size and the number of machining paths used. Even with a very small step-over 
between adjacent paths, and hence small cusps, some hand-finishing may still be 
required (McMahon and Browne 1993) p 324. 
Factor 4g is where a lack of liaison to align the design approach to the CNC tool 
characteristics may result in geometry that is difficult to programme or execute. The 
civil aerospace studies showed examples of trade-off: designers had to be persuaded to 
accept a small penalty in shape to allow machining to proceed more quickly and 
economically (CAS Al-2; T1-3). Such changes may also allow the use 3- or 4-axis 
instead of 5-axis machines. As well as making use of lower-cost machines, this could be 
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an important factor in broadening the potential supplier base to expand capacity or to 
participate in offset agreements (CAS). 
6.5.5 Inappropriate standards - existing standards do not match 
requirements 
Factor 5d occurs where standards lag behind practice, and may be over-prescriptive, 
irrelevant or inadequate for the required processes/materials. Both the AEROEXTN 
project and the civil aerospace studies found that the standards used to specify 
mechanical tolerances were based on those developed many years ago, when machined 
parts were not made in such large sizes. For example, absolute tolerances were specified 
according to size, but the largest size specified was `over 500 mm, ± 0.5 mm'. While 
this represented a latitude of 0.2% in a 500 mm dimension, it would be nearer 0.03% for 
a3m part. Such a3m aluminium part would alter its length by the whole of this 
latitude if the temperature changed by only 7 degrees, although the standard did not 
specify the temperature. New standards of geometric dimensioning and tolerancing 
should ensure greater clarity of intent (AXP and CAS A5). 
6.5.6 Inadequacy of database information 
Factor 6f is where the DFM database contains errors, or the constraints on its 
applicability may not be apparent to users (BPS). Minis et al pointed out that traditional 
manufacturability evaluation approaches are useful for comparing the relative cost and 
time when the manufacturing process is known and standardized but may be insufficient 
and may lead to poor designs when there exist alternative process plans and a choice of 
subcontractors that have different capabilities (Minis, Herrmann et al. 1999) p 387. 
Factor 6g occurs when the DFM tool users fail to communicate such shortcomings to 
the appropriate support group, so that they are perpetuated. The civil aerospace studies 
found an example where the supplier was used to working with a particular software 
package for composite ply placement, but this was not developed to work well with the 
customer's Design Office CAD. Design had to outsource this aspect to a third party 
before being able to provide the supplier with the design information required (CAS 
C6). 
6.5.7 Sub-optimal solution from DFM software 
Factor 7f is where the application is not optimised for the process/material 
combination. Petroski points out that efforts to improve engineering design by 
concentrating on the refinement of its more easily-quantifiable analytical models and 
tools may actually be counter-productive if those efforts come at the expense of studies 
aimed at improving the assumptive and interpretive skills of engineers (Petroski 1994) p 
184. 
6.5.8 Errors in CNC tape generation software 
Factor 8f is that the software may not be matched for the process. Petroski asserts that 
the development of computer aids for design and other aspects of engineering cannot be 
expected to be free of error, and denying, de-emphasising, or ignoring this fact can only 
create a climate even more hospitable to error than one in which it is high in the 
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consciousness of those working on engineering design problems or on the development 
of computer software to attack them. Computer aided design tools created in a 
methodological vacuum devoid of past experience are likely to provide more than their 
own fair share of case studies of error and failure for the next generation (Petroski 1994) 
p 182. 
6.5.9 Malfunction of machine (e. g. tool breakage) 
Factor 9c is the lack of familiarity with machine set up and operation. Peklenik 
describes the complexity of the machine tool in manufacturing. The performance 
depends on: the time-dependent geometrical and physical parameters of the machine 
tool performing the machining; tooling; the ability of the CNC control system to follow 
the reference instructions with an accuracy required; the ability of the control system to 
adapt the machine tool when the disturbances (tool wear, thermal deformation, 
vibrations, etc. ) affect the performance of the machining system. 
Peklenik provides examples of complex manufacturing processes such as grinding that 
include random effects. A secondary source of disturbances is wear, adding to the 
stochastic. However, such secondary effects can suddenly trigger major perturbations 
that may lead to catastrophic events such as tool breakage, etc. (Peklenik 1999) p34. 
In the civil aerospace in-house study, Manufacturing were gaining experience with their 
new 5-axis machining centre, and were learning to cope with practical limitations that 
included the thermal effects of high-speed machining. They recognised that even with 
hot probing of the dimensions they would be unlikely to meet the very close tolerances 
originally requested by Design without adding a fourth stage to the machining process 
or selecting pallets (CAS A4). 
X6.5.10 Format/translation problems 
Factor 10d is the lack of use of standard formats to promote accuracy, consistency and 
interoperability. Court found that a significant issue for the integration of knowledge in 
new product development was the need for agreement on an appropriate format for 
information and knowledge presentation that will be shared between users. Currently 
information is presented in a multitude of formats and languages, which significantly 
affect its future applicability and usefulness; the same can be said of knowledge. 
However, the format of the information within the sources is beyond the direct control 
of the engineer; but even when it is, major difficulties arise because they frequently 
transfer information in the format that is easiest for the originator. These problems also 
extended to electronic data, as the existence of many types of software and various 
methods for data representation implies that data provided by one source is likely to 
require some manipulation to the format understood by the end user. It was important 
that formats should cater for the nature of the information and knowledge used by 
engineers (Court 1998) p 394. 
Schmitz reported that audits of data models showed a very high proportion that did not 
fully meet quality standards. Not only does this add rework time and cost downstream 
locally, but it also reduces the capacity for data to be exchanged between different 
software systems. The results of these quality audits were consistent with research 
conducted by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). A March 
1999 study by NIST showed that interoperability problems due to data quality errors 
121 
within the automotive supply chain alone could cost as much as $1 billion a year. One 
reason digital models fall short of standards is the inherent flexibility of product 
modeling software systems that offer engineers a number of ways to create, assemble, 
and annotate a digital model. Without defined guidelines, the danger is that each 
designer will create models according to his or her own individual methodology, rather 
than in accordance with company standards. As the audits discovered, this causes 
problems because even designers on the same team may not be able to make simple 
changes to one another's designs (Schmitz 2000). 
Quality problems with digital data may be considerably reduced by the use of software 
such as DesignQA, which compares solid models generated by designers and engineers 
to their company standards and good modelling practices and reports discrepancies. 
This software includes a checklist of over 130 design standards based on best CAD 
practices. After identifying a model that does not follow administrative standards, 
DesignQA alerts the designer, explains the standard the designer violated, and either 
fixes the problem or suggests a correction (Rosinski and Brooks 2000). 
Factor 10g concerns the missing or incomplete features or annotations in translating or 
interpreting file formats. Prasad lists many categories of potential data loss occurring 
during the translation process, including: inaccuracies; incomplete or extraneous 
information; missing data; ripples; and instabilities (information layers, dimensional 
intelligence, non graphics information, connectivity information, components 
configuration information, routing information, or alteration of text or fonts) (Prasad 
1997) p 369. 
Owen concluded that, despite all the expertise utilised in generating STEP protocols, 
problems would arise even when data exchange was undertaken using two performance- 
tested processes of a well-defined standard written using formal methods. He 
considered product data exchange was unlikely to become `appliance' or `black box' 
technology in the near future, if ever (Owen 1997) p 131. 
In the civil aerospace studies, the outsourced supplier received design models on a 
workstation with the same CAD software as the designer, and then translated it to his 
own CAD software for production. This translation was not without its difficulties, but 
in this case the supplier could readily check on the design model without having to 
contact the customer (CAS). 
In the best practice study, one manufacturing supplier also had a design division, which 
contributed some design work to the customer. Although they had used notionally the 
same version of the same CAD software as the customer, they had not received the 
same support as their customer from the CAD supplier to fix some anomalies ('bugs') 
in the software. In consequence, they had to pay for their model to be harmonised 
before it could be accepted (BPS). 
6.5.11 Difficulty in representing features on model/drawing 
Factor 11 e is that software vanes in ease of presentation. McMahon and Browne 
observed that even though systems concentrate on the modelling of designs, the range 
of properties that are represented is limited. Properties that might be modelled include 
form, dimension, tolerance, material, surface condition, structure and function, but it is 
only the first two of these are covered extensively in CAD - the others are generally 
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covered by annotations of a drawing, or by attaching attributes to the three-dimensional 
model. A system that captures a complete model of product will require annotations for 
all the properties of the design. Furthermore, CAD systems may not model even the 
geometric aspects of the design in the way that designers think of them. For example, a 
connecting rod might be represented by a collection of lines and arcs on a drawing, or 
by surfaces on the part, or by instances of solid primitives. The designer, on the other 
hand, may envisage the part as two `eyes' joined by a `shank', or might think in terms 
of manufacturing features such as a reamed hole, a blend or a flash-line (McMahon and 
Browne 1993) p 216. 
A production engineer on the AEROEXTN team presented an example of three 
dimensioning schemes, showing how the supplier's Manufacturing Department, the 
supplier's Quality Department and the customer's Quality Department could each apply 
(quite correctly) a different dimensioning scheme to meet what was notionally the same 
general tolerance requirement. This could result in `vicious circles' of parts being made, 
rejected and returned, rechecked and nothing found wrong. One way to ensure a 
correctly manufactured and inspected product would be to indicate every dimension on 
the model or drawing in the position intended by the designer, especially if the parts 
were to be made on a manual, rather than a CNC machine (AXP). 
Factor 11g is the problem of understanding among team members caused by lack of 
clear representation of features. Ehrlenspiel et al reported that this is most frequent in 
:ý- the context of unclear or missing sketches and 
illustrations. Supplementary information 
or views may be required (Ehrlenspiel, Giapoulis et al. 1997). 
AEROEXTN team members were aware that a common vocabulary could be a barrier 
to communication when discussing features and capabilities. It was too easy to make 
assumptions of knowledge and about the meaning of terminology (e. g. `cleat' or `shear 
ßr angle'; `point' or `vertex'; did `long-bed machining' refer to 3m or 30m beds? ) (AXP). 
6.5.12 Material not best matched to process and geometry 
Factor 12c occurs because Manufacturing may not be familiar with working the 
proposed materials with existing equipment, or designers may not be familiar with the 
geometric features that help and hinder production by various processes. Training for 
production engineers and for designers should ensure that they are familiar with the 
principles involved, such as those set out in textbooks (Pahl and Beitz 1995), (Matousek 
1963), (Bralla 1986) and (Boothroyd, Dewhurst et al. 1994). 
A number of the easements requested in both the AEROEXTN project and the civil 
aerospace studies were for textbook examples of geometry that was awkward to 
machine. For example: a rectangular slot with radiused corners was changed to have 
semicircular ends, so that a single cutter could be used; spot faces would allow the drill 
to enter normal to the surface, instead of at an angle; a larger-radius cutter would 
machine deep pockets quicker (AXP 51,5,6,9 and CAS T2). 
Factor 12d is where standards and reports do not fully cover process limitations, and 
should be revised and expanded to avoid future problems. Suppliers' catalogues and 
brochures are likely to specify their capabilities under ideal conditions, emphasising 
what they can do well. Further investigation may be needed to identify side effects and 
characteristic sub-issues (Chen 1998) p 122. In the civil aerospace in-house study, the 
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specification for the machining centre defined accuracy sufficient to meet the tolerances 
called for by Design. Such accuracy was possible, but only if the work piece had been 
mounted on a specified pallet or a fourth machining stage had been added to allow the 
work piece to cool down before the final cut (CAS A4). 
Factor 12f occurs when the proposed materials and processes are not on the database 
for the DFM tools used, or the tools are not capable of automatically interpreting every 
geometric feature. Gayretli and Abdalla developed a prototype knowledge-based tool 
for machining process optimisation. This used a combination of both mathematical 
methods and constraint programming techniques to provide designers with the 
evaluation and optimisation of feasible machining processes in a consistent manner at 
the early stages of the design process. However, the best use of available alternative 
processes and concurrent consideration of manufacturability analysis and process 
evaluation and optimisation had not yet been fully exploited (Gayretli and Abdalla 
1999) p 655. 
Where DFM tools are highly developed, and the designer relies heavily on them for 
taking care of Producibility matters, the point made in Section 6.1.6 by Reason in 
connection with operator training also applies: "the most successful automated systems 
with a rare need for manual intervention may need the greatest investment in operator 
training" (Reason 1997) p 42. 
Factor 12g is when Design does not receive feedback on material behaviour under 
processing, or on previous problems or alternative processes. Discussion may lead to 
changes to allow use of stock size materials to eliminate or modify processes. 
Todd gives, as examples of redesign for ease of manufacture relating to materials: 
altering the dimensions of a nylon spacer to suit available raw materials so that a 
machining operation could be eliminated; and (at the suggestion of a production 
specialist) redesign of a brass fabrication as a pressing which could be manufactured in- 
house, saving DM63,000 per year for a one-off tooling cost of DM24,000 as well as 
reducing lead time and stock holding. Also, purchasing cost reductions were achieved 
with the help of design staff replacing specific requirements with a generic description, 
or including alternative manufacturers' products, so that buyers could identify 
alternative sources. Increasingly designers and production specialists were working 
more closely with their opposite numbers at the suppliers in order to find ways of 
improving product performance and reducing cost (Todd 1995) Page 259. 
Ashby emphasises that the final choice of materials will often depend on local 
conditions, such as the existing in-house expertise or equipment, on the availability of 
local suppliers, and so forth. A systematic procedure cannot help here - the decision 
must instead be based on local knowledge (Ashby 1999) p 68. An example of the use of 
local knowledge in the AEROEXTN project was the offer of alternative steel to a higher 
specification, which would have been cheaper than the specified material for the small 
quantity required, because the supplier used a lot of it for other work. Although 
notionally cheaper, the original material had a minimum order quantity of several times 
that needed, together with a 3-month delivery forecast (AXP). 
In many cases there will be a conflict between the Producibility requirements and the 
performance requirements that can be resolved only by negotiation, referred to in 
Section 6.2.3g. A number of examples were found in the civil aerospace studies, where 
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Design were persuaded to accept a weight penalty, additional design effort or increased 
material costs to simplify and speed up the manufacturing processes (CAS A4,5; T1-4; 
C 1,2,5,6,7,9,10). 
6.6 Summary 
Table 6.6 Types of problem related to sources of information 
SOURCES of INFORMATION and INFLUEN CE 
TYPE of 
PROBLEMS 
Training and 
Experience 
Standards 
Specifications 
Reports 
Textbooks 
CAD 
Systems 
DFM 
Databases an 
Tools 
Communication 
and 
Teamworking 
TOTALS 
Human error 6 2 3 0 5 16 
Culture/social 1 1 1 1 10 14 
Knowledge 4 3 1 3 4 15 
Organisation 5 2 0 3 17 27 
Technical 2 3 3 4 7 19 
Totals 18 11 8 11 43 91 
Total% 20% 12% 9% 12% 47% 100% 
A total of 91 factors were identified as potential sources of problems. For the purpose of 
this analysis, these factors were divided into human (72) and technical (19). Human 
`r aspects were further divided into four categories: human error (16); culture/social (14); 
knowledge (15) and organisation (27). These are summarised in Table 6.6. 
6.7 Conclusion 
It was found that communication and teamworking (47%) was by far the most important 
source of information and influence for designers, relating to twice as many factors as 
training and experience (20%). Standards, specifications, reports and textbooks (12%) 
matched DFM databases and tools (12%), ahead of CAD systems at (9%). 
The results show the prime importance of communications and teamworking in 
resolving potential manufacturing problems, so as to prevent their reaching the 
shopfloor. They can be used alongside the Producibility Interaction model for 
structuring the Concurrent Engineering process to achieve design for manufacturing. 
Any organisation could use this analysis to review the nature of their reported DFM 
problems, conduct root cause diagnosis and allocate resources in a wider business sense 
to areas capable of contributing the greatest benefit to the DFM process. 
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Chapter 7 Validation Illustrations 
This chapter shows how the issues from the AEROEXTN and civil aerospace case 
studies could be mapped to the relationship tables, covering step 14 of the methodology 
set out in Chapter 2. 
The industrial validity of the relationship framework is then discussed according to the 
criteria to be met in order to ensure the practical relevance of this research, as identified 
in Chapter 2. 
7.1 Applying the industrial cases to the framework 
The 38 issues raised during both the AEROEXTN project and the civil aerospace 
studies from Tables 3.2 and C1-3 were set out and examined to see what they had 
shown in the way of relationships between their nature, where they might have been 
picked up if there had been no producibility interaction, where the information to 
prevent them might have lain, how they cross-referred to the subjects in the PI Table. 
These relationships are shown in Table 7.1. Most of the headings are self-explanatory, 
and cover material extracted from data captured as described in Chapter 3, Appendix B 
and Appendix D. The serial numbers in the first column relate to the issue numbers in 
Tables B1 (S=Sesame stainless steel), D. 1 (A=aluminium) and D. 2 (T=titanium; 
C=composite). The following paragraphs explain how the entries were derived for 
negotiated trade-offs and Chapter 6 factors. 
7.1.1 Negotiated trade-offs 
None of the SESAME issues had involved any conflict between the Producibility 
requirements and the performance requirements that could be resolved only by 
negotiation, as suggested in Section 6.5.12g, and might have made Design reluctant to 
adopt the suggestions or recommendations of the supplier's production engineers. 
However, a number of issues in the civil aerospace studies had involved negotiation 
with Design (usually with Purchasing and Quality in attendance) before requests from 
Manufacturing were accepted. The particular significance of these issues is that Design 
may well have been aware that a feature was awkward to manufacture, but did not alter 
the original design because of the perceived cost or performance penalties. A column 
has therefore been included to draw attention to the issues that required a negotiation or 
trade-off (Neg tr/ off? ). 
7.1.2 Mapping the issues 
Each issue was analysed to see how it might best be mapped to the factors in Chapter 6. 
The following questions were considered for the each of the five categories of reasons 
in turn: 
Could the issue have arisen because of any of the types of reasons in that 
category? 
If so, which types of reasons? 
0 For each type of reason, which factors were relevant? 
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Once the factor or factors in that category had been identified as relevant, the next 
category was considered. Any number of factors could be accepted as helping to show 
why each issue had arisen. 
It was important to check that the framework completely covered all 38 issues. After 
confirming every issue was related to at least one factor, further questions were 
addressed for each issue: 
0 Did the factors identified so far completely cover all aspects of the issue? 
0 If not, should a new factor or factors be introduced to the framework? 
0 If so, did this show one or more new types of reason? 
9 If so, did these fit properly into the existing categories? 
0 If not, what new category or categories were required to expand the framework? 
No new factors were identified from the latter set of questions. This was expected, since 
issues captured during the industrial studies had been included in the process for 
generation of ideas for developing the framework. However, the framework was 
expanded to include illustrations from the specific industrial issues. 
Table 7.1 Issues raised during producibility interactions 
Ser Issue Type/ Where Where info Neg PI Chap 6 
nature picked up available tr/ Table Factors 
off? subj's 
Sl Mismatch undercut Machining First article Textbook No 22,27 6.3.2c 
and rear face marks 6.5.12c 
6.5.12g 
S2 Operating lengths - Tolerances- Never, Textbook No 10 6.5.3g 
fit diameters extent unless 6.5.12c 
requested tolerances 
not 
achievable 
S3 Tooling hole needed Tooling Manu Manufacturing No 23 6.4.7f 
Planning 
S4 Supplier happy to CAD Never Supplier 24 6.5.2e 
accept CAD modelling process 
modelling method method knowledge 
producing mirrored needed 
features, whereas 
Design had assumed 
generating them by 
rotation would help 
manufacturing 
S5 Change rectangular Reduce Mann Textbook No 24 6.3.2c 
slot with small radius number of planning 6.5.12c 
to full radius end cutting tools 
and 
machining 
operations 
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Ser Issue Type/ Where Where info Neg PI Chap 6 
nature picked up available tr/ Table Factors 
off? subj's 
S6 Request for slot Tool Tape Textbook, but No 24 6.5.12c 
width to be increased clearance proving Manufacturing 
due to concern about experience 
cutter head distance needed 
to wall; feature could 
not be changed, but 
wall height could be 
made smaller to 
facilitate cutter 
S7 Alignment required Design intent Manu query Designer: to be No 11 6.5.3g 
for piston hole for datums on sight of shown on 
initial model drawing 
S8 Tooling hole size Tooling Continuation Manufacturing No 11 6.4.7f 
and position of Issue 3 
discussed 
S9 Add 8 off spot faces Ease of Manuf Textbook No 23,24 6.3.2c 
to M4 holes machining planning 6.5.12c 
S 10 Engraving - can it be Supplementa Manu Designer No 16 6.5.3g 
done by hand? ry process Planning 
S11 What method of part Part marking QA check Checklist item No 17,19 6.5.3g 
marking? Omitted of drawings 
from original. 
Position important 
S12 Request to remove Tooling Continuation Manufacturing No 10,26 6.4.7f 
tight position of Issues 3& 
tolerance on tooling 8 
hole (see 
producibility issues 3 
and 8) 
S13 Considered replacing Helpful but Not Supplier N/A 24 6.4.14c 
8 small slots with a unacceptable technically suggestion 
proposed new slot suggestion allowed following sight 
design of assembly 
model 
Al Use of 5-axis feature 5-axis NC Drawing No 10, 6.5.1g 
in place of angled programming changes to 12,13, 6.5.4g 
cutters in 3-axis or 5- allow use of 5- 22,24, 
axis scanning axis features 27 
A2 Geometry definition 5-axis Production 3-D modelling No (24) 6.2.3g 
did not allow simple Planning required 6.5.4g 
5-axis machining 
A3 Problems and errors 2D drawing Production Checklist items No 5 6.1.2d 
with drawings, e. g. errors Planning 6.1.3c 
dimensions missing, 6 1 3e 
notes and pictorial . . 
view not matching 6.2.5g 6.3.2g 
6.4.10g 
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Ser Issue Type/ Where Where info Neg PI Chap 6 
nature picked up available tr/ Table Factors 
off? subj's 
A4 Web tolerancing Tolerance Production Design not Yes 9,10 6.2.3g 
expected to be too beyond Planning matched to 6.5.9c 
tight with current capability process 6.5.12d 
process capability 6.5.12g 
A5 Tooling hole Tolerance Production Tolerance Yes 9,10 6.2.3g 
tolerance too tight beyond Planning standard out of 6.4.1 lg 
capability date 6.5.5d 
6.5.12g 
Ti Ruled surface added 5-axis NC prog Textbook, but Yes 12,24 6.2.3g 
(Pylon) weight penalty 6.5.4g 
6.5.12g 
T2 Change of corner Allowed NC prog Required up- Yes 12,24 6.2.3g 
radius on deep faster cutting to-date 6.5.4g 
pockets (Pintle) manufacturing 6.5.12c 
information 6.5.128 
T3 5-axis landings Allowed NC prog Textbook, but Yes 12,24 6.2.3g 
requested /added faster cutting weight penalty 6.5.4g 
(Pintle) 6.5.12g 
T4 Bush insert for Use of Possibilty Risk reduction Yes 5,13 6.2.3g 
grease nipple hole supplier's of damage 6.4.14c 
(Pintle) expertise to to hole 6.5.12g 
improve part 
T5 2D drawing GD &T Datum Inspection Change of No 11,19, 6.1.3c 
datum errors (Jack) Designer's designer - error 29 6.1.3e 
error not picked up 
before drawing 
release 
T6 Models created to Tolerancing Inspection Probable No 11,19, 6.1.2d 
nominal dimn on ++ error mistake in 29 6.1.3e 
tolerances (Jack) looking up 
associated part 
information 
T7 Pintle locking block Designer's Assembly Late part No 29 6.1.3c 
radius in wrong error 3D requirement, 6.1.3e 
position CAD model not subjected to 
clash detection 
Cl Alternate plies of Material Production Easy to spot, Yes 8 6.2.3g 
woven and standardisati planning. but 6.5.12g 
unidirectional carbon on compromised 
changed to all woven design 
ABRI 0023 
C2 Landing areas Legacy- Tooling Design effort Yes 23 6.2.3g 
redesigned to be the complex needed 6.3.2d 
same thickness tooling 6.5.12g 
throughout the panel 
C3 Honeycomb ribbon Legacy- Honeycomb Manufacturing No 8 6.3.2d 
direction different caused manufacture experience of 6.3.3f 
from earlier panels. problem double 
curvature 
panels needed 
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Ser Issue Type/ Where Where info Neg PI Chap 6 
nature picked up available tr/ Table Factors 
off? subj's 
C4 Deletion of outer Legacy - not Production Lack of design No 8 6.2.3c 
surface Tedlar film. needed planning handbook, or 6.4.9g 
feedback from 
earlier designs 
C5 Use of technology Tooling Design Supplier Yes 23 6.2.3g 
from another commonality requirement 6.3.2d 
supplier project for 6.5.12g 
tooling for bonding 
and routing. 
C6 Use of Fiber-sim for CAD/CAM Design Supplier Yes 17 6.2.3g 
ply development. software requirement 6.3.2d 
commonality 6.5.6g 
6.5.12g 
C7 One shot foiling of Production Production Original design Yes 8,16 6.2.3g 
panels. flexibility planning. too prescriptive 6.5.12g 
C8 Addition of tooling Customer Assembly Late part No 8,11 6.2.4g 
holes for customer tooling build specification 
assembly jig pick- requirement change 
up. 
C9 All plys to be one- Manufacturing Production Supplier request Yes 24 6.2.3g 
piece plys (ref item 6) easement planning 6.3.2d 
6.5.12g 
CIO Ply drop-offs Inspection Production Supplier Yes 16,17, 6.2.3g 
designed incorrectly requirement planning requirement 26 6.3.2d 
for aesthetics. 6.5.12g 
C11 Incorrect Designer's Honeycomb Wrong material No 8 6.1.2d 
specifications for error manufacture specification 
formed honeycomb (look-up error) 
core. 
C12 Elimination of core Followed Production Yes 23 6.2.3g 
filling. issue C2 planning 6.5.12g 
C13 Addition of Synskin Change to Paint Consideration o No 8 6.3.2c 
for surface finish. reduce overall preparation subsequent 6.4.14c 
surface finish finishing 
costs processes 
7.2 Analysis 
Each of the 38 study issues raised was related to at least one factor in the Chapter 6 
framework, with an average of more than two factors for each issue. An analysis of 
these factors is summarised in Table 7.2, using the same format as Table 6.6. 
The distribution in Table 7.2 shows a predominance of technical reasons, of which more 
than two-thirds are concerned with communications and teamworking. This may be 
expected from the way in which the study information was gathered, since each issue 
was the result of producibility interaction that involved face-to-face communication, 
and the technical nature reflects the physical aspect of the mismatch between the design 
and the manufacturing process/material called for. It should be noted that very few 
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issues came under the categories of CAD Systems or DFM databases, probably because 
designers were reluctant to blame their tools or did not use them. 
Table 7.2 Distribution of factors relating to issues 
SOURCES of INFO RMATION and INFLUEN CE 
TYPES of 
PROBLEMS Training and 
Experience 
Standards 
Specifications 
Reports 
Textbooks 
CAD 
Systems 
DFM 
Databases and 
Tools 
Communication 
and 
Teamworking 
TOTALS 
Human error 3 3 4 10 
Culture/social 17 17 
Knowledge 5 6 1 1 13 
Organisation 3 3 3 9 
Technical 6 2 1 26 36 
Totals 18 11 5 4 47 85 
Total% 21.2% 12.9% 5.9% 4.7% 55.3% 100% 
7.3 Industrial validity of relationship framework 
The five criteria that should be met in order to ensure the practical relevance of this 
research were set out in Chapter 2 Section 2.7 as: descriptive relevance; goal relevance; 
timeliness; operational validity and non-obviousness. This section addresses these 
criteria and their associated questions, and expands on the summary given in Table 2.3 
of what was demonstrated by this research. 
7.3.1 Descriptive relevance 
Does the research capture a 'real ' problem for the practitioner? 
The industrial collaborators drove the original research proposal for the AEROEXTN 
Project to investigate concurrent engineering in the extended enterprise. They had 
already experienced the benefits of in-house CE, and were keen to extend these to the 
manufacture of outsourced components after they had ceased to make the parts 
themselves. It was the practitioners from both customer and supplier in industry that 
gave the subject of producibility their highest priority. The CE template that was 
developed to set up the SESAME pilot project had the Producibility Interactions as its 
central activity. 
The producibility issues captured during SESAME and subsequent civil aerospace 
studies addressed very real problems for the practitioners. It was the realisation that 
these problems could occur, despite the availability of CE and the associated tools 
intended to avoid them, that led directly to this research question. When mapped to the 
framework, Table 7.1 shows the type and nature of those issues falling into the 35 types 
of reasons. This provides confidence that these types of reasons are relevant to the 
industrial problems, and also shows where the information available falls into the five 
categories of sources. The factors explain the relationship, and relating issues to the 
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factors shows the power of the framework to provide explanations that can help 
practitioners to understand the issues. 
The author participated in discussions with practitioners at industrial seminars and 
presented papers at conferences on aspects of the research covered by this thesis. These 
forums confirmed that practitioners in the whole of the design to manufacture chain 
recognise the real nature of the problems. 
7.3.2 Goal relevance 
Is the output of the research related to the objective/function of organisations? 
The literature shows that the industrial design to manufacture chain has a competitive 
imperative to improve their processes. Management techniques such as CE are directed 
at improving efficiency, reducing time to market and cost. Much effort is directed at 
improving communication, teamwork, encouraging innovation and inspiring 
participants. However, the literature also shows that the availability of such techniques 
does not guarantee their implementation. 
The output of this research is intended to help industrial users to identify the factors that 
prevent their producibility processes from being fully effective. This is directly related 
to the goal of organisations wanting to improve their efficiency. 
7.3.3 Timeliness 
Do the phenomena change faster than science can come to grips with the problem? 
The phenomena investigated in this research covered the five categories of types of 
reasons for producibility problems. Of these, the technical & knowledge categories 
might be affected most by rapid changes in technology. However, while specific 
technical matters and the associated knowledge may change with advances in 
technology, the principles of the factors involving the need for effective training, 
communication and teamworking and the maintenance of standards are unchanged. 
The evidence from this research shows that most of the problems are related to the 
human, cultural and organisational aspects that require good leadership and 
management to prevent them. Many of the factors involved are not new, but problems 
continue to arise because of them. If and when the relevant factors alter, the flexibility 
of the framework would allow it to be amended, expanded or adapted as quickly as the 
phenomena might change. 
The content and structure of the framework enable the analysis of current industrial 
problems. The acceptance of a paper presented at the 6th ASME DETC/Design for 
Manufacturing Conference 2001 supports its relevance and importance to the research 
community. 
7.3.4 Operational validity 
Can the results of the research be implemented by manipulating causal variables? 
The relationship framework was developed as a diagnostic tool so as to draw attention 
to the causal variables affecting producibility problems in the design to manufacture 
chain. This was done to draw attention to the reasons why these problems occur. This 
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was intended to help practitioners and researchers address them, and hence work to 
manipulate the variables so as to eliminate them. 
The descriptive relevance (Section 7.3.1 above) gives a high degree of confidence that 
the industrial issues can all be explained by applying the framework. However, the 
framework has not yet been tested in industry to prove its utility in practice. 
7.3.5 Non-obviousness 
Does the research simply reinvent the wheel? 
While much of the material presented in this research may have appeared obvious to 
one or more of the parties involved in the design to manufacture chain, the fact that they 
were raised suggests that they were not obvious to all. Alternatively, matters were 
influenced by factors that prevented them from being resolved before they came to 
notice. In either case, the manner in which the data from industry has been captured and 
the material from the literature has been selected has been used by the author to derive 
the categories and to construct the framework so as to present the factors in a way that 
they provide a fresh insight into the relationships between the types of problem and 
influences on them. 
The relationship framework combines industrial case study experience with extensive 
illustrations from a wide range of literature. The structure of the framework is not 
obvious. Published work uses case studies to warn of pitfalls and sets out prescriptive 
processes to avoid them, but does not attempt to structure a large amount of data from 
case studies. 
The unique opportunity to maintain extensive industrial contact over a long period of 
time enabled the insight to define the categories of reasons and sources of information 
in a way that could lead to practical actions by industry managers. 
The framework is a practical contribution to industrial practitioners who need to address 
producibility issues. 
134 
Chapter 8 Discussion 
Now that the relational framework and its validity have been presented, this chapter 
discusses the significance of the work in the light of the state-of-the-art published 
material and industrial practice, and explains how the framework could be applied in an 
industrial situation to improve the design for manufacture process. 
Sections 8.1 to 8.7 discuss the significance of the work, following the structure of the 
literature review in Chapter 4 to highlight the additional contribution to knowledge of 
the work under the same main headings. 
Section 8.8 explains some possible industrial applications of the framework. 
8.1 Concurrent engineering 
Textbooks on CE present clear prescriptive directions for the design-to-manufacture 
process, with the underlying theme that the processes are presented in an idealised form, 
albeit with warnings of the problems and pitfalls in practice. This presents problems as 
exceptions to the `correct' operation of the process. The idealised process is unlikely to 
be followed in practice. 
The literature does acknowledge that the effective implementation of CE processes is 
not a foregone conclusion - even well-managed organisations may take years to get the 
basic principles right, which means that they will spend a long time addressing 
problems in trying to see where they have failed to live up to the ideal process. 
This research is based on a longitudinal industrial study over a long period. The 
relationship framework presents users with the basic assumption that problems will 
occur and that these can readily be mapped onto the framework so as to show the factors 
that identify the reasons for them and relate them to the sources of information available 
to Design to avoid them. 
8.2 Integrated product development teams 
Teamworking is an essential element of CE. People from different disciplines need to 
talk with each other, and this should eliminate producibility problems. 
The framework can help IPD teams to identify problems. The Producibility Interaction 
Table can be used as a tool to help structure the discussion, but it still needs a 
favourable environment. The organisational relationships shown in the framework help 
to identify problems caused by the working environment, since the IPD team is a form 
of organisational mechanism. The framework factors can highlight how teams could be 
structured better, as it draws on CE literature on teamworking, human and cultural to 
illustrate the factors that can help teams to work. The framework will help pinpoint 
sources of information that should be brought into the team. 
8.3 Producibility 
The `manufacturability' of a part was defined as being equivalent to its `producibility', 
and the latter term has been used in this thesis. While the significance of manufacturi ng 
cost reduction in the design phase is well understood and accepted, the exact definition 
of producibility/manufacturability is still very elusive. To measure producibility even 
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after the product is in production relies on subjective judgement, and there are no 
established ways to measure it. 
The list of producibility issues in Section 3.8.3 helps us to understand the context of 
producibility in the mechanical aerospace components domain. This is a valuable aid to 
advance understanding of the subject by demonstrating the range, people, processes and 
skills that are involved in producibility. 
8.4 Design 
Theoretical studies of design aim to create systematic and idealised models of design 
activity, but there is little evidence that such models are applied in practice by industry. 
The author attempted to generalise the stages of the design process in Table 4.1, and 
concluded that a generic design model would contain five common stages. Such stages 
would be readily recognised by engineering managers responsible for organising the 
design process and its connectivity with the other functions in the project environment. 
However, the design models tend to have producibility as a constraint to be considered 
during one or more of these design stages, but without a clear definition of how the 
constraint should be applied, i. e. what level of producibility information is needed. The 
framework draws attention to the need for sufficient communication to identify the need 
for change at the stage when it would have involved minimal effort. It also shows the 
need for support organisations to be allowed to use time and energy to participate in the 
crucial up-front work that will benefit them later. 
8.5 Manufacturing information requirements for design 
Section 4.4 details at length the complexity of the requirement for manufacturing 
information and various stages of design. The author found that industry practice tended 
to delay contact between Design and Manufacturing until the design process was well 
underway. Standard procedures called for producibility inputs to Design, or offered 
preliminary information to Production, on relatively few occasions. This fell far short of 
Chen's detailed requirement characteristics, suggesting that potential opportunities to 
improve producibility were being missed while designers concentrated on aspects such 
as functionality and performance. 
The PI Table was developed to structure the exchange of manufacturing information to 
give the maximum benefit from cross-functional teamworking. In particular, it sought to 
address all subjects that might be relevant to producibility at the earliest possible stage, 
and to keep them under scrutiny until the part successfully entered production. During 
the SESAME pilot, some of the 13 issues raised were `textbook' producibility matters, 
e. g. the rectangular slot, spot faces (AXP S5 and S9). These could have been brought to 
notice by simple guidelines. However, other issues such as the tooling hole (AXP S3, 
S8 and S9) would have been extremely difficult to recognise and specify with a 
manageable set of rules. This showed the advantage of having experienced producibility 
engineers engaging in direct contact with the designer. The exchange of producibility 
information is poorly understood by industry, and learning by designers about any 
shopfloor problems is hampered by the time interval before their design reaches 
production. 
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8.6 Sources of information to influence design 
Design in aerospace engineering is largely derivative, because the stringent 
requirements for structural integrity combined with a high-strength/weight performance 
result in the need for extensive component testing and qualification. These requirements 
tend to be satisfied by incremental development, and radically new design concepts are 
rare. Designers rely on previous work and experience as a basis, and seek fresh 
information only to cover the changes needed to meet a new specification. The 
aerospace industry develops new products over a timescale of many years, so that the 
functional specialists on project teams may work on only a very small number of 
different projects in the course of their careers. The long gestation period means that the 
accumulation of experience is very slow, and engineers may not have contact with other 
projects that are meeting problems at the same stage of development so as to share 
information on the producibility aspects of current production processes. 
Although the literature recognises the importance of training for people at all levels and 
stages of experience in the organisation, in practice the pressures in industry to complete 
project tasks may prevent an ideal training programme from being implemented. There 
was little evidence for producibility training being given to designers, who were 
expected to rely on on-the-job experience. Whatever training may have been received 
could be out of date within a few years as new production processes were adopted. 
Recognising those production problems that are related to training and experience 
therefore becomes an important means of making management aware of the need for 
training or for taking on people with the right experience. 
Standards, procedures, specifications, reports and textbooks were a greatly under- 
utilised source of information, and a potential trap if not properly maintained and 
managed. 
CAD Systems are used to convey design intent and provide a representation for 
producibility analysis. This is important to support the producibility dialogue, so that 
the participants can refer to the same design features. However, the cost of a full- 
function CAD workstation and software, together with its upkeep and the training of 
users, is very high. This may preclude the provision of compatible fully-featured CAD 
facilities to all those who could usefully participate in the dialogue from their place of 
work. 
The SESAME pilot project showed how a low-cost viewer would enable a 3D model to 
be manipulated and interrogated on a PC platform with little or no user training. This 
could greatly enhance the value of the producibility dialogue for those without CAD 
workstations, e. g. to allow people on the shopfloor to be involved at an early stage. 
Whereas the full CAD model may need to undergo translation before it could be viewed 
on the supplier's workstation or fed into CNC programming, the low-cost viewer used a 
protocol that would enable files to be readily downloaded from the CAD in a 
compatible format. However, while the viewer could be extremely useful as an aid to 
producibility discussions, it had limitations such as not being able to show how the 
CAD model had been constructed, and it was not sufficiently accurate for quality 
assurance purposes. 
The software for CAD workstations may place constraints on the designer, such as the design sequence and range of features available. It may be difficult or impossible to 
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change features entered early in the design sequence without extensive work to unpick 
the design. Compatibility/interoperability with other systems may introduce errors or 
omissions, resulting in queries and delay. 
DF117 databases and tools often embrace good concepts for producibility and are 
potentially very helpful, but are frequently under-utilised. 
Checklists are cheap, but only can only be expected to identify elementary producibility 
issues reliably. Even incremental design may generate features that the general checklist 
does not pick up. Expertise is needed to recognise the impact of changes, and apparently 
minor differences can push the production process beyond its limits. The implications of 
checklist questions may not become apparent until they are discussed with those 
responsible for manufacturing on the shopfloor. 
Guidelines can go much further than checklists, but are also historically based and need 
to feedback from the identification of problems to keep them up-to-date. The impression 
gained from contact with the aerospace industry was that design guidelines, including 
producibility, were not prominent as a source of first resort and were not a priority to 
update. 
DFM software was not seen to be used much in the aerospace industry. Much of DFM 
software was developed for the evaluation of detailed process plans to be used in 
volume production, and was therefore not of use when considering issues that might 
involve a change of geometry. Such software would not usually offer redesign 
suggestions. Designers were more likely to consult the producibility engineer on the 
team than spend time entering detailed data into a complex DFM calculation. 
The author selected `DFM databases and tools' as a separate category of sources of 
information for design because of its potential importance in helping to avoid 
producibility problems. Few factors were found to relate to this category, and these 
tended to concentrate on their shortcomings. Although much research is being done on 
virtual manufacturing and knowledge-based engineering, automated producibility has 
not yet had a major impact on the aerospace industry. 
8.7 Communications and Teamworking 
Nearly half the producibility factors in the relationship framework are to do with 
communication and teamworking, a much higher proportion than in any other 
category of sources. No designer works alone to design and make an item in the 
aerospace industry. Interacting with other members of the team is an important source 
of information for designers to complement their training and experience as well as the 
sources of paper and database information, CAD Systems, and DFM software and tools. 
When the information is not already known, or it is not known where it can readily be 
found, designers are heavily dependent on communication and teamworking to obtain it. 
The relationship framework is a tool that can help narrow the search to identify the 
particular aspects of communication and teamworking relevant to the type of reason for 
the problem. This section discusses the significance of communication and 
teamworking as a source of information and influence in relation to each of the 
categories of types of reasons, i. e. in relation to the set of factors in each of the tables in 
Chapter 6. 
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Human error contains a number of communication and teamworking factors because 
miscommunication is a common cause of mistakes. These can be particularly significant 
for producibility when the dialogue is based on wrong assumptions, a question is 
answered in the wrong context, or errors are repeated because the communication chain 
did not provide feedback to tell designers there was a problem. In this category, the 
highest number of factors relate to training and experience, reflecting the prime 
importance of these in preventing errors. This may also be the effect of assigning 
responsibility for mistakes to an individual, rather than attributing it to a shortfall in 
communications: "you failed, " not "the team let you down. " Communication and 
teamworking arrangements may not provide an environment where the members are 
supportive and help each other to avoid mistakes. 
Culture and social matters are primarily concerned with the `soft' aspects of people's 
relationships with others, so nearly all factors relate to communication and 
teamworking. Lack of teamwork is itself presented as a type of reason, because of the 
fundamental importance of teamworking in the producibility dialogue. This enables a 
number of points concerning leadership and teamwork to be brought out that can help 
managers in industry to recognise their impact and appreciate that extensive further 
guidance is available elsewhere. Several factors relate to the rejection of good advice - 
the `good' often being recognised only with hindsight - because it is so important for 
people to examine who had been able to offer the right advice and why it had not been 
accepted. This is not so that `witchhunts' may be conducted, but so that managers can 
realise the importance of the potential contributions from all team members and hence 
develop teamworking practices that make the most effective use of them. The final 
factor concerning the need to obtain the best advice may be proved crucial to the 
survival of the company. 
Knowledge was brought out as a separate category to emphasise the importance of 
factors relating to `know-how' and knowledge of processes and the environment, rather 
than including these points in other tables. Failure to recognise the need for advice can 
result in great embarrassment and delay when problems reach the people on the 
shopfloor, who cannot understand they were not avoided. Communication and 
teamworking can do much to promote team knowledge and synergy. 
An organisation relies heavily on communication and teamworking for its 
effectiveness. Several factors are included as relating to different aspects of 
communication as the types of reasons for problems to emphasise the importance of 
organising the details to ensure the channels are effective. Pressures in industry are such 
that any barrier to contact may prevent the busy designer or production engineer from 
seeking or giving advice that is not contractually required. Cost optimisation appears 
grossly underrepresented in the early stages of design: while being conscious of costs, 
both designers and production engineers in aerospace would often expect changes in 
details to be left to a later cost-reduction exercise rather than delay the prototype 
production. Much space is devoted to metrics and rewards, which are considered vital for developing the right attitudes to focus on what is important for the producibility 
process to succeed. Similarly, lack of feedback can waste the opportunity to learn vital 
producibility information. The failure to share information for commercial, political or 
parochial reasons is an `own goal' that should recognised and firmly rooted out in any 
modern organisation in favour of building trust and the longer term relationships. 
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Teamworking and communication can make a big difference to the anticipation of 
problems, especially where meetings are properly conducted and organisations ensure 
that potential difficulties suggested are followed up with a proper investigation, rather 
than overridden by a dominant chairman or functional specialist. Effective teamworking 
and leadership can overcome both lack of ability and lack of effort, but for different 
reasons. Time is often the enemy of producibility, because producibility is not 
addressed properly in the early stages of design, when people with the right experience 
on the team could improve matters. 
Technical matters will always create their share of problems. There are two aspects 
relating to communications covered by Table 6.5: the corruption of data, and the need to 
tell people about actual or potential technical problems. However, the will to 
communicate is frequently more important than the technical means to do so, and 
technical difficulties in communication must not be allowed to prevent the producibility 
message getting through. The main thrust of the communications and teamworking 
aspects that are related to technical problems is that many technical problems are to be 
expected, especially where there are changes in manufacturing processes, materials used 
or design intent. With a high proportion of derivative designs in the aerospace industry, 
it is particularly important to have such matters clearly visible to everyone involved in 
the design to manufacture chain so that they may anticipate incompatibilities. It is 
equally important that they should have a means of communicating their concerns so 
that technical problems can be dealt with efficiently and the circumstances reported so 
that they are avoided in the future. 
The prime significance of the framework lies in the way it can help managers to 
navigate into these sources of information from the problems. 
8.8 Applications of the framework 
The whole approach to this research has been concerned with presenting the factors 
relevant to each category of sources of information or influence so that users can 
appreciate the significance of the problems they experience in their own environment. 
Industrial users could map the problems relating to their own circumstances onto the 
framework, so as to identify the factors and the associated relationships that they should 
address in order to develop solutions to match their needs. 
The aim is for users to be able to map the problems as described in Section 7.1.2, to see 
which factors could be relevant, then take a critical look at the design-to-manufacture 
chain to consider how each factor could stimulate action to prevent manufacturing 
problems reaching the shopfloor. 
8.8.1 Risk management 
Before a new project starts, the project manager could use the framework to make sure 
that potential producibility problems are anticipated. During the project, areas where 
new technology or procedures are introduced can be reviewed with the framework to 
reduce the risk of producibility problems being introduced. 
8.8.2 Problem solving 
One of the strengths of the framework is the range of problems represented. This 
enables it to provide connections between the problems and the reasons for them that 
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can help to identify causes. Bicheno describes 'root cause' problem solving as 
fundamental to the philosophies of JIT, lean manufacturing, continuous improvement, 
the Toyota production system, and TQM (Bicheno 2000) p 130. It means solving 
problems at the root rather than at the superficial or immediately obvious levels, as 
described by Wilson et al (Wilson, Dell et al. 1993). 
The `5 Whys' and the `5 Ilows' are techniques of problem solving based on the 
experience of the Toyota Company, who found that `why' (or `how') needed to be 
asked successively five times before the root cause was established. The first reason 
given should never be accepted, but always probed to expose the underlying causes that 
led to it (Bicheno 2000) p 130. 
Bicheno also refers to a thoughtful article by Finlow-Bates, who concluded that there 
were no ultimate root causes; rather, root causes were dependent upon the problem 
owner; there could be more than one potential root cause and the final choice of root 
cause could not be made until the economics of possible solutions had been considered. 
There was usually a chain of events that led to any particular unwanted effect, and each 
person along the chain was not interested in the problems of lower echelons. Each of 
these causes represented a failure in control or in communication. The real issue was 
therefore not to find the root cause, but to find how the problem could be solved most 
economically and effectively to prevent recurrence (Finlow-Bates 1998). 
Clarke et al describe how the Theory of Inventive Problem Solving (often referred to by 
the Russian acronym TRIZ) is effected by a combination of the searching process and 
by the availability of the knowledge required to solve the problem. It applies analytical 
and knowledge-based tools to enhance the structured generation and utilisation of ideas. 
TRIZ is intended to improve the effectiveness of the problem solving process and the 
development of implementable solution concepts (Clarke 1999). L. R. Smith et al 
provide an example of using TRIZ techniques to answer the question "How do we 
introduce into an organisation like engineering, the necessary skills and methods so that 
changes are not needed after the drawings are released? " (Smith, Zlotin et al. 1999). 
The framework could assist industrial users to apply techniques such as the `5 Whys' 
and TRIZ by helping to provide the knowledge required to identify the underlying 
causes, so as to solve the problems most economically and effectively to prevent 
recurrence. 
8.8.3 Allocation of resources 
Industrial resources are always limited, and the framework could help to identify areas 
where they might be used most effectively. For example, many factors could be avoided 
by developing communication and teamworking skills to help implement CE. 
A training manager could review the factors in the Training and Experience column to 
see whether the firm's training programmes cover each of the issues with the right 
people to the appropriate depth and scope. Section 6.4.14. c might lead to the discovery, 
for example, that no arrangements had been made to brief designers on the 
consequences of reducing the number of first-tier suppliers. They should be aware that 
there would be less opportunity for direct contact with the third-party suppliers who 
actually made the parts on subcontract. The subcontractors' ideas for improving 
producibility may well get filtered out by the first-tier supplier. It could be useful also to 
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train Procurement and Contracts staff to know when to help bridge the gap by calling on 
the subcontractors' expertise at the appropriate time to advise Design. 
8.8.4 Organisation design 
The framework could be used to improve the interface between manufacturing 
organisation and overall business organisation. The analysis in Section 6.6 showed that 
DFM success was heavily dependent on communications and teamworking. The 
organisation strategy should be designed to promote this by considering means such as: 
9 Metrics and rewards; 
0 Co-location, representation and meetings strategy; 
9 Appointment and responsibilities of team leaders; 
0 Removing contractual, IPR and interdepartmental barriers to teamworking. 
For example, Section 6.4.8 contains material covering several different aspects of 
metrics and rewards. These could be reviewed in the light of a firm's particular 
industrial goals to ensure that principles such as that of the balanced scorecard are 
observed. Performance gaps could be identified and timelines set to close them. The 
performance of a manager of a new project conducting a risk assessment (as suggested 
in Section 8.8.1) could be measured on how well he anticipates problems. 
Sections 6.4.12 and 6.4.13 cover a number of points regarding potential barriers to co- 
operation. These include the importance of matching the business goals to the needs of 
the partners on a continuing basis, to avoid being overwhelmed by the complexity of 
collaboration. 
8.8.5 Guideline building 
Industrial managers could use the framework to review their particular producibility 
problems. These could form the basis for them to build guidelines or checklists 
according to their specific needs and circumstances. 
The framework can readily be expanded to incorporate additional factors to cover 
problems outside the current scope of Chapter 6. This could be done to address 
manufacturing processes beyond those covered in this research, including those in other 
industry sectors. 
The framework could also be `customised' for a particular area of application. The 
problems in that area would first be mapped onto the framework and then used as 
illustrations as feedback to others in the organisation. If required, factors irrelevant to 
the application could be precised or removed from the framework to streamline the tool. 
8.8.6 Tools development 
DFM databases and tools could be acquired or developed to avoid the shortfalls in both 
the nature and the usage of current material identified in the framework (e. g. Sections 
6.4.6 and 6.4.7). Management training should emphasise the potential benefits and 
encourage the use of tools that are matched to the actual producibility requirements of 
designers at each stage in the design process. 
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Chapter 9 Conclusion 
This chapter presents the achievements of the research by describing the extent to which 
the Research Objectives have been met, sets out in detail the justification for claiming 
that the research makes a contribution to knowledge, and suggests some ideas for future 
research. 
9.1 The extent to which the Research Objectives have been met 
This section sets out the extent to which the research objectives in Section 1.4 were met. 
Determination of producibility issues 
The author generated the list of producibility issues set out in Section 3.8.3 from the 
experience of the industrial case studies and a preliminary study of the literature, as 
described in Chapter 3. They represent the issues of concern to current practitioners in 
the research domain, i. e. the design for manufacture process covering mechanical piece 
parts for the aerospace industry. This list provided a valuable basis for focusing the 
research on producibility matters of practical relevance. 
The types of reasons for problems and their concept categories were similarly 
generated, as described in Chapter 5, following the author's immersion in the industrial 
case studies. Together with the list of problems and opportunities, this provided a full 
response to the requirement to determine producibility issues. 
Identification of sources of information and influence 
The set of five concept categories for sources of information and influence was 
developed primarily from the literature set out in Section 4.5, as described in Chapter 5. 
They included `CAD Systems' and `DFM Databases and Tools' as separate categories 
to help draw attention to factors relevant to these areas. `Communications and 
Teamworking' completed the closed set by ensuring that any information not found 
from the other four categories could be made available in this way. In addition to 
providing factual information, each category was capable of influencing the designer in 
matters affecting producibility. 
The assumption was made that the information available to prevent any particular 
manufacturing problem was available somewhere, in some form, tacit or explicit. If this 
information were not already written down, on an electronic database, or in someone's 
head, then the lack of it could be recognised and research or tests put in hand to find 
answers in time for them to be used in the design process. Given that producibility 
information was available that would enable the designer to alter the design so as to 
avoid manufacturing problems before manufacturing instructions reached the shopfloor, 
then it was assumed that this information could become known to the designer through 
one or more of the sources. 
These five categories provided a full response to the requirement to identify information 
sources and influences in the research domain. 
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Framework for application to practical engineering environments 
The Relationship Framework set out in Chapter 6 was developed as a means of setting 
out the answer to the Research Question "Why do manufacturing problems reach the 
shopfloor when sources of information are available to prevent them? " in a form that 
could be of use in a practical engineering environment to help managers find factors that 
related to their own problems and diagnose their sources. These factors could either 
prevent the designer from identifying, receiving or knowing of the information needed 
to avoid a producibility problem, or they may influence the designer who knew the 
information to fail to apply it so as to overcome the problem. 
The author contends that breadth of the database assembled from industry and from the 
literature, and the way that the framework was developed and organised to present the 
relationship factors derived from the data provides a comprehensive answer to the 
question of why such problems reach the shopfloor. This fully meets the requirement to 
devise a framework for application to practical engineering environments. 
Partial validation of framework 
The reseach objective was limited to partial validation because it was not practicable in 
the time available to test the framework in industry after it had been developed. The 
following paragraphs set out the aspects of the work that the author blieves justify the 
claim that partial validation has been achieved. 
The recommended tests for research validity were set out in Section 2.7 Table 2.2, 
together with details of the research strategy adopted to satisfy them. The author 
contends that the best practice and industrial case studies provided an accurate picture 
of the industrial problems by using the rich communication methods of semi-structured 
interviews with each participant in the DFM chain, followed by face-to-face review 
meetings covering all of the 38 producibility issues from the industrial case studies. 
A cross-section of the aerospace industry reseach domain was obtained by the use of 
live case studies from both Defence and Civil Aerospace involving four major UK 
companies -two as customers responsible for design, and two as manufacturing 
suppliers. The manufactured mechanical piece parts covered were made from stainless 
steel, aluminium, titanium and composites involving a variety of processes. In each case 
the author visited the manufacturing shop floor as well as the design, quality and 
purchasing offices, to ensure that the practical working environment was fully 
understood. A wide range of literature was studied to to support the industrial 
experience and provide further material for populating the framework. Both the 
literature and the best practice study were drawn from a much broader field, but 
provided much material that was agreed by practitioners to be relevant to aerospace. It 
is reasonable to infer that many of the entries in the relationship tables are generalisable 
to a range of industries. , 
Chapter 7 showed how the 38 producibility issues could be mapped onto the 
relationship tables that formed the framework, and also explained the grounds for 
believing that the framework had industrial validity, satisfying the practical relevance 
tests of Section 2.7 Table 2.3. 
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9.2 Justification for the contribution to knowledge claimed 
The output of this research is the completed relationship framework set out in Chapter 
6. In order to develop this framework, the methodology described in Chapter 2 was 
designed. The initial steps in the methodology involved teamworking on the 
AEROEXTN Project. The author does not claim total credit for the data gathered from 
industry as a joint effort. The author did, however, take the lead in developing the 
Producibility Interaction model described in Chapter 3. He also gathered and 
documented the data from the civil aerospace studies, and used the combined set of 
industrial data together with his study of the literature as the basis from which to 
develop the framework. 
The first use of the data was to explore the context of producibility in the mechanical 
aerospace components domain, so as to develop the list of producibility issues listed in 
Section 3.8.3. As a means of helping the understanding of `producibility' in this context, 
this represents a contribution to knowledge. 
The process set out in Section 5.2 for formulating and categorising the lists of types of 
reasons and sources of producibility information and influence was fundamental in 
filtering the large volume of information to develop the framework structure into which 
the relationship factors could subsequently be entered. The concept of using a two- 
dimensional matrix as a framework for presenting qualitative research results is well 
established. However, the author claims that the recognition of the practical relevance to 
producibility of the types of reasons, at a level of granularity that enabled the 
identification of factors to relate them to the categories of sources, represents a 
contribution to knowledge. 
The concept of a closed set is well known. What is novel is its application to defining 
the sources of information available to designers as a closed set such that, given that the 
information was available somewhere, one or more of the source categories defined 
must be related to each of the types of reasons for producibility problems. This was the 
key to the use of the framework in building the answer to the Research Question, 
enabling each of the factors to be identified from the large volume of problem issues 
from industrial experience and literature. Entering the factor into a cell immediately 
showed its relationship both to its type of reason for causing a problem and to the 
source of information that could influence design. The ability of the framework to 
`pigeonhole' any new factor suggested by scrutiny of the database was a major benefit 
in enabling the framework to be populated rapidly. This was especially useful when 
new material was found in the literature, because it could be entered directly into the 
framework without going through an intermediate process of collating it with like items 
- the framework effectively acted as a collator. 
The completed Relationship Framework is a diagnostic tool that is not available in the 
published literature. It has been compiled with a very large element of industrial 
experience that fully recognises the responsibilities and concerns of managers, so that 
they should be able to relate readily to the factors and identify them with their own 
experience. At the same time, the broad basis of the literature consulted enables the 
table to show factors covering embarrassing problems, such as those resulting from 
human error or personal antagonism. Managers are reluctant to admit to these, and 
would most certainly avoid putting them in project reports. 
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9.3 Ideas for future research 
Application of framework to industry 
The research timescale did not allow the framework be tested in industry. Further 
research could demonstrate its utility, to refine the factors and provide additional 
illustrations of their application. 
The framework could readily be extended to other industrial contexts. The methodology 
that was affected in developing this framework could cover other industries and be 
applied to other fields. Many of the types of reasons for problems would read across 
directly to other applications, with a change of wording to adapt to the contexts. Five 
categories of types of reasons could well be unchanged, since they have general 
applicability, e. g. `organisation'. Sources of information would have to be categorised 
according to the specialist function, but `training and experience' and `communication 
and teamworking' could be unchanged. The framework could then be populated with 
factors that related to the nature of the business concerned, but again many factors are 
likely to be common. 
Involvement of industrial psychologists 
The framework represents an engineer's attempt to relate problems and lost 
opportunities in producibility to the reasons for them and the sources of information to 
avoid them. The contents of the framework has a very high proportion of `soft' factors, 
in terms of both training and experience as well as communication and teamworking. 
Even in the other three source categories one may argue that how people use the 
information is more important than the availability of the information. Although the 
framework is a practical tool to enable managers to home in on improvement actions or 
plans to understand fully the reasons why producibility problems occur, industrial 
psychologists could help to develop a further understanding of the human factors 
involved. 
Business process re-engineering 
Hammer and Champy show the importance of following the business process rather 
than attending to narrowly defined tasks and working within predefined organisational 
boundaries, emphasising the importance of information technology acting as a 
neighbour to allow organisations to working radically different ways (Hammer and 
Champy 2001) p 50. 
Further research could develop the framework to assist directly in the radical re- 
engineering of business processes in the design-to-manufacture chain. 
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Appendix B AEROEXTN Proj ect 
13.1 Context 
The AI: ROEX'I N project vW as set up to develop processes by which competence in 
concurrent engineering could he applied to the IFxtcndcd Enterprise. This involved the 
design-to-manufacture Chain from the customer (responsible for design, assembly and 
test) to the supplier (responsible for the manufacture of machined parts, on a remote 
site). The supplier would be invok ed in the design loop at an early stage, providing 
advice on Proclueihility. This arrangement is reterred to as `supplier in the loop' (SIL) 
working, or `Carly supplier involvement' (ESI), and is illustrated in Figure B. 1. 
`Supplier in the Loop' (Earl), Supplier Involvement) 
Product model 
Process pkIIIIIIng 
"l)csi-n ['art (IPR) "IFM 
feature additions 
-Agree modifications 
"NC tape programming 
froh product model 
" Maintain hrOdUCt 
model DFM/process 'Mwl iIaeturlm-, analysis 
capability "Metllocds a111(1 tooling 
dialogue 
Supplier 
0 
Figure B. l Supplier in the LOOP Concurrent Engineering (SIL ('I. ) 
B. 2 Project structure 
The A[ROEXT'N Project structure and tluw chart are shown in Fi urc B. 2, which is 
annotated with the numbers I to 7 to indicate the items of'particular relevance to this 
thesis, corresponding to the methodology actions steps described in Sections 2.9 and 
2.9. 
The project ran from June 1997 until September 1999, and was mainagc(l by senior 
academic staff from Crant eld University (I)r Ih-S111119 fein) and the t lniversity of Luton 
(Professur David Hamblin) as Principal Investigators. Mrs lily I'hi1pott, of the 
University of Luton, and the author were employed as i'ull-tin'ic researchers fier the 
project. 
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Scoping 
0 
O 
10 Literature Review In-house audits Best Practice Study 
CE scenarios - BTP, BTT, SIL 
O 
User requirements 
(D[ 
Metrics & targets 
Decision support Tool structure I Pilots identitied 
DST detailing II Baseline analysis 
Business Case for SIL. -CE --- -----------11 
_T_ 
Producibility defined & into process 
O Fit(), TO-BE' wish-list 
01 Pilot project 
CE template defined 
O 
'SESAME' Pilot implementation, 
Q monitoring, evaluation 
DST rulebasc SIL-CE rulebase 
Dissemination I 
Figure 13.2 AFROEXTN Project structure and flow chart 
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B. 3 Prescriptive CE implementation model 
B. 3.1 CE Implementation template 
The AEROEXTN team used the prioritised list of issues and enablers derived from 
workshops with industrial collaborators as a basis for formulating a list of 
implementation tasks to plan the involvement of the supplier in the design stage for 
SIL-CE working. These `TO-BE' tasks were derived from comparing the current 'AS- 
IS' processes with the arrangements needed for the supplier to contribute production- 
engineering expertise. 
A planning structure was needed for the AEROEXTN live pilot project, in order to 
implement the `TO-BE' tasks in the appropriate sequence. It was important that long- 
lead items and pre-pilot tasks were put in hand in good time to be completed before the 
start of the pilot phase. A number of Producibility activities were planned around the 
core requirement to facilitate Producibility Interactions between customer and supplier. 
These implementation tasks covered: 
" Long-lead items, such as developing the producibility process, obtaining 
management buy-in for the business case, and choosing the pilot parts; 
" Pre-pilot tasks, such as auditing the present design and manufacturing processes, 
addressing contracts and intellectual property rights (IPR), and arranging any 
necessary training; 
" Pilot tasks, such as producibility interactions, programme management, culture 
alignment, communication, and measurement; 
" Post-pilot tasks, such as analysing lessons learned and addressing the digestion 
and re-use of knowledge. 
The template in Figure B. 3 was developed to illustrate the flow of tasks. 
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Concurrent Engineering Template 
.,, PRE- LONG PROJECT PROJECT 
LEAD 
'r oduC b iity 
process 
development 
iI`; IP" e, ss 
Project 
Plan & 
choice of 
product 
ý? sirt(s)I 
tasks 
1 
13.4 SESAME 
Prirnc; 
audit & 
trainv, r 
, Hi< Cts 
! q'tr' 
POST- 
PROJECT 
PRODUCT[ ILITY ACTIVITIES 
'roducibility 
interactions 
Programme 
Management 
Culture 
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Y, 31(llllfý 
4 
IT -CAD/CAM 
Figure B. 3 Block Schematic CE Template 
Lessons 
learned: 
knowledge 
digest 
re-use 
6.4.1 Purpose 
The purpose of the project named `SESAME' was to pilot CE in the Extended 
Enterprise on a live project. A co-operative independent supplier produced complex 
mechanical parts designed by a prime contractor. There was no sub-contracting of 
design work to the supplier. The researchers facilitated the setting up of a team to bring 
the designers together with the supplier's producibility engineers at an early stage of 
product development. 
B. 4.2 Pilot Project Circumstances 
The SFSAME industrial circumstances were as follows: 
" The customer was a Defence Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), who 
had recently outsourced the manufacture of machined parts, retaining design, 
assemhly, systems integration and test, 
" The supplier undertook a wide variety of civil and military aerospace machining 
tasks; 
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" The distance between OEM design and supplier manufacturing sites was some 
200 miles by road; 
" The nature of the product required complex CAD-designed mechanical 
machined parts to enable the highly-stressed system to achieve the required 
performance with minimum mass and volume; 
" Because of the nature of the defence contract, the customer saw time-to-market 
as important, in that penalties were related to program lateness. Until recent 
`smart' initiatives, there had been little incentive to improve time to market; 
" The parts were required in relatively low volume and individual component cost 
was low; however, design risk and potential project impact were high. 
The context was that of the Senior Designer offering the supplier's Production 
Engineers an opportunity to comment on the manufacturability of his design at an early 
stage in its development, when changes could be incorporated at minimal cost. Both 
parties knew that their questions, comments and observations would be critically 
discussed and analysed at the team meetings. They also knew that what they were doing 
had full management backing from both firms, and that there were no contractual or IPR 
barriers to prevent the full and free exchange of information. 
For the purposes of analysis this dialogue between Design and Manufacturing was 
required to be recorded by both parties, including its nature, date and duration. The 
logbooks maintained were also used to record the man hours spent by Design in 
preparing material to be passed to the supplier, and the man hours spent by 
Manufacturing in assessing the material, noting problems and considering suggestions 
for improvement. 
The team members had been working together over a period of several months during 
the preparation for the pilot phase of the project. The teamworking culture alignment 
was developed to promote interaction for the benefit of the project without regard to the 
affiliation of the originator. Encouragement was given for any relevant matter to be 
raised. 
B. 4.3 Monthly review meetings 
The project team for SESAME was run as an Integrated Development Team (IDT), with 
a planned schedule of monthly meetings to review progress and discuss the technical 
producibility issues. The venue was rotated between the customer, supplier and 
university sites to provide an opportunity for team members to visit each other's 
workplaces. This also served to avoid any suggestion that any one party bore a greater 
responsibility for running the proceedings than the others. Social events were held to 
encourage people to get to know each other, typically in the form of a team dinner the 
evening before the day of the meeting. 
Membership consisted of: 
The senior designer (who was solely responsible for the design of the SESAME 
parts); 
" The IT group leader (responsible for the customer's process development, 
configuration management and standards); 
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" The procurement engineer and quality manager (responsible in their functions 
for the work placed with this supplier); 
" Two production engineers (responsible for the shopfloor planning and 
manufacture for their machining work for this customer); 
" The supplier's engineering development manager (responsible for process 
development); 
" The university researchers (acting as facilitators, and responsible for recording 
the meeting minutes). 
Each meeting consist of three parts: 
9A formal (IDT) procedure to identify issues and to monitor their resolution; 
" Detailed discussion on technical issues; 
" Results-monitoring activities of the research team. 
B. 4.4 Producibility issues discussed (units of analysis) 
Three formal iterations of the PI model were made over a period of six months. This 
timescale reflected a common working pattern for this size of project, where neither the 
Designers nor the Production Engineers were dedicated only to SESAME. A total of 13 
technical issues were raised during the Producibility Interactions. These are summarised 
in Table B. 1, together with the team's assessment of their importance, method of 
communication and impact. 
Table B. 1 SESAME producibility interactions 
PART DESCRIPTION: Importance Method of Communication Impact of Issue (tick one only) (tick one only) 
Stainless steel 
(machined from stock) w CO b 
5 
Ov O0 A 
" C 'O bA CA 
q 
ý 
A ö 
it 
3 
.. cd 
I Ä 
'ý Producibility issues ° 0 
.U 
U 
0 > 
O 
on 
3 b 0 ö 0° 
03 ¬'° n 
=I 
U 
W b 
04 a, 
ö 
A In ° Ä 
. 
v, w 
SI Mismatch undercut and rear face First M M M 
article 
S2 Operating lengths - fit diameters Never, m m M 
requested unless 
tolerances 
not 
achievable 
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PART DESCRIPTION: Importance Method of Communication Impact of Issue (tick one only) (tick one only) 
Stainless steel C 
(machined from stock) 0 
N Cd -0 
- C E. 
r, 
Q 
ö 
i ä " ä en ¢I 
. . . , bA CA 
Ä 4- Ü 0 0 
Ü 
> 
R 
I ö 
1 
Producibility issues - .n ; > r. 0 :3 ö 10 
v C4 -0 ä Ü 
W CZ3 62. A, 
o Ä N0 " Ä E n 
:3 
S3 Tooling hole needed I WO Manu M m M 
Planning 
S4 Supplier happy to accept CAD V Never m m - 
modelling method producing 
mirrored features, whereas Design 
had assumed generating them by 
rotation would help manufacturing 
S5 Change rectangular slot with small Manu M M M 
radius to full radius end planning 
S6 Request for slot width to be V Tape M M M 
increased due to concern about proving 
cutter head distance to wall; feature 
could not be changed, but wall 
height could be made smaller to 
facilitate cutter 
S7 Alignment required for piston hole N/A: No 
would be change 
shown on 
drawing 
S8 Tooling hole size and position Continuat No 
discussed ion of change 
Issue 3 
S9 Add 8 off spot faces to M4 holes Manu M m M 
planning 
S10 Engraving - can it be done by hand? Manu m rn A 
Planning 
I 
S II What method of part marking? QA check m m A 
Omitted from original. Position of drgs 
important 
S12 Request to remove tight position Continuat m 
tolerance on tooling hole (see ion of 
producibility issues 3 and 8) Issues 3 
&8 
S l_3 Considered replacing 8 small slots Not M 
with a proposed new slot design technically 
allowed 
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Notes on the issues shown in Table B. 1: 
S1. The original geometry might have caused the inspector to query a witness line 
on the back face. Here, with the supplier in the loop (SIL), it was an easement, 
but under make-to-print (BTP) it could have been critical, especially if the first 
article was satisfactory and the problem only appeared later in production. 
S2. Under BTP, Manufacturing would have attempted to achieve close tolerance on 
2 diameters, increasing the cost of the part, raising a query only if they failed. A 
supplier used to working on missiles does not usually question high precision. 
The issue raised the designer's awareness of the need to specify more fully. 
S3. This tooling-hole requirement could extend the timescale by months on a 
multinational project. Manufacture might have proceeded under concession, or 
at risk until a modification was approved. 
S4. A radius to allow the tool to enter was possible either way. Rotation of the 
model to generate the four instances of the feature had involved more work for 
Design than using the mirroring facility of the CAD software. 
S5. This avoided a tool change. Under BTP a proposal for change would probably 
not have been made unless as part of a cost-reduction exercise. The cost of a 
formal modification was likely to exceed the saving for the small batch required. 
S6. Either a long-shank tool would have been used, or there was a risk of conflict. 
S7. This showed the limitations of viewing a model: drawings would have shown 
relevant tolerances. The issue was raised because the model showed a piston 
hole on each side, and the query concerned whether the general tolerances could 
be applied separately to each hole, or whether it was important for the bores to 
be aligned with each other. 
S8. Under BTP, this discussion would have taken place during the modification 
procedure. 
S9. Alternative methods of achieving the result would have involved extra work. As 
for Issue 5, under BTP such a proposal for change would probably not have been 
made unless part of cost-reduction exercise. 
S 10. A note would have been added to the drawing: "May be done by hand". Such an 
amendment could be done by memorandum. 
S 11. The method of part marking could have been one of many specified in the 
standard quoted, and needed clarification. 
S 12. Without this change, inspection might have rejected a part as out of tolerance, 
when the exact tooling hole position had no effect on the correct part function. 
S 13. This initiative was possible only after the supplier had been shown a CAD 
model of the assembly at the previous working group meeting, and it had been 
made clear that the supplier could be `radical'. It was proposed due to the 
manufacturing difficulty of the slots, and would have reduced costs if feasible. 
The proposal was reviewed by Design, who on revisiting the model found other 
problems with mating faces. While the supplier suggestion could not be 
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accepted due to fit and functional requirements, the question initiated design 
development on the part of the Designer. 
Points 10-12 were based on the Key Features Drawing (KFD), which was passed to the 
supplier with the second iteration of the model. 
Importance 
The issues were placed into one of three categories, according to their importance: 
" `Critical to Design or Manufacture' were issues raised to resolve problems that 
would have required either clarification or an engineering change before 
manufacture could proceed; 
" `Easements' were where it would have been possible to make the part, but a 
suggestion was made to ease manufacture; 
" `Redundant Design' covers the case where the designer had adopted a more 
time-consuming technique to generate the part design, because it was mistakenly 
thought that the part would be easier to make. 
Method of communication 
The principal method of communication that stimulated the raising or resolution of an 
issue was placed in one of three categories: 
" Personal contact, including face-to-face and telephone discussion; 
" Model viewer. 
" Drawing only 
Full drawings would not normally be produced until detail design was complete, but 
sketches or drawings of key features that could not be shown on the 3D model were 
produced for the second iteration of the model. Most points were raised as a result of the 
supplier seeing the 3D model on a viewer, but some only became apparent when shown 
on a key features drawing (KFD). 
Impact of issue 
The industrial collaborators determined the impact of each issue by assessing four 
aspects of what would have happened if there had been no Producibility Interaction SIL 
process. These are shown in Table 3.2 as follows: 
" The stage at which the matter would have been picked up; 
" Whether it would have required a major or a minor change by Design; 
" Whether it would have required a major or a minor change by the Supplier; 
" Whether the change would have needed a full modification, or could have been 
satisfied by a drawing amendment. 
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B. 4.5 SESAME lessons 
The principal lessons learned from setting up a concurrent engineering project of this 
nature in the extended enterprise were seen as: 
B. 4.5.1 Choice of project parts 
No Project Manager will readily offer to involve a project with a new way of working, 
at a time when the budget for design has already been allocated, and project milestones 
have been set that include release of drawings. People needed persuading that the 
potential benefits outweigh the likely additional time and effort necessary to involve 
suppliers with Design. 
AEROEXTN found that including the setting up of an integrated development team 
with a management plan and timescale for the pilot project was an advantage. It helped 
to show Project Management that there was not an open-ended invitation to extend the 
design phase against the vague hope that some time might be saved in production. 
The actual choice of parts depended on the nature of the product and the characteristics 
of the supplier. The AEROEXTN team developed a decision support tool to facilitate 
the assessment of the factors relevant to determining whether and in what way suppliers 
should have early involvement with Design. The prime industrial collaborator's 
Procurement adopted the AEROEXTN module for characterising suitability for early 
supplier involvement in their Joint Improvement Management System (JIMS). Details 
of the decision support tool have not been included in this thesis, but were reported in a 
conference paper (Fan, Hernando et al. 1999). 
B. 4.5.2 Contracts and IPR 
The supplier is naturally concerned at the possibility that his Production Engineering 
effort will be wasted if the customer does not proceed with the project. There may also 
be concern at the possibility that the customer may reap the benefit of his expertise and 
place the order elsewhere. These matters were addressed in the AEROEXTN Project 
and reported in a conference paper (Philpott, Hamblin et al. 1999). 
B. 4.5.3 Producibility Agenda 
The team agreed on the importance of the PI Table as an agenda to ensure that questions 
were asked to cover all relevant matters, especially `grey areas' where previous work 
had not met the customer's expectations. It had been helpful to learn of examples of 
earlier queries, or where the supplier's interpretation had not been what Design intended 
or Inspection would pass. 
B. 4.5.4 Industrial change 
Industry frequently makes changes in its organisation for reasons of strategy (e. g. 
company amalgamations, factory moves, product rationalisation and outsourcing). 
Personnel involved in a project may be affected directly by such changes, or they may 
move in the normal course of career development, promotion or retirement. Such 
change is to be anticipated during the life of the project, and it is important that 
management should recognise the need to avoid losing the potential benefits of 
experience in ESI working. In the AEROEXTN case the involvement of the customer's 
Configuration Management and Procurement meant that they developed procedures 
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which could be applied as standard practice to other projects, and where appropriate 
could be incorporated into new procedures which were being developed because of the 
industrial change. Traceability was an important aspect both for keeping track of what 
had occurred on the current project, including logging reasons for change against a 
particular stage or model, and for enabling a valid comparison to be made with previous 
projects. 
B. 4.5.5 Training and Publicity 
An important element of the project was to ensure that the customer and supplier 
understood each other's business and terminology, and knew what was expected of 
them for effective ESI working. In the case of AEROEXTN, the team benefited from 
some of the supplier members having previously worked for the customer, before the 
manufacturing was outsourced. The team recommended that: 
Training support should cover the principles of ESI working, perhaps in an 
upgrade package for designers and project managers; 
" Examples of the successes of ESI projects should be given maximum publicity; 
The problems and unsuccessful experiences should also be taught, together with 
an appraisal of the reasons and advice on how to overcome or avoid them in the 
future. 
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Appendix D Civil Aerospace St u dies 
This appendix describes in detail the industrial studies involving both in-house and 
outsourced manufacture of parts for the civil aerospace industry summarised in Chapter 
3, Section 3.7. Two major manufacturers allowed the author to collect data by talking 
directly to the people involved in the design-to-manufacture chain. In both cases, 
Company A was the customer responsible for design. The first study was of a mature 
aluminium alloy part, where a batch was currently being machined in house. The second 
study was of one set of titanium machined parts and one set of composite moulded 
parts, both being manufactured by Company B as a supplier to Company A. 
The author used semi-structured interviews and group meetings to gather historical data, 
and conducted each study on-site over a period of five working days. The Producibility 
Interaction model developed for the AEROEXTN project was used as a tool to ensure 
that all relevant subjects were covered, and reviewed to confirm its relevance in the 
context of both internal and external supply. 
D. 1 In-house manufacture study 
D. 1.1 Study methodology - internal supply 
The aim of the study was to capture information on in-house manufacturing problems in 
civil aerospace from the relevant functional specialists, by using a particular part that 
was currently in work as a vehicle to trigger discussions. 
Although senior management had placed no specific constraint on the time that could be 
spent with the company, the author considered it prudent to limit the study to one 
working week, excluding the initial visit and any follow-up needed. 
The first requirement was to ensure there was on-site support for the study. A working- 
level point of contact was established during the initial visit. He was made available to 
provide local knowledge and guidance, arrange meetings and interviews, and provide 
administrative support throughout the week of the study. 
It was important to make sure that the people to be involved understood the nature of 
the research, the contribution that was expected of them, and that the study had been 
authorised by a senior executive the company. This was achieved by choosing a week 
when the appropriate people would be on site, arranging advance notification, and 
holding a short meeting to brief representatives of the functions and answer questions 
on procedures at the start of the study. 
The sequence of interviews and meetings was given careful consideration. The author 
decided that it was appropriate to start immediately after the initial briefing with 
Manufacturing and Quality, combined with a visit to the in-house shopfloor, on Day 1. 
The points raised would then be discussed with Design on Day 2, followed by a visit to 
the off-site assembly shopfloor on Daily 3. Procurement/Purchasing would be fitted in 
when available. The morning of the Day 4 would be used to consolidate notes and 
prepare a presentation. The afternoon of Day 4 was reserved for a review meeting to 
discuss issues raised with representatives of the functions together as a team, to ensure 
that the results of the study represented a balanced consensus. The morning of Day 5 
would be used to pursue any loose ends before leaving the site. 
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A proforma was used to facilitate the gathering of data and the preparation of reports. 
This was designed so that Manufacturing could raise each problem, or set of similar 
problems, and then comments could be added in turn by each of the relevant functions. 
The completed proformas would then provide a basis for the review meeting, and the 
Producibility Interaction table could act as a tool to stimulate discussion and ensure that 
no subject was omitted. 
The author agreed to produce the minutes of the review meeting and circulate them to 
the company as a report of the study. 
D. 1.2 Nature of in-house part 
The structural part chosen for the in-house study is referred to as Part A in this thesis. 
This was an existing part that had been produced by a series of external suppliers for a 
number of years. Following the business failure of the current supplier, a small number 
of sets was being produced by the in-house manufacturing facility, to keep the assembly 
line going until the new supplier could be brought online. 
Part A weighed 30 kilograms, after being milled on a high-speed 5-axis machine in 
three stages from a solid aluminium alloy billet of of 800 kilograms. 
This part was selected because it had been a particular problem for Manufacturing, with 
a high number of queries, change requests and concessions. 
D. 1.3 Study of in-house part 
Manufacturing had experienced a total of 36 arisings on Part A, which they summarised 
on five report proformas that were then copied to the other functions and discussed with 
them. 
Because Design had a heavy workload on new projects, they could not spare more than 
one engineer to attend the review meeting for the whole afternoon on Day 4. They did, 
however, agree to discuss the proformas and DFM in the Design Office. The author was 
privileged to have a two-hour meeting with the Head of Manufacturing Design, the 
Design Task Leader, the Design Team Interface Manufacturing Engineer and the 
CAD/CAM/ICAD Manufacturing Engineer. Discussion covered not only the design of 
Part A, but also the procedures developed for later designs. The Design Team Interface 
Manufacturing Engineer subsequently attended the review meeting on Day 4. 
Manufacturing Engineering had been set up some years previously to provide an 
interface between Design and Suppliers, because direct contact previously had been 
found to lead to an uncontrolled increase in costs. While this provided a normal means 
of liaison, it did not preclude designers visiting supplier facilities, especially when new 
manufacturing processes were involved. Manufacturing Engineering had recently put 
considerable effort into advising an overseas supplier on how to make best use of their 
new high-speed machinery to fulfil a large contract that was awarded as part of a 
workshare agreement. Such `Producibility Interaction' was in marked contrast to the 
AEROEXTN experience, where the production engineering expertise had been with the 
supplier. 
Procurement were not available to attend the review meeting, but provided a very 
valuable briefing on the firm's procedures, including: bid packs containing product 
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specifications, delivery schedule requirements, drawings and CAD data; tendering; 
capacity and capability analysis; `first article' inspection, concessions and non- 
conformance investigations; configuration management, and processing of works query 
notes from suppliers. 
Procurement recognised that in the past problems had arisen following a change of 
supplier. For example, where the previous supplier had made a part for years, had found 
that the tool made to the tool drawing was wrong, and had modified the tool without 
getting the tool drawing changed. When the new supplier made the part to the drawings, 
it did not fit the assembly. It was noted particularly that on-site Manufacturing, as an 
internal supplier, did not get the opportunity afforded to external suppliers to negotiate 
on delivery, cost and tooling, and to discuss any technical input. They were simply 
tasked with producing the parts to drawing. Manufacturing pointed out that a number of 
work packages were being brought back in-house, as they moved from old to new 
technology, and that they would normally look at the process of the current supplier 
before taking over. In the case of Part A, this had not been possible when the external 
supplier failed. 
The visit to the assembly line shopfloor at Site B provided an opportunity to observe 
Part A being fitted into the aircraft structure, and the effect of out-of-tolerance parts. 
The Engineering Group Leader stated that the part number did not change on change of 
supplier. Assembly would therefore not be involved, except to be told that a trial part 
was coming, and any opportunity to change the manufacture of Part A would have been 
very low-key - perhaps someone would have asked "Any problems with Part A? " There 
was, however, a paperwork penalty on change of supplier because configuration 
management required all structural parts to be traceable. Also, because Site B had 
authority to vary the `condition of supply' of a part, e. g. fastener holes might be 
specified as pilot-drilled only, there could be differences between parts from different 
suppliers to the same part number. Any concessions that had been made in the 
manufacture of a part would be received with the part documentation and checked by 
the Product Assurance Controller to ensure that they were compatible with the 
assembly. 
D. 1.4 Review of in-house part 
The report on Part A presented details of the part and an estimate of the man-hours 
involved in addressing the manufacturing problems covered by the five report 
proformas. This was tabled at the review meeting on Day 4 (see Appendix D, Section 
D. 1.1 - some details have been omitted to preserve commercial confidentiality). 
The review meeting was attended by the Engineering Group Leaders from the Part A 
manufacturing cell and the Part A manufacturing project, the Design Team Interface 
Manufacturing Engineer, together with the Manufacturing Engineer and the new 
Quality Group Leader who had accompanied the author throughout the week. 
Table D. 1 summarises the issues, their importance, method of communication and 
impact in a similar manner to that used in Appendix B Section B. 4.4 for AEROEXTN. 
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Table D. 1 Manufacturing Issues for Aluminium Parts 
PART Importance Method of 
DESCRIPTION: (tick one 
Communication Impact of Issue 
only) (tick one only) 
Part A 
Machined from Al 
billet 
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Al Use of 5-axis feature 
in place of angled NC m m A 
cutters in 3-axis or 5- prog'g 
axis scanning 
A2 Geometry definition Prod'n 
did not allow simple plan'g 
M M -- 
5-axis machining 
A3 Problems and errors 
with drawings, e. g. Prod'n 
dimensions missing, plan'g 
m M. A 
notes and pictorial 
view not matching 
A4 Web tolerancing 
expected to be too v VO 
Prod'n 
m M A 
tight with current plan'g 
process 
A5 Tooling hole VO 
Prod'n 
m M A tolerance too tight plan'g 
Notes on the issues shown in Table D. 1: 
Al. Problems with the 5-axis features could be resolved with a recommendation 
given in the Design response. This action could be carried over on to other 
parts that had similar problems. Concern over the number of changes to 
drawings could be eased by inclusion of condition of supply as part of the 
drawing specification. 
A2. The problem found could not have been identified from 2D drawings, so that a 
Design review with Manufacturing would not have picked up the issue. The 
CAD system used when these parts were designed produced only 2D drawings, 
and did not generate a 3D model of the part. Modelling would have picked up 
196 
this issue on the basis that production of the solid model would have shown up 
the Manufacturing concerns. 
A3.2D drawings were prone to human error. The depth of the manufacturing 
review would not have picked up such errors. Insufficient communication may 
have taken place with previous suppliers, who had all used the same tapes and 
facilities, so masking the problem. Before there was a change of manufacturer, 
parts should be modelled. The outgoing quality and production process at the 
existing suppliers should be fully understood before any move. 
A4. Revisions in general notes should resolve the issue. General notes from later 
designs would be included on all drawings where applicable. Time to achieve 
capability data would extend time frame. 
A5. Revisions in the tolerancing standard would be required to overcome the issue 
fully. In the short term, a change could be made in line with later designs. The 
adoption of ISO standards could be reviewed to confirm acceptability, though 
concern was expressed by Design regarding the potential to increase 
tolerances. Manufacturing observed that their 5-axis machines were capable of 
positioning to an accuracy of 0.04 mm over a 4m x 2m bed, and the tolerance 
between tooling holes required by the standard could be achieved by adding a 
fourth stage of machining and allowing the part to cool before this. Adding this 
extra stage would require additional pallets and would slow the production rate. 
The total cost of man-hours for Design, Manufacturing and Quality amounted to 246.4, 
over half of which involved raising and answering Works Query Notes. At an average 
cost per man-hour of, say, £40 this represents £10,000. Discussion with Manufacturing 
after the meeting calculated the cost of materials and labour for the 3 trial parts. Each 
billet was 800 kilograms at £5 per kg = £4000, and involved 13 hours' machining at, 
say, £100 per hour = £1300. Typically one would be scrapped, and the following two 
would be re-worked and concessed, costing an estimated £7000. While it was 
appreciated that the 5 axis machines were new and the process needed proving, any 
progress toward `right first time' could generate considerable savings. This might be 
achieved by: 
" Design liaison as part of project (this was not standard practice for in-house 
production of `mature' parts); 
" Fully-integrated CAD/CAM system; 
" Solid models with design-for-manufacture consideration; 
" Development capacity (allocated machine time); 
" Confirmed manufacturing methodology to close the DFM loop; 
" Cutter parameters must be proven - continuous improvement; 
" Verification specialist to check methodology to brochure; 
" Product assurance involvement at front-end to produce inspection plans and Key 
Acceptance Dimension (KAD) charts for operators' use; 
" Production engineers and operators to run Tape Try Out (TTO). 
Many of the problems had arisen because the task had been generated as an internal one 
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for Manufacturing, as a switch from an external supplier that had failed. Some problems 
had been anticipated on the change to 5-axis machining, but others had not been 
eliminated by current procedures and had reached the shop floor to cause additional 
work. Concessions and Works Query Notes appeared to take an excessive time, except 
when there was a very urgent need for the parts, and tended to treat the symptoms rather 
than the cause. The very process of raising the reports and discussing the problems for 
Cranfield University DFM research during this week, culminating in the review 
meeting, had resolved a number of issues and had gone a long way toward having the 
causes recognised. Any DFM improvements would be carried forward to benefit future 
suppliers whenever there was a change of manufacturer. 
D. 1.5 Review of the PI Table - in-house manufacture 
The PI table was reviewed in the context of internal supply. Each subject was addressed 
as follows: 
" To confirm its relevance to the Part A problems. 
" To confirm the relevance and completeness of the broad range of subjects, 
drawing on the experience of those present. 
" To consider the method of communication, especially as to whether a low-cost 
viewer could be useful. 
" To enter clarifying or amplifying remarks on aspects that would help to get the 
best results in the Company A application. 
" Overall priorities. 
Part A. The five reports on Part A had related directly to 9 of the 29 subjects. Only 
report No 2 was not related to the PI table, as it would have required the 2D drawings to 
have been converted to a 3D model of the part for the problem to have been identified 
before metal was cut. This had been estimated as requiring 250 hours of Design effort, 
and had not been done because of the `mature' nature of the part. Design now 
recommended modelling of parts for all projects, following experience of the 
manufacture of parts for the latest design, where all parts had been modelled and design 
queries were virtually zero. If a major supplier insisted on receiving CAD models where 
only 2D drawings existed, this was normally agreed despite the current shortage of 
design resources. 
PI Subjects. Each subject was considered in turn, and endorsed. The only change was to 
expand item 24 ('No. of separate set-ups and machining activities') to add `machine run 
time and specialist cutting tools'. No new subjects were added. 
Communication. It was agreed that representation of the initial CAD model by the use 
of a low-cost viewer on a PC, including mark-up of annotations where necessary, would 
allow communication of most relevant subjects. Exceptions were NC programming ease 
(item 12), Jigs and fixtures (item 23) and Inspection requirements (item 26), for which 
the full CAD models would be needed. 
Remarks. Appendix B shows the revised PI table, complete with agreed remarks 
covering the Company application. 
Overall priorities. The following subjects were nominated as covering the most 
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important part of the PI process: 7,9,10,12,13,22,23, and 24. 
Validation. The PI model developed for the AEROEXTN project appeared to be a good 
fit to the Company application. It was agreed that it had the potential to reduce the 
problems reaching the shop floor, but only if it were properly recognised by 
incorporation into standard procedures and senior management allocated the resources 
required to allow the necessary communication to take place. 
Cost effectiveness. The effort expended in carrying out the PI process, especially if 
integrated with existing procedures, was far less than the full cost of solving problems, 
which included not only man-hours but also increased work in progress and delays. 
Furthermore, the PI process was aimed at tackling the root cause, so that a change of 
supplier/manufacturer or future developments based on the current design would not 
result in repeating the same problems. It was appreciated that some subjects were 
already addressed in the new Design procedures. 
D. 1.6 Further Observations: 
The author gave the review meeting a CD-ROM demonstration of a low-cost viewer (of 
the kind used for the SESAME pilot in AEROEXTN). Such software enabled 3D part 
geometry to be downloaded from CAD systems, including CATIA and CADDS 5, and 
displayed on a PC. The model could be rotated, zoomed, sectioned, annotated, and red- 
line marked up. Feature dimensions could be interrogated. Assemblies could also be 
viewed. E-mail or floppy disk could be used to send files, and a self-opening viewer 
was provided so that the recipient did not need a copy of the software or a licence in 
order to view the model. The viewer could be used by anyone with a little practice, and 
formal training was not needed. 
It was accepted that such a viewer could be used to show an initial CAD model to a 
manufacturing department or a supplier, to enable them to view part features and 
assemblies, without the need for a full CAD workstation and the associated data link 
and operator training. This could be particularly useful as an aid to communication and 
discussion of producibility before the detail design was complete and before detailed 2D 
drawings were available. Design could answer queries and to respond to the concerns of 
Manufacturing by making changes while they could be done at little cost before design 
freeze. The viewer could also be used to help Manufacturing understand the detailed 
features and plan their tooling and processes accordingly, rather than discover problems 
later and suffer the resulting delays and costs. 
Manufacturing considered that the low-cost viewer could be useful as a development 
tool, but was concerned over the communication of design intent. 
Design stated that CADDS 5 models were given out at A and B schemes. `A' schemes 
had limited detail, sufficient for example to define approximate billet sizes. The `B' 
scheme was more detailed, to allow tooling. The adoption of the knowledge-based 
ICAD system for future modelling should pick up problems, but its impact on designs 
had yet to be confirmed. It was understood that where ICAD was used to develop a 
generic part, the detailed model for each particular part would not be generated until the 
design was complete. Subsequent discussion confirmed this, but it was explained that 
the particular instance of an ICAD-generated part could be produced at any stage of its 
development - for example to enable it to be passed to Manufacturing for comment. 
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Manufacturing observed that all items in a standard tool pack, of say 30 tools, might be 
needed to do a job when enhanced communication with Design might have allowed this 
to be reduced to, say, 10 tools. 
D. 2 External supply 
D. 2.1 Study methodology - external supply 
The approach to the study where the supplier was external was identical to that for 
internal supply in Section D. 1. The only differences in the execution were a 
consequence of the contractual status and geographical separation between the customer 
and the supplier, here referred to as Company A and Company B. 
The author took great care was taken to ensure that he did not breach confidentiality by 
passing information between the two firms without their express consent. In practice, no 
difficulties were encountered, because there was good co-operation between them, and 
they were very open in discussing design for manufacture problems with the author. 
Working level contacts, to arrange meetings and provide on-site support, were provided 
by Procurement in Company A and Manufacturing Projects in Company B. 
The sequence of the study was the same: an initial visit to Company B to discuss the 
study and select suitable parts; Day 1 and Day 2 at Company B for a briefing meeting 
and capture of the manufacturing problems; Day 3 and Day 4 at Company A to discuss 
the problems with Design, Quality and Procurement; and Day 5 at Company B for the 
review meeting, with Company A represented. Unlike the in-house study, the dates on 
which people were available resulted in a time gap between the three site visits. This 
study therefore took longer than a working week to complete. 
D. 2.2 Nature of outsourced parts 
Two sets of parts were selected for this study. Both were derivatives of earlier designs, 
but were new parts that had been fully modelled in 3D CAD. One was a set of titanium 
parts (Parts T) machined from forgings and the other a set of composite panels (Parts 
C). 
Titanium is a hard metal that is difficult to cut and requires special tools. Because of its 
strength and relatively low density it is used for highly stressed components, such as 
engine attachment fittings. All material for Parts T was bought in as forgings, already 
stress relieved. The forgings had a long lead-time, and for some parts they contained 
extra material to allow for the future development of the aircraft without changing the 
supplier's tooling. Manufacturing involved: rough cut machining on 4-axis machines, 
ideally plus 3 mm to form; heat treatment for stress relief (because so much material 
was removed - but improved cutting tools in future may induce less stress); semi-finish 
machining to half mm; finish cut on both 4- and 5-axis machines; shot peening, zinc 
spraying and painting. Some parts had bushes fitted by Company B. 
The composite parts were exterior panels with compound curves to provide the required 
aerodynamic profile. Manufacture involved the following processes: cutting to shape 
pieces of pre-impregnated carbon fibre, aramid fibre (kevlar) or glass-fibre cloth; 
placing the pieces accurately into a female mould with the preformed honeycomb 
inserts in the the correct sequence and with the correct orientation; placing a caul plate 
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to consolidate the fibres in specified areas; vacuum bagging; curing under high 
temperature and pressure in an autoclave; de-bulking the vacuum bag and associated 
materials; trimming the panel edges and drilling the tooling and fastener holes with a 
high-precision ICY machine; coordinate checking and ultrasonic testing. A thin layer of 
aluminium foil that was required for electrical bonding and lightning protection could 
either be placed and cured with the main layup, or applied and cured separately to avoid 
outgassing problems. 
D. 2.3 Study of outsourced parts 
Company B had experienced a total of 7 Arisings on Parts T, and 13 Arisings on Parts 
C. These were discussed on Day 1 and Day 2 and subsequently summarised on 
proformas for discussion with the functional specialists at Company A. 
The author's discussions with Company B on Parts T were principally with the 
Manufacturing Project Manager for the Company A work, the Section Leader in NC 
Programming who had been heavily involved in meetings to discuss Producibility with 
Company A over a 12-month period some two years previously. Similarly, Parts C were 
discussed with the contract engineer from the Composite Engineering Department who 
had been in regular communication with Company A during development of these parts. 
The following points were made in respect of the work on hard metal parts (Parts T): 
Problems had been encountered in data conversion from CADDS 5 at Company 
A to CATIA at Company B. IGES wireframe (not volume) was tried, but they 
found that Theorem worked satisfactorily. The NC programming was done from 
CATIA. Wireframe could be used for three-axis work, but a solid model was 
needed for 5-axis surfaces. Model sizes of 3 MB became 12 MB in CATIA, but 
8 MB in CATIA via Theorem. Trials had been undertaken to prove the system, 
verifying back to the CADDS 5 model. (Note: Company A paid the cost of 
conversion, but the main problem was lead time, some 5 to 6 weeks overall. ) 
Company B Production had visited Company A when the design was virtually 
complete, and was invited to comment. They agreed to add a ruled surface 
(cheaper to machine), but insisted that the top face on the pintle must be 
produced 5-axis (this is the only 5-axis feature on the part - scanned features 
were requested, which would have allowed parts to be made on a 4-axis 
machine). The shot-peening requirement was currently under consideration at 
Company A, and may not be needed (this would save the days taken to move the 
parts to the shot bay, queue, peen and return). The original corner radiuses were 
too small for deep pockets (a 170 long cutter would have been needed - the aim 
was to keep within 3 to 4D to avoid slowing feed and speed); this change had 
been accepted. To a avoid using a shaped cutter, a 5-axis landing was agreed. 
Company B was involved in weekly (internal) and monthly (with Company A) 
meetings to discuss parts over a 12-month period. Points would be raised at 
meetings with no set agenda. These meetings started about halfway through 
model design and had continued until the first set of parts was completed. 
Operators were sometimes included: they were responsible for scheduling their 
machines - if a suggestion saved machine time, they could put more work 
through and the cell would be more successful. Cell engineers had CATIA, 
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which Operators could look at to view models. Quality Engineering and an 
inspector from the shopfloor were sometimes included in the Company A 
meetings to discuss the location of inspection points. 
" NC programming should be considered at an early stage, as the sequence in 
which the CAD model was built up could make a big difference to the ease of 
NC programming. (Note: the ease of NC programming must be from the full 
CAD model, but an early model was useful to see the way it was constructed). In 
all cases, Company B would produce a CATIA model. Where earlier parts had 
been designed on ANVIL 2D, these would now be modelled in CATIA as a 
`manufacturing' model, which could not be used for anything else. For a typical 
part, the effort to generate a CATIA model was about 2 weeks, and the NC 
programme would be generated in 3 to 4 weeks. The manufacturing model 
would not need corner radiuses, because the cutter size would be known - but a 
similar level of work was needed to produce a full Design model. If a part had 
previously been made elsewhere, Company B would re-post-process the 
previous NC programme for their machines. 
" Contact outside the meetings was by e-mail, fax (including sketches) and 
telephone. Company B Production regarded communication as excellent, 
allowing direct discussions and enabling problems to be solved as quickly as 
could be expected. The current Company A Purchasing Engineer, who had 
briefed the author about the Company B work during the Part A study, had 
himself become involved part way through the development of Parts T. 
" Company B would design their own tooling, in CATIA for new work, using the 
same design modelling as for the part itself. The inspection programme would 
also be written from the CATIA model. 
" Company B had been allowed to specify the requirements for the forging design, 
enabling them to keep the same hole positions for all brackets, use the same 
fixtures and the same storage. This saved set-ups, as three operations could be 
carried out on components on the same set-up. The preliminary forging drawings 
for the part had been models by Company A in CADDS 5, converted via 
Theorem and used for VERICUT. 
" Company B Production's comment on concurrent engineering: "It is important 
for the right people to meet, with knowledge of detail to the right level. " 
The contract engineer from the Composite Engineering Department was part of the IPT 
for Company B internal supply supporting the manufacturing department for carbon 
fibre parts. He made the following points in respect of the work on Parts C: 
" Company A had sent 2D drawings as pre-issue copies for a set of Parts C panels. 
The designer was good on CATIA, but he was not a `carbon' designer, and 
Company A had a lot to learn about carbon-fibre manufacturing. 
" Two examples of the lack of appreciation of composite manufacturing involved 
specifying alternative plies of two types of material, and varying the thicknesses 
of the `landing' areas in between the honeycomb cores. Changing to 12 plies of 
woven material, instead of six of woven and six of unidirectional, allowed both a 
saving in the cutting operation and an easier lay up. Redesigning the landing 
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areas to be the same thickness greatly simplified the caul plate that was placed 
over them in the mould to help consolidate the plies. These made manufacturing 
easier, and also inspection (because the tolerance on all parts of the landing was 
the same). 
" Honeycomb cores were much easier to model in CATIA. The CATIA model 
would be sent to Hexcel, who produced 3D shaped cores with a net edge that 
saved hours of production time. 
" `Fiber-sim' software was used to access CATIA data and develop ply-by-ply 
lay-up details, including tooling holes in plies. The use of CATIA was a big 
advantage compared with CADDS 5 for working with Fiber-sim. 
" Cured parts were trimmed on an ICY machine on which they had a capacity 
problem (note: a subsequent tour of the facility revealed that this 5-year-old 
machine was regularly breaking down). The first five articles were required by 
Company A to be inspected on a CMM, which were also had capacity problems. 
A 2D laser inspection checking system was used. All completed parts were 
subject to ultrasonic testing; the rig in the workshop was capable of testing 
large-area panels. 
" Honeycomb and shear laminate test pieces would be included in the cure lay up 
and co-cured with a set of panels. They would subsequently be cut up and tested. 
" Composite moulds were 5-axis machined from the CATIA model. Nylon 
locating pins were placed in moulds to locate the lay ups, the caul plate and the 
honeycomb template. After cure, the nylon pins would be drilled out to provide 
tooling holes for subsequent processes - these holes might be situated in lugs 
outside the area of the finished part. When a design change reduced the length of 
a panel by 100mm, the tooling change was minimised by keeping the original 
edges and tooling holes. 
" Company B worked very closely with Company A during the development of 
the part. Contact started with the preliminary issue 001 of drawings, on which 
they raised 21 points (of which 18 were accepted). 
" The composite shop in Company B never previously had the `first article 
inspection' proved. Company A Supplier Instructions now required a first-off 
verification. Once this had been done, Company A accepted the process map, 
including kitting and autoclave cure details, as an `approved manufacturing 
route'. 
" When a part was rushed, Company B would work to `model as master'. There 
would be a buy-off process on the ICY machine for hole centres and edge of 
part. 
" Composite panel size was limited by the ICY machining facility. The machining 
area was approximately 4 in by 2 m. In the case of Parts C, a set of 4 panels 
could be loaded simultaneously onto a frame. Frames were loaded automatically 
into the temperature-controlled chamber while the previous parts were being 
machined, allowing time for the temperature to stabilise before cutting. 
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The author took the opportunity at Company B to receive a presentation by the R&T 
Simulation Development Engineer on the automation of engineering processes: 
" CATIA Generative Shape Modelling used associative multi-model links to 
generate a functional model of a component, which could then provide the 
component detail model and the downstream tooling. For example, a shape 
could be defined by its con tour and centre. E. g. the centre may be associated 
with the centre line of a pipe. If it subsequently became necessary to re-route the 
pipe, the centre could be moved (thus moving the contour) and the changes 
would then cascade to all associated models. 
" Tooling design for parts modelled in CATIA could be generated very quickly 
using Prescient Technologies' `StoneRule' software. A demonstration was given 
of the design of tooling to form a sheet metal part - this could be done in 5 to 10 
minutes, instead of 11 hours. 
" Dassault Systemes `DENEB' software was demonstrated. This suite included 
assembly simulation and machining simulation. The original CAD model could 
be read in for the simulation to show how the parts would fit, check for 
collisions/clashes, and enable Production to look at an animation of the assembly 
process. Virtual numerical control (VNC) could simulate machining, including 
collision checking and probe measurements for GD & T. Careful control of 
process factors was necessary. 
A Quality Manager from Company B expressed the view that time was the problem on 
the parts for this aircraft project. It had been demanding, with no time to devote to 
correcting/reinforcing learning. Attention to detail had been the nitty-gritty of the 
problem (he compared this situation with the past, when the aircraft drawing office had 
employed 600 men attending to detail). He saw all the problems as being related to 
communication - the knowledge and understanding existed within the organisation. He 
recommended that suggestions schemes could be used more. He claimed that Company 
B had been involved too late on the parts for this aircraft programme. The models by 
then were quite mature, but needed significant change for manufacture (e. g. ruled 
surfaces, corner radiuses) - independent of who manufactured parts. 
The author held a meeting on Day 3 with Company A in the Design Office. This was 
attended by the designer who had been responsible for some of Parts T, the designer 
responsible for Parts C, a quality manager and the Procurement Projects Manager 
responsible for both hard metal and composite parts with Company B. The Engineering 
Task Leader was unable to attend, because he was on paternity leave - but, as this event had been anticipated, the author had the benefit of a telephone discussion with him the 
week before. 
Further discussions were held on an individual basis with Procurement, Quality and 
Design during the rest of Day 3 and on Day 4. In particular, the Composite designer 
took considerable trouble to explain his design approach, because he was about to leave 
the firm and would not be available for the review meeting or any subsequent queries. 
D. 2.3.1 Review of outsourced parts 
Details of Parts T& Parts C were tabled at the review meeting at Company B on Day 5 
(see Section D. 2 - some details have been omitted to preserve commercial 
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confidentiality). Unlike the study of Part A, separate proformas had not been raised for 
each type of problem; details were compiled directly in the form of Tables C. 2 and C. 3 
below. 
Company B was represented at the review meeting by the Manufacturing Project 
Manager for the Company A work, the Section Leader in NC Programming and the R& 
T Simulation Development Engineer, Manufacturing Processes. 
Company A was represented by the Procurement Projects Leader responsible for 
Company B work and the Quality Group Leader who had accompanied the author 
throughout the week of the Part A study. Company A representation was limited by the 
geographic separation - Design did not normally travel to suppliers unless there was a 
specific part or process to view; they could not justify the time or the funding on this 
occasion. 
Apologies were received from the contract engineer from the Composite Engineering 
Department. 
Tables D. 2 and D. 3 summarise the issues, their importance, method of communication 
and impact in a similar manner to that used in Table B. 1 for AEROEXTN and Table 
D. 1 above. 
D. 2.3.2 General observations on context 
Company A pointed out that the aircraft project had originally being planned with the 
expectation of minimum change. The programme therefore worked to short lead times, 
which put pressure on Design resources when more extensive changes were found to be 
necessary. 
With new technology about, it was not clear how designers found time to learn the 
developments in their field. The composite designer had found it very difficult to get 
away for seminars and similar forums for updating expertise. Company A employed a 
significant number of contractors, and it was not usual for them to be sent on courses to 
update their skills. 
When asked what was the current level of understanding of manufacturing processes, 
Company B stated that it was common to survey the skills of the team to identify 
capability. Company A said that normally the Design Group lead designer would advise 
- however, owing to shortage of staff, there had been no Design Leader for the 
composite panels. 
Company A expressed the need to have a mechanism for embedding processes. Much 
was down to individual capability, but the benefit of such skills should be made 
available to all. There was a need to look at the risks to the business of not embracing 
changes, otherwise there was a danger of getting `another structure the same' rather than 
a significant improvement for a major new project. 
Company B observed that small-work-package CE teams worked very well, but large- 
scale pressures tended to reduce their effectiveness, as a large work package was not 
seen as a group of small packages. 
Asked if there was a well-defined process with clear visibility, Company A stated that 
such a process existed for the current project, but not enough people had been on the floor to do the job. The teams for the new project were working on a work breakdown 
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structure following the A-B-C scheme route, trying to get far more Manufacturing 
information into each team, including: Datums; key characteristics for assembly; DFM 
handbook for designers; capacity of manufacturing machines; and transportation. The 
`reality check' included health and safety and a black list of part/problems. 
Forgings were a long-lead-time item (8 to 18 months). Lead times varied from 
component to component, reflecting the differences in material, shape, size and 
complexity. The lead times for all Pylon forgings (Titanium) were 10-12 months. Pintle 
forgings were in the region of 8-10 months After the above lead times un-approved 
forgings would be ready for machine tape try-outs, `Forging approval' would run 
concurrent with machine trials; if the forgings were then approved, any successful tape 
try-out would be allowed to be flown. As soon as the Forging Supplier was known 
Company A invited all machining participants to suggest any additional Manufacturing 
requirements (e. g. tooling lugs, etc). In the current project, Company B had been `ahead 
of the game' in evaluating manufacturing issues, but no one had been able to provide 
early answers. The actions possible from the A scheme had been limited - no tool designs or ordering. Company A stated that a Purchase Order could not be raised until 
drawings were released, but a new set of commercial rules allowed an Authority to 
Proceed (ATP). However, some companies refused to work with an ATP. The new 
project had a different approach with DBTs. 
Well-defined rules could be used for design. Company B had been looking at building 
design rules into CAD applications. These may be parametric constraints. An 
application might generate error messages for minimum thickness, radius etc. KBE 
could be a very effective means of incorporating manufacturing rules at the design stage 
to prevent problems. Company A was using ICAD to generate wing geometry; the ribs 
were major reported successes. Company B used StoneRule as there were problems for 
ICAD to output CATIA geometry. KBE worked only when rules were well defined, but 
not all problems could be expressed in simple rules. Some rules would be general, and 
some related to early CAM tools: there was therefore a need to know why each rule had 
been formulated. It was suggested that a future way to embed process improvement was 
the integration of manufacturing rules in KBE, but it might be several years before this 
could be realised. 
Full CAD models exchanged between Company A (CADDS 5) and Company B 
(CADDS 5& CATIA) provided Manufacturing with ready access to geometric details. 
Following discussion it was agreed that a low-cost viewer would have been adequate to 
enable the issues, to have been identified. This could be a more cost-viable option for 
smaller suppliers. 
D. 2.3.3 Communications and teamworking 
Company A would not normally go to a supplier or potential supplier until the end of B- 
scheme design, other than for general matters. However, suppliers should be alerted to 
key characteristics, and it was pointed out that much early work had been done on new 
aspects of the current design, where made test pieces had been made and proposals 
submitted. 
During the development period of the current parts, both companies had held regular in- 
house meetings. These had been organised under the IPT at Company A and the by the 
Manufacturing Project Manager at Company B. Inter-site meetings were initially held at 
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Company A on a monthly basis; later as the jobs got into Manufacturing, meetings were 
held at Company B to allow Company A people to see the processes. 
Electronic communication between sites was on a daily basis by telephone, fax and file 
transfer. The Optegra system at Company A had been set up so that Company B could 
view relevant files on the server. It was suggested that virtual teams could have been 
formed, and the importance of the culture issue was emphasised in gaining acceptance 
of conflicting points of view. 
To maintain the integrity of procedures, works query notes (WQNs) had been raised. 
Prior to the meeting, Company B had expressed concern that responses to non-priority 
WQNs routinely took 2 to 4 months, and had suggested that there should be a service 
level agreement to provide (say) a 30-day response. All faxes sent by Company A were 
registered copies, to ensure traceability. It was noted that Company B had not been 
registering their faxes. Models put on the server by Company A were registered via the 
Data Exchange Group. 
Concern was expressed as to why it appeared that the problems of earlier aircraft 
projects were being repeated: there may be a requirement to cut corners, but there 
should be a systematic approach. There did not appear to be the fundamental tools for 
Design into Manufacturing, and there was no mechanism for escalation, effectively to 
weight concern as a business issue. Company A responded that mechanisms were in 
place, work had been concentrated on priorities for current project, and the efforts did 
produce the parts. However, the original planning for the project had been unrealistic in 
timescale and in the expectation that there would be no requirement for new jigs. The 
biggest impact on programmes would be achieved by improving upstream planning. 
D. 2.3.4 Costs 
Information was not readily available to assess the detailed costs involved in people 
travelling and participating in meetings, and the costs saved as a result of doing so. 
D. 2.3.5 Producibility issues raised on hard metal parts 
A total of 7 issues had been raised on the three types of hard metal parts referred to as 
Parts T (Pintle Fitting, Engine Pylon Bracket, and Retraction Jack). Table D. 2 
summarises these issues, their importance, method of communication and impact in a 
similar manner to that used in Section B. 4.4 for AEROEXTN and for Part A in Section 
D. 1.4. 
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Table D. 2 Manufacturing Issues for Titanium Parts 
PARTS T Importance Method of 
DESCRIPTION: (tick one 
Communication Impact of Issue 
Jack mounting only) 
(tick one only) 
Pylon Brackets 
Pintle Fittings 
, 
ý" 
"- 
Machined from Ti "ý ;ý ° >-. ýQ o r- 
F-1 E 
forgings A c A ö t ö o 
0 
ö 
> _ ö 
03 
I r. 
0 
`7' 
'o 9 ° Vý 
ö 3 
A t4 -0 
Issues 
U I 
3 A 
T1 Ruled surface added NC m M M (Pylon) prog 
T2 Change of corner NC 
radius on deep V m M M 
pockets (Pintle) 
T3 5-axis landings NC 
requested /added prog m 
M M 
(Pintle) 
T4 Bush insert for grease Damage M M M 
nipple hole (Pintle) to hole 
TS 2D drawing GD &T v 
Inspecti 
m M A datum errors (Jack) on 
T6 Models created to Inspecti 
nominal dimn on ++ v m M M 
tols (Jack) on 
T7 Pintle locking block Assemb 
radius in wrong ly m m A 
position 
Notes on the issues shown in Table D. 2: 
Ti. The original inside surface had been generated on the CAD model using a 
constant thickness from the outside double-curvature surface. Changing to a 
ruled surface allowed to the used of a standard rectangular cutter, instead of a 
shaped ball or barrel cutter, allowing much faster machining. Any NC 
programmer would have picked this up. Company A pointed out that the 
change of inside surface from a constant thickness to a ruled surface was 
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agreed and incorporated very early on in the design phase, but compromised 
the design of the component to enable a manufacturing easement. 
T2. The pockets were deeper than on the previous design, and the change allowed 
the cutter size to be kept to the maximum for faster cutting. This requirement 
could have been on a rule base for design. However, the designer had 
commented at the Company A meeting (on Day 3) that he had learned only 
from talking to a current Manufacturing practitioner that it was possible to use 
a cutter with more than the 3: 1 height-to-width ratio that his producibility 
engineer colleague had advised. 
T3. The use of a 40 mm diameter rectangular cutter inside the acute angle of the 
pintle allowed faster cutting, but left a `landing' wedge of material that 
increased the weight of the part. Design were prepared to accept this penalty. 
T4. The addition of a grease nipple resulted from an in-service problem of grease 
not reaching all round the pintle fitting. The original proposal had called for 
this quite complex feature to be put directly into the titanium, with the 
possibility of damage leading to the whole part being scrapped. Much 
interaction had occurred between Manufacturing, Design and Testing before 
Company B's proposal using a bush had been adopted. 
T5. Errors had occurred on the Pintle because the designers had changed, and GD 
&T were generated from the wrong datum. Tolerances were not seen from the 
3D solid model. 
T6. This was discovered on assembly, when a bearing was found to be slack 
instead of an interference fit. The tolerancing had not been given on the model, 
but came out later with a drawing. It was possible that the designer may have 
picked up wrong information on a proprietary bearing. It was noted that this 
aircraft project had for the first time used minimum-content 2D drawings, and 
the operators had needed more information. 
T7. This was a design error in the locking block for the pintle. Normally, such an 
error would have shown on clash detection and been corrected before reaching 
Manufacturing, but the part was a late requirement and time pressure had 
contributed to the mistake not being found. It would have been possible to 
detect this using a low-cost viewer showing the assembly of this part. 
D. 2.3.6 Producibility issues raised on composite parts 
A total of 13 issues had been raised on the four types of composite panels referred to as 
Parts C. Table D. 3 summarises these issues, their importance, method of 
communication and impact in a similar manner to that used in Section B. 4.4 for 
AEROEXTN, for Part A in Section D. 1.4 and for Parts T in Section D. 2.4.4. 
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Table D. 3 Manufacturing Issues for Composite Parts 
PARTS C Importance Method of 
DESCRIPTION: (tick one Communication Impact of Issue 
only) (tick one only) 
Composite Panels o 0 E (4 Off Each Hand) '' Y 
y N 
A 0 u .b 0 I- 
Ei > 
0 
Q 
o 
Issues v ä 0 
w 4- vý - U . ¢. "0 
C1 Alternate plies of woven 
and unidirectional carbon Production in M A changed to all woven ABRI planning. 
0023 
C2 Landing areas redesigned to 
be the same thickness Tooling M M M 
throughout the panel 
C3 Honeycomb ribbon Honeycomb direction different from 
manufacture m 
M A 
earlier panels. 
C4 Deletion of outer surface Production 
in in A Tedlar film. planning 
C5 Use of technology from 
another supplier project for Design M M M 
tooling for bonding and 
routing. 
C6 Use of Fiber-sim for ply Design M M M development. 
C7 One shot foiling of panels. Production in in A planning. 
C8 Addition of tooling holes Assembly for customer assembly jig v VO build M M M 
pick-up. 
C9 All plys to be one-piece plys Production M in M (ref item 6) planning 
C10 Ply drop-offs designed Production 
incorrectly for aesthetics. planning in in 
A 
C11 Incorrect specifications for Honeycomb 
formed honeycomb core. manufacture m in 
A 
C 12 Elimination of core filling. Production 
planning m m 
A 
C13 Addition of Synskin for Paint prep. m in A surface finish. 
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Notes on the issues shown in Table D. 3: 
Cl. This allowed all 12 pieces of cloth to be cut from one roll of fabric, instead of 
six from each of two types of cloth. Design had considered the differences in 
strength and weight of the panel to be acceptable. 
C2. The original mid-80's design had been difficult to manage and expensive on 
tooling. 
C3. Certain honeycomb cores would not form with the ribbon direction as 
specified - this had not been a problem for flat cores used elsewhere. 
C4. This had been an unnecessary carry-over from the earlier design. 
C5. A change was necessary to keep the tooling holes standard for the tooling 
route. 
C6. The Design culture at Company A differed from the expectations of 
Manufacturing at Company B. Design regarded it as their responsibility to 
define the finished boundary of each ply, while Manufacturing were used to 
having the CATIA adjunct programme Fiber-sim develop the cutting 
schedule for each ply. Company A did not use Fiber-sim, but had agreed to 
arrange for a subcontractor to apply the programme. 
C7. Company B was allowed flexibility as to whether they co-cured the 
aluminium foil backing-layer with the main panel lay up, or applied it in a 
separate lay up. This had materials as well as process implications, because 
out-gassing had been one of the problems with co-curing and a possible 
solution would have been to adopt a perforated or expanded foil rather than a 
solid foil. The cost of this might have been less than that of the second cure. 
C8. This was an assembly requirement, not originally identified. 
C9. Manufacture requested one-piece plies because these could more readily be 
laid up on the locating pegs than separate pieces that had to be located using 
templates. This was, however, less economical in the use of cloth. 
C10. Acceptable to Design, but would not have passed Company B inspection. 
C11. A correction to the specified material, which was readily apparent to 
Manufacturing. 
C12. Possible as a result of the common thickness of landings introduced at Issue 
2. 
C13. This extra thin layer was to eliminate surface pinholes, and should result in a 
cost saving in finishing. 
The composites designer had considered issues Cl, 4,7,8,11,12 and 13 to be of 
general applicability, regardless of the supplier, while he saw issues C2,3,5,6,9 and 
10 as being specific to the Company B site. He had also suggested that Design would 
have been prepared to address a `wish list' of issues raised by suppliers before detailed 
design commenced. 
211 
D. 2.3.7 Review of the PI Table - external supply 
The PI table was reviewed in the context of external supply. Each subject was addressed 
as follows: 
" To confirm its relevance to the Company A/ Company B DFM problems. 
" To confirm the relevance and completeness of the broad range of subjects, 
drawing on the experience of those present. 
" To consider the method of communication, especially as to whether a low-cost 
viewer could be useful. 
" To enter clarifying or amplifying remarks on aspects that would help to get the 
best results in this application. 
PI Subjects. Each subject was considered in turn, and endorsed. No new subjects were 
added. 
Communication. It was agreed that representation of the initial CAD model by the use 
of a low-cost viewer on a PC, including mark-up of annotations where necessary, would 
allow communication of most relevant subjects. Exceptions were NC programming ease 
(item 12), Jigs and fixtures (item 23) and Inspection requirements (item 26), for which 
the full CAD models would be needed. 
Remarks. Appendix C shows the revised PI table, with agreed remarks covering the 
Company A/Company B application. 
Validation. The PI model developed for the AEROEXTN project appeared to be a good 
fit to the current application. It was agreed that it had the potential to reduce the 
problems reaching the shop floor, but only if it were properly recognised by 
incorporation into standard procedures and senior management allocated the resources 
required to allow the necessary communication to take place. 
Cost effectiveness. The AEROEXTN project had shown that the effort expended in 
carrying out the PI process, especially if integrated with existing procedures, was far 
less than the full cost of solving problems, which included not only man-hours but also 
increased work in progress and delays. Furthermore, the PI process was aimed at 
tackling the root cause, so that a change of supplier/manufacturer or future 
developments based on the current design would not result in repeating the same 
problems. It was appreciated that some subjects were already addressed in the current 
project procedures, and it was expected that a more structured approach would yield 
further benefits. 
D. 3 Application of the Producibility Interaction Model to civil 
aerospace manufacture 
The PI Table originally developed for the AEROEXTN project was accepted as being 
both relevant and complete by the industrial practitioners who participated in the civil 
aerospace studies. No new subjects were suggested or introduced, and the only changes 
made to the wording were to make it more general, rather than specific to AEROEXTN. 
Although the participants in the civil aerospace studies all had access to full CAD 
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systems for viewing design models, they agreed that a low-cost viewer could have been 
used for most purposes. In particular, such a viewer could have helped to convey the 
design intent in discussions with suppliers who did not operate full CAD systems, 
although (after observing a brief demonstration) Manufacturing at Company A had 
reservations about its capabilities. 
The most important aspect of the PI Table is its use as a tool to assist management to 
structure discussions between Design, Manufacturing and other relevant functions at an 
early stage in the development process. While cooperation between Company A and 
Company B appeared very good, it was clear that some aspects could have been started 
earlier. This may have been affected by strategic decisions on sourcing, which had not 
finalised on Company B before detailed design commenced. 
The producibility discussions between the two companies that had taken place during 
the development of Parts T and Parts C were on an ad hoc basis and unstructured. In the 
case of the composite parts, Design stated that they would have been prepared to accept 
a `wish list' from the supplier at an early stage. It may be significant that Company A at 
the time had no Design manual for composite parts, and that the only site-specific issues 
raised were related to the manufacturing processes of the composites supplier. 
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Appendix E Report Proformas 
E. 1 In-house manufacture 
Summary Report for Part A 
Part A Size 115x3178x692 Material Al plate 7010 
Weight 30kg from 
800 kg billet 
Assembly -- Aircraft/project -- Quantity/production 
rate 6 sets (12 off) 
Classification: Qnew/prototype Qderivative Qimproved version   ch of manuf 
Qhigh volume   small batch Done-off 
Designed by: Organisation: A Location: Site A 
Drawing/part number: -- Date: 1992 
Manufactured by: Organisation: A Location: Site A 
Manufacture Release - Inspected by: A Location: Site A 
Acceptance for Assembly - Inspected by: 
Organisation A (paperwork only) 
Location: Site B 
Process (type -- primary/secondary, treatment; new or familiar to manufacturer): 
Milling from rolled 7010 plate in three stages, on new 5-axis machines 
Arisings (see following reports for nature, action and time to resolve, design effort, 
tooling changes, wasted materials, delay to production, cost & relation to PI Table): 
Summary of Arisings 
and man-hours 
Report 
No 
Total 
Arisings 
Design 
Man-hours 
Manufacturing 
Man-hours 
Total 
Man-hrs 
Engineering Queries 2 1 2.6 3.5 + 4.8 = 8.3 10.9 
3 11 110 44 154 
Engineering Changes 1 1 7.8 1.7 9.5 
Scrap and Re-Work 4 12 -- -- -- 
Concessions 5 12 72 0 72 
BTP/BTT/SIL: BTP ( Build to Print) Total Man-hours 246.4 
Time to first article, set up time, machining time: 
Plan for 3 attempts, normally scrapped or reworked, before the first deliverable item. 
Auto-loading of pallet, total 13 hours m/c time 
Could any problems have been foreseen/eliminated by early Manufacturing 
involvement in design? 
-- Yes, all but Report No 2 (which would have needed an early decision to convert the 
2D drawings to a 3D model in order to recognise the problem) 
Could a better way of making the part have been possible with design changes? 
-- Report No 1 showed saving of machine time using 5-axis features. 
-- Future designs could be less dependent on tight tolerances for features such as the 
web thickness, which was very difficult to control 
Comments by: Manufacturing, Quality and Design 
(see attached reports 1 to 5) 
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E. 1.1 Part A: Arising Report No 1 
Category: []Engineering Query   Engineering Change []Scrap Q Re-Work 
[]Concession []Other (state): 
Date raised: -- Date resolved: -- Elapsed wkg 
days: 12 wks 
Nature: To use 5-axis feature in place of using angled cutters in 3-axis, or 5-axis 
scanning. Manufacturing do not use special cutters due to the cost and difficulty of 
maintaining them. 
Scanning would take three times longer, so the saving would be approx 1 hour 
machine time per part. 
Action to resolve: Proposal was taken to DDP, which met once a month. They would 
then take the time to consider the merit and give approval. 
After approval engineering changes were put in to cover the parts of LR 8-11,13 and 
SA 2-5 
Design effort to resolve (man-hours): Est 180 hrs for 23 parts = 7.8 hours for Part A 
Manufacturing man-hours to address (management/supervisor): 40 hrs for 23 parts = 
1.7 hours for Part A 
Manufacturing man-hours wasted (production): - 
Wasted materials (cost) -- 
Tooling change ( cost) -- 
Delay to production: Identified early and planned into project time 
Comment by Manufacturing: Due to the time taken in the process, this is only 
possible before NC programming takes place. 
Manufacturing feasibility review (with Design, Manufacturing Engineering, NC 
Programming and Procurement) would have reduced timescale for necessary changes. 
Once NC Prog completed, it would be much harder to make changes. 
Comment by Quality/Inspection: Once the drawing has been changed, the 5-axis 
`lump' can be passed off for use in production. 
Comment by Design: 
See later design process, where generic drawing note covers all manufacturing 
information (see drawing -- ). 
Modify all existing drawing set, to create generic drawing notes. 
(Note: for later designs, Condition of Supply is on drawing, and requires Business 
Case to change) 
Comment by Eng Group Leader, (Site B): 
20 or 30 minor changes a week (such as these 23) are currently received, requiring 
each to be planned into production, up-issue drawings to be read (even if no action 
required) and process plan changed. Configuration Group also need to note the up- 
issue. Currently I man spends 2 days/week on this. 
Relate to PI Table subjects 
10,12,13,22,24,27 
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E. 1.2 Part A: Arising Report No 2 
Category:   Engineering Ouery QEngineering Change QScrap Q Re-Work 
QConcession QOther (state): Not yet submitted 
Date raised: Jul 00 Date resolved: N/A Elapsed wkg days: 
Nature: After parts manufactured, some areas noted that were unacceptable to the 
drawing. Geometry definition does not allow simple 5-axis machining. 
Action to resolve: A new geometry needs to be raised and justification needs to be 
such that it will be worth pursuing to get drawings changed. 
(Had this been raised with the initial block of 5-axis changes, it would have been 
resolved then. Now difficult to address. ) 
Design effort to resolve (man-hours): Estimate 60 hours for 23 parts = 2.6 hours for 
Part A 
Manufacturing man-hours to address (management/supervisor): Estimate 80 hours for 
23 parts = 3.5 
Manufacturing man-hours wasted (production): 20-30 minn per part in rework (hand 
blended) = 0.4x 12 = 4.8 man-hours total for 6 sets of two ribs 
Wasted materials (cost) - 
Tooling change (cost) - 
Delay to production: - 
Comment by Manufacturing: Difficult to foresee how big the 5-axis `lump' would 
be before manufacture, as working from 2D drawings. Need time to develop a possible 
5-axis geometry that allows use of standard cutters. 
Comment by Quality/Inspection: Part is unacceptable to drawing. Either process 
changed to meet requirements or standard needs to be changed. 
Comment by Design: 
Create CADDS 5 solid models of each part and programme from the model. 
Experience on later designs shows similar parts produced with zero queries. 
Comment by Eng Group Leader: As for report 1/drawings raised in issue. 
Relate to PI Table subjects: 
Not possible to recognise problem from drawings, so design review with 
Manufacturing would not have helped. 
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E. 1.3 Part A: Arising Report No 3 
Category:   Engineering Query QEngineering Change QScrap Q Re-Work 
QConcession QOther (state): 
Date raised: Various Date resolved Various Elapsed wkg days: 1 day to 4 
months 
Nature: 
Problems and errors with drawings, e. g. dimensions missing, notes and pictorial view 
not matching etc. 
11 instances raised total for Part A. For rest of work package average of 2 per part no. 
Action to resolve: 
WQN raised and submitted to Design for clarification of drawing. Once Design have 
looked at drawing an answer is issued. (4 of 11 not agreed) 
Design effort to resolve (man-hours): Estimate 10 hours per WQN, total 110 hours. 
Manufacturing man-hours to address (management/supervisor): Estimate 4 hours per 
WQN, total 44 hours. 
Manufacturing man-hours wasted (production): -- 
Wasted materials (cost) -- 
Tooling change (cost) -- 
Delay to production: Difficult to gauge or measure - NC proceeded at risk 
Comment by Manufacturing: 
Often the NC program was completed before WQN was answered, first part often 
manufactured and assumed that other problems would be put right for the next trial. 
Comment by Quality/Inspection: 
Often TTO report would include reference to the WQN, as the problem with the 
drawing was known, but this meant that the first part would be held waiting for the 
reply from Design. 
Comment by Design: 
Overcome by modelling ribs and creating 2D drawing. 
Comment by Design Liaison: 
`First article' inspection had been carried out with the original supplier. Previous 
suppliers all used the same machines and existing NC tapes and tools, and parts were 
accepted without drawings being updated. 
Relate to PI Table subjects: 
5,27 (for CMM) 
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E. 1.4 Part A: Arising Report No 4 
Category: QEngineering Query LiEngineering Change LjScrap Q Re-Work 
E. 1.1.1 DConcession   Other (state): Extra inspection and potential rework 
Date raised: -- Date resolved Elapsed wkg days: 
Nature: 
Web tolerancing expected to be too tight with current process 
(Note: Design uses web thickness to control weight) 
Action to resolve: 
Capability studies to take place, decision made after that to challenge whether such a 
tight tolerance is required. If so, then may be need to modify process to be capable. 
Design effort to resolve (man-hours): -- 
Manufacturing man-hours to address (management/supervisor): -- 
Manufacturing man-hours wasted (production): -- 
Wasted materials (cost) -- 
Tooling change ( cost) -- 
Delay to production: -- 
Comment by Manufacturing: 
This needs to be monitored. A decision can be made only after we get some results 
after testing. Capability of 5-axis machines not yet fully explored. 
Comment by Quality/Inspection: -- 
Comment by Design: 
Web thickness tolerance required to ensure reserve factors are maintained. Tolerance 
could be increased positively, but would increase Part weight. Prepared to allow use 
of General Notes for drawings from later design on this series of parts. 
Comment by (other): 
Relate to PI Table subjects 
9,10 
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E. 1.5 Part A: Arising Report No 5 
Category: []Engineering Query []Engineering Change []Scrap Q Re-Work 
  Concession []Other (state): 
Date raised: Various Date resolved: Various Elapsed wkg days: 3days 
Nature: 
Concessions raised for design features out of position according to general tolerancing 
specified. Tooling hole tolerance is too tight. 
12 concessions in total 
Action to resolve: 
Quality Inspector would first contact Concession Office to get concession Engineer to 
make assessment. If likely that concession would be accepted, then query note would 
be raised and other production operations would be done at risk of concession being 
refused. 
Design effort to resolve (man-hours): Estimate 6 hours per concession, total 72 hours. 
Manufacturing man-hours to address (management/supervisor): - Nil (concession 
paperwork raised in course of normal inspection) 
Manufacturing man-hours wasted (production): -- 
Wasted materials (cost) -- 
Tooling change ( cost) -- 
Delay to production: Difficult to gauge, as other work was done at risk 
Comment by Manufacturing: 
Part A is fit for function, but the standard for general tolerancing is not appropriate. It 
needs to be reviewed. If it is not changed, a technique sheet must be raised to cover 
the part. 
Comment by Quality/Inspection: 
While it is accepted that the part will fit and the error will not compromise 
performance, the standard must be worked. Compared to current supplier, the new 
parts are closer to the drawing. 
Comment by Design: 
See later design drawing set, where GD +T applied. 
Datum holes have positional tolerance of 1 mm (= ±0.5) and are dimensioned from 
nearest edge, which complies with tolerance standard. 
Comment by Eng Group Leader (Site B): 
Surprised that this has not been resolved with action from previous suppliers, since 
this is the 390th set! 
Relate to PI Table subjects: 
9,10,17 
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E. 2 External Supply - Hard metal 
E. 2.1 Pintle Fitting 
Description of part Name Size Material 
Pintle Fitting 760x600xl70 Ti 
Weight Assembly aircraft/project quantity/production 
76kgs rate I a/c per month (2 off per a/c) 
Classification: []new/prototype  derivative []improved version []change of manuf 
[]high volume   small batch Done-off 
Designed by: organisation: Company A Location: Site A 
Drawing/part number: Date: 
Manufactured by: organisation: Company A Location: Site C 
Manufacture Release - Inspected by: Location: Site C 
organisation Company B 
Acceptance for Assembly - Inspected by: Location: Site B 
organisation Company A (paperwork only) 
Process (type -- primary/secondary, treatment; new or familiar to manufacturer): 
4-axis rough machining of forged Ti billet leaving 3mm finish allowance / heat treat for 
stress relief/ 4/5 axis semi-finish /finish /shot peen /zinc spray /paint 
Issues raised during Supplier-in-Loop (SIL) working: 
-- (serial numbers of Table C. 2 issues applying to this part) 4,7 
BTP/BTT/SIL: SIL T3D CAD modelled? Y 
Time to first article, set up time, machining time: Total machining time = @35hrs + 
sets 
Note: trial part machined in aluminium. 
Questions: was first attempt in Ti successful? Yes 
-- Approx how many hours of rework were needed on first successful part? N/a' 
Could any problems have been foreseen/eliminated by ESI in design? 
Design of grease nipple hole 
Could a better way of making the part have been possible with design changes? 
If scanned faces had been allowed on angled flange tops, additional 5-axis operation 
could have been eliminated. 
-- what savings might have resulted? Less stages/set ups 
221 
E. 2.2 Pylon Bracket 
Description of part Name Size (eg bracket c) Material 
Pylon Bracket 640x600xl50 Ti 
Weight Assembly aircraft/project quantity/product 
30kgs (bracket c) 
ion rate I a/c per 
month (8 
brackets per a/c) 
Classification: Qnew/prototype   derivative Qimproved version Qchange of manuf 
Qhigh volume   small batch Qone-off 
Designed by: organisation: Company A Location: Site A 
Drawing/part number: Date: 
Manufactured by: organisation: Company B Location: Site C 
Manufacture Release - Inspected by: Location: Site C 
organisation Company B 
Acceptance for Assembly - Inspected by: Location: Site B 
organisation Company A (paperwork only) 
Process (type -- primary/secondary, treatment; new or familiar to manufacturer): 
4-axis rough machining of forged Ti billet leaving 3mm finish allowance / heat treat 
for stress relief / 4/5 axis semi-finish /finish / assemble sub /5 axis finish outside profile 
/ disassemble /shot peen / zinc spray / paint / assemble / in-line bore (4 details) 
Issues raised during Supplier-in-Loop (SIL) working: 
-- (serial numbers of issues in Table C. 2 applying to this part) 1,2,3 
- - BTP/BTT/SIL: SIL J 3 D-CAD modelled? Yes 
Time to first article, set up time, machining time: Total machining time = @35hrs + 
sets (per bracket) 
Note: trial part machined in Ti 
Questions: was first attempt in Ti successful? Yes 
-- Approx how many hours of rework were needed on first successful part? N/a 
Could any problems have been foreseenleliminated by ESI in design? 
Corner rads / ruled surfaces /5 axis landings 
Could a better way of making the part have been possible with design changes? 
Manufacturing process problems were averted by early liaison/design changes on the 
above issues . 
-- what savings might have resulted? N/a 
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E. 2.3 Jack Mounting 
Description of part Name Size Material 
Jack Mounting 440x l 90x230 Ti 
Weight Assembly Aircraft/project quantity/production 
18.7kgs rate 
I a/c per month 
2 off per a/c 
Classification: Qnew/prototype   derivative Qimproved version Qchange of manuf 
Qhigh volume   small batch Done-off 
Designed by: organisation: Company A Location: Site A 
Drawing/part number: Date: 
Manufactured by: organisation: Company B Location: Site C 
Manufacture Release - Inspected by: Location: Site C 
organisation Company B 
Acceptance for Assembly - Inspected by: Location: Site B 
organisation Company A (paperwork only) 
Process (type -- primary/secondary, treatment; new or familiar to manufacturer): 
4-axis rough machining of forged Ti billet leaving 3mm finish allowance: / heat treat 
for stress relief / 4/5 axis semi-finish /finish / shot peen / zinc spray / paint 
Issues raised during Supplier-in-Loop (SIL) working: 
-- (serial numbers of Table C. 2 issues applying to this part) 5,6 
BTP/BTT/SIL: SIL 3D CAD modelled? Yes 
Time to first article, set up time, machining time: Total machining time = @14hrs + 
sets 
First tape prove in Ti . 
Questions: was first attempt in Ti successful? Yes 
-- Approx how many hours of rework were needed on first successful part? N/a 
Could any problems have been foreseen/eliminated by ESI in design? 
Yes - model should have been created to nominal tolerance for manufacture (lack of 2D 
drawings to highlight ++tolerances ) 
Could a better way of making the part have been possible with design changes? 
Rad between lug profile and component front edge . Larger rad (i. e. 16.5 or 21) would have allowed the full profile to be rolled. Because of small rad (12mm), alternative 
method had to be used. 
-- What savings might have resulted? Reduced run time and no additional tool 
requirement 
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E. 3 External Supply: Composites 
Description of part Name Size Material 
Parts C Composite Panels From 0.5M to 1.5M Carbon/Kevlar/ and 
(4 Off Each Hand) Glasscloth/ Al foil 
Weight Assembly Aircraft/project quantity/production 
From 1.5 to 6 kgs rate 
1 a/c set per 
month 
Classification: anew/prototype   derivative improved version Jchange of manuf 
Qhigh volume   small batch none-off 
Designed by: organisation: Company A Location: Site A 
Drawing/part number(s): Date: 
Manufactured by: organisation: Company B Location: Site C 
Manufacture Release - Inspected by: Location: Site C 
organisation Company B 
Acceptance for Assembly - Inspected by: Location: Site B 
organisation Company A (paperwork only) 
Process (type -- primary/secondary, treatment; new or familiar to manufacturer): 
Cut material/lay up in mould with pre-formed honeycomb inserts/vacuum 
bag/autoclave cure/additional lay up and cure of foil layer/ trim perimeter with ICY 5- 
axis machine/ultrasonic test-inspection /paint 
Issues raised during Supplier-in-Loop (SIL) working: 
-- (serial numbers of Table D. 3 issues applying to this part) 1-13 
Arisings See Section D. 2.4.5 for details and observations 
BTP/BTT/SIL: SIL 3D CAD modelled? Yes 
Time to first article, set up time, machining time: 
Total manufacturing time =3 to 8 days per panel 
Questions: were first attempts successful? Yes 
Could any problems have been foreseen/eliminated by ESI in design? Yes 
Could a better way of making the part have been possible with design changes? Yes 
Question: would earlier discussion with Design have led to Model build up that was 
easier for NC programming, tooling and subsequent manufacture? Yes 
-- what savings might have resulted? MANPOWER SAVINGS 
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